Capital Ships and the Houthi Challenge
Recently, I spoke with my friend and colleague Lt. Gen.(Retired) Preziosa about various strategic developments. And as we did so he posed the following question: Did I think that recent events in the Red Sea indicated the end of legacy maritime littoral operations and the role of surface ships in enforcing order in the littorals?
Perhaps one could accuse him of bias in posing the question as he is an ex-Chef of Staff of the Italian Air Force, but frankly, the question is dead on. Without question the Red Sea events and the Iranians have changed littoral operations calculus of operations.
Given the destructive disruption by combined maritime and air unmanned and autonomous systems, an adversary can launch such capabilities against an opponent operating its forces to try to project power from “anti-access/area denial” enclave. And by so doing, they can then organize their longer-range strike forces to take advantage of the adversaries need to deal with the chaos unleashed by the unmanned clusters of projected forces.
How do capital ships deal with this challenge?
Jennifer Parker, the noted Australian naval analyst, in her presentation to last September’s Sir Richard William Foundation, provided a thoughtful answer to the challenge facing capital ships in an environment like the Red Sea or the Black Sea. The bottom line of her analysis was that the new technologies and approaches had a clear impact on capital ship naval vessels, and with relevant defence measures, technologies and relevant training, capital ships could still operate effectively in the littorals.
But the point can be put bluntly: you need to adapt your ready force to deal with new technologies, new con-ops and technologies.
In his presentation to the recent Surface Navy Association meeting last week in Washington, Vice Adm. Brendan McLane, commander, Naval Surface Force, highlighted the Red Sea challenges as an example of U.S. Naval successful adaptation.
In an article released by the U.S. Navy, the speech was discussed at length.
The Admiral was quoted as saying: “We’ve learned a lot from the last year in the Red Sea, and from recent years of fleet experiments with directed energy weapons and with unmanned surface vessels, and from our recent study of amphibious ship maintenance,” said McLane. “All of this rapid learning has been applied to our update of the Competitive Edge strategy. Thanks to the hard work and collaboration with our Flags, retired and active, especially NAVSEA, SURFLANT, N96, and SMWDC, we have revised our roadmap to achieve and sustain 80% of our warships in a combat surge ready state by 2027.”
Competitive Edge refers to the U.S. Navy strategy to enhance fleet readiness. But to do so in the kind of environment which they had to deal with in terms of the technology available to the Houthis meant upgrading the shipe, training for these types of contested operations, and having the kind of C2 and ISR which enabled fleet success.
One of the points Parker made in her presentation was simply to do what the Admiral was emphasizing meant that surface fleets needed to be upgraded much more rapidly than in the Cold War period, for example.
While there is much emphasis on the need to build more capital ships, one challenge to funding such an effort, in my view, will be the ongoing investments and upgrades and the training of the sailors to deal with a period of rapid technological change being thrown at the surface fleete from not only peer competitors but small nations and groups who possess capability to disrupt maritime trade and to threaten capital ships.
Notably, allied combat surface ships by in large did not join in because of the lack of necessary upgrades.
Vice Adm. Brendan McLane highlighted the key importance of training in the successful Red Sea operations.
“Something that I think that gets lost in after action reports, news stories, and post-deployment briefs is the whole ship effort required in combat. On Spruance, it wasn’t just the Sailors on the controlling stations on the Bridge and in CIC. Supply was on hand bringing everyone food on station. The Chaplain was roving, offering spiritual strength. Sailors literally did not want to turn over the watch, because they wanted to be in the seat to defend the ship. Even once off watch, they would come back to check on the next section. Truly a whole ship effort, everyone involved in the fight from the bottom of their hearts.
“And Spruance wasn’t content to just stop there. Their motto of “Launch the Attack,” commits them to an excellence built on the solid foundation of constant improvement. That’s why every tactician in the fleet can read their war diary on SMWDC’s Collaboration at Sea site. Now every warship can learn and improve their own combat effectiveness from Spruance’s experience.
“This is what you can expect from a warship literally stacked with WTIs, to include the CO and the XO. Because this is the winning readiness model: the right leadership, stellar tacticians, and a warship built and sustained to fight and win at sea. This is our Sailors embodying the centuries-old legacy of Navy wins. This is sharpening the sword in action. And our sharp swords become our legacy.”
He then provided the most authoritative presentation to date from the U.S. Navy on the Red Sea operations.
We’ve had 26 ships so far operate in the Red Sea Weapons Engagement Zone, and thanks to the efforts of many in this room, we’ve rapidly learned a tremendous amount, allowing us to better prepare the next deploying warships like the ones in NIMITZ CSG starting C2X next week. Last year, I told you the story of USS Carney. What it took our enterprise to bring her back from Rota, modernize her in Mayport, and prepare for employment in the Basic, Advanced, and Integrated Training Phases. And how on deployment not a minute was ever wasted, training and self-assessment continued everyday. CNY returned home safely this past Spring and all told, after a 235-day deployment, the ship was in 55 engagements and fired 71 missiles. The CO, Jeremy Robertson is now at SMWDC and working on SWATTs to advance our competitive edge of tactical development. He is truly investing his battle experience into our Sailors and Warships.
