Confident Enough to Disagree: What NATO 3.0 Can Learn from How the Cold War Ended
Near the end of his Ditchley Foundation Annual Lecture on September 16, 2026, NATO Secretary General…
Read More »MUMS-14 and the Impact Force: Closing the Gap Steel Knight Exposed
On June 16, 2026, under a covered pavilion at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, the…
Read More »Insourcing versus Integration: Toyota, BYD, and Two Roads to the Global Market
In a recent Defense.info piece, “BYD, Batteries, and the Architecture of Dependence,” I looked at BYD…
Read More »From Truck to Toolkit: AUKUS Payloads and the Hull Gap Decade
Australia’s first public unveiling of the AUKUS Pillar II payloads for Ghost Shark, Speartooth and Bluebottle…
Read More »NATO 3.0 and the Unfinished Pillar: What Rutte Did Not Say at Ditchley
When NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte delivered the Ditchley Foundation’s 62nd Annual Lecture on September 16,…
Read More »Building Depth: How Indo-Pacific Allies Are Hardening for a Long Contest
The headlines in the Indo-Pacific tend to focus on the visible: carrier movements, missile tests, coast…
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The MV-75 Cheyenne story usually gets told through the big numbers: speed, range, the schedule and the budget lines that will decide whether the Army finally fields a new generation of vertical lift. Those numbers matter. But a recent Army account of the program's sixth Special User Evaluation points to something less visible and arguably more important: the Army is trying to build the operational force around the aircraft before the aircraft arrives. That is the real test for a program carrying the weight of Army aviation history. Programs do not fail only because of engineering problems. They fail when requirements drift away from users, when sustainment is treated as an afterthought, and when the institutions around a platform lose a shared sense of what is being built...