The Russian Geopolitical Approach: Deterrence, Coercion, and Revision of the International Order

The war in Ukraine has highlighted a deep divide between Russia’s strategic vision and that of the West.

At the heart of this confrontation lies a different conception of security, deterrence, and geopolitical legitimacy. While the West continues to view the expansion of NATO and the European Union as instruments of democratic stabilization, Moscow interprets these processes as existential threats to its own vital space and sovereignty.

Russia’s strategy is based on a comprehensive view of national security, which includes projecting influence over post-Soviet states. The concept of the “near abroad” (blizhnee zarubezh’e) constitutes the geopolitical perimeter that Moscow considers essential for its survival as a great power. NATO’s eastward expansion, beginning with the 2008 Bucharest summit, is seen as a violation of the balance established after the Cold War.

Moscow is pursuing a strategy of multiple restoration: territorial (annexation of Crimea), political (interference in Eurasian democratic processes), military (creation of bases and presence in foreign theaters), symbolic (revaluation of imperial power), and normative (challenge to liberal international law).

Contrary to Western doctrine, which distinguishes between deterrence and compulsion, Russia adopts a hybrid approach in which threats and action are closely intertwined.

Russian deterrence is not only preventive, but also reactive and offensive. It primarily includes the nuclear threat as a means of extended deterrence and containment of NATO reactions, but also makes use of large-scale exercises, cyberattacks, and war rhetoric to generate strategic uncertainty. Finally, it considers the use of diplomatic coercion to obtain concessions without the direct use of force.

According to Dmitry Adamsky’s analysis, Putin’s ultimatum in December 2021 was not intended as a prelude to an invasion, but as strategic pressure to obtain legal guarantees on halting NATO expansion. The failure of this coercive communication, interpreted in the West as a threat of invasion, triggered the armed escalation.

From the Kremlin’s point of view, the West violated the post-Cold War strategic balance by rejecting any proposal for structural compromise. According to Moscow, the failure to comply with the Minsk Agreements and Ukraine’s persistent desire to integrate into the West reinforced the narrative of encirclement.

The intervention in Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 represent three phases of the same geostrategy: to show that Moscow is ready to use force to defend its sphere of influence and prevent a geopolitical shift in favor of the West.

A useful comparison can be made between Russia’s strategy and the dynamics between Iran and Israel. Both actors use force in a calibrated manner to send strategic signals to their adversary. Israel has employed targeted attacks to deter Tehran from developing nuclear weapons, while Iran has responded with proportional retaliation.

This model of ‘active deterrence’ is also present today in Russia’s posture, which alternates nuclear threats, military maneuvers, and rhetorical negotiations to maintain the strategic initiative and test the limits of Western reaction.

Russian geostrategy does not aim at a simple tactical victory on the ground, but at a transformation of the rules of the international game. The use of force is intended as a means of delegitimizing the liberal order based on sovereignty, international law, and collective security. The demand for “removal of the causes of the conflict” is tantamount to a demand for Ukraine’s political surrender and acceptance of Russian revanchism.

For Moscow, Ukraine is the symbolic and concrete battlefield on which to reaffirm its status as a great power. For the West, the challenge is to understand that deterrence is only effective if it is communicated in an intercultural manner, adapted to the perceptions of the other, and supported by a coherent and multilevel strategic vision.

The most serious mistake the West can make is to consider Russia an irrational or isolated actor. Its geostrategy shows consistency when viewed through the lens of its culture.

The most serious mistake the West can make is to consider Russia an irrational or isolated actor. Its geostrategy shows consistency when viewed through the lens of its strategic culture, imperial history, and multipolar worldview.

This article was translated from the Italian.

The article was first published on July 5, 2025 by the PRP Channel.