The fight in the Red Sea has tactically evolved. The first phase from the early outset of hostilities in October ’23, saw largely inexpensive drones and cruise missiles shot at irregular intervals. Beginning in late Jan ’24, we observed a marked escalation in the scale and complexity of enemy techniques and capabilities, with the employment of anti-ship ballistic missiles, and roving, one-way UAVs in pre-assigned kill boxes. We’ve sped-up our own learning and teaching so that our deploying ships are always prepared with the latest TTPs before they go over the horizon.
All of this is possible because SMWDC and our industry partners created a robust operational feedback loop. This used to require a ship to be pierside, physically removing the tapes and shipping them to Dahlgren. Now, after a battle, a warship sends off a large data package containing their detect to engage sequence over-the-air. This rapid data transfer is followed by expedient analysis at NSWC, Dahlgren, which is now running 24/7. Within 48 hours, they provide our Warfighters with rapid feedback on their engagement and actionable information for the whole Force on how to best counter the tactics and threats that we’re having. This rapid learning is reinforced and spread by leaders like CDR Robertson, who incorporate it into tactical education for our warships during SWATT and C2X. Our ships practice scenarios involving threat-profiles and kinematics informed by the latest real-world action. This operational, fully informed feedback loop continues to drive our competitive edge beyond the exercises, all the way into our schoolhouses at Surface Combat Systems Training Command and Surface Warfare Schools Command.
I’d like to spend a moment with you on what is often referred to as the “cost curve,” or the relationship between the cost of the weapons the Houthis are firing and the cost of the missiles we are intercepting them with. There are several points worth making here.
First, none of our Commanding Officers are worried about the cost curve, nor should they be. They have other things to worry about, like what’s for breakfast. The cost of the missile that they are going to shoot is not one of them.
Second, increasingly, more modest threats are being engaged with guns and electronic countermeasures and aircraft, both fixed wing and rotary. Proper threat assessment and operational feedback allow our Commanders to make the best tactical decisions. As an example of engaging with guns, take USS O’Kane for instance. O’Kane protected a merchant convoy against hostile UAVs and employed their 5-inch gun to successfully defeat the threat. This is their fo’c’sle on the morning after. I love this story because it was a whole ship effort. Off watch personnel, including 4 cross-trained Sonar Technicians and 3 junior Machinist Mates who happened to be lifting weights in Forward Pallet staging when shooting began, took the initiative and worked the early hours of the morning moving 5-inch shells from Deep Mag to refill the loader-drum. Volunteers pitching in on a working party led by a junior GM2 kept O’Kane seamlessly in the fight. Those are America’s Warfighting Sailors.
Also on the topic of the cost curve, in collaboration with our teammates at Integrated Warfare Systems and the Rapid Capabilities Office, our destroyers have tested several new C-UAS systems, each bringing unique tactical capabilities to the fight. Through an accelerated capability introduction process, to include onboard testing and training alongside development of enhanced tactics, techniques and procedures, I expect several of these systems to be deployed soon. As technical maturity increases, I’m confident we’ll have even more cost-effective systems available in the counter unmanned systems fight across the entire force.
The surface action certainly demonstrated that the Navy is working its capability to deliver an interactive defensive-offensive integrated force capacity which is crucial to the future role of the surface navy.
In an interesting article published on 14 January 2025 by Geoff Ziezulewicz, the author underscored the following about the Admiral’s presentation:
Top U.S. military leaders have also in recent months expressed concern that munitions fired in the Red Sea and elsewhere are “eating into” critical munitions stockpiles needed for a future Pacific fight with China, and the sea service has sought extra funding from Congress in the past year to restore these depleted stocks.
On Tuesday, McLane, known in the community as “SWO Boss,” cited the Arleigh Burke class destroyer USS Spruance (DDG-111) as an example of what sailors are facing in those waters. The warship got home from a Red Sea deployment with the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) Carrier Strike Group (CSG) in December.
“They were in a fight where they shot down three anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM), three anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) and seven one-way [unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs],” McLane said. “So that’s how it kind of rolls up.”
The combat capabilities on such warships are controlled by a Combat Information Center (CIC), manned by sailors and officers who are being tested in ways a CIC has never been tested before, as TWZ reported earlier this month.
McLane added that the Navy’s missile expenditure in the conflict is within “the historical norm.”
“We’ve done the analysis with what we used to shoot in World War II, and we’re at about two rounds per incoming missile,” McLane said.
The Admiral stated certainly a true point: “None of our Commanding Officers are worried about the cost curve, nor should they be.”
That makes sense for the combat warrior, it makes no sense for overall fleet operations. The expenditure of weapons used against the Houthis dramatically reduced the arsenal available to the U.S. Navy. Such actions could deplete significant capability when a peer adversary decides to strike.
There clearly needs to be a much more cost-effective set of options than sending a key capital ship to do this task and to put itself into harm’s way thereby reducing the capability avaiable to deal with a major power.
But then again what the Houthi’s have demonstrated is that the term peer competitor may no longer be synonymous with the term “Great Power.”
Featured image: Vice Adm. Brendan McLane, commander, Naval Surface Forces, delivers a status of the force update at the Surface Navy Association’s (SNA) 37th National Symposium. The symposium brings together joint experts and decision-makers in the military, industry, and Congress to discuss how the Surface Force is a critical element of national defense and security. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Claire M. Alfaro)
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