Deep Fake and the Air and Missile Defence Network

Among the most consequential developments within the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is the integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) into defence technologies and networking systems, substantially enhancing the operational efficiency of modern weapons platforms.

Yet AI-driven systems carry inherent vulnerabilities. One such vulnerability is the deep fake, digitally fabricated content capable of undermining national security.

Deep fakes have emerged as a growing concern across the security landscape, and nowhere is that concern more acute than in the domain of air and missile defence, particularly given India’s complex threat environment.

What is deep fake?

A deep fake is digitally manipulated content, video, audio, or imagery, engineered to spread misinformation. State and non-state actors alike can exploit deep fake technology to fabricate situations or statements with malicious intent.

These capabilities are enabled by machine learning, and deep learning in particular allows adversaries to reconstruct or alter events in ways that serve their strategic objectives.

How deep learning is used in missile and missile defence network?

Deep learning has fundamentally transformed missile and missile defence networks, converting them into adaptive, intelligent systems capable of operating across diverse threat environments. These technologies translate real-time situational data into decisive operational outputs.

A critical challenge in any missile engagement is the accurate prediction of flight trajectories, which can deviate significantly due to external variables. Deep learning addresses this by enabling precise trajectory analysis of adversary missile systems, thereby reducing the risk of catastrophic miscalculation.

Neural networks further enhance performance by allowing missile systems to distinguish between genuine targets and countermeasures, narrowing the margin for error and compressing engagement timelines.

Deep fake in missile and missile defence network

Deep fake technology exploits the same deep learning techniques that empower missile defence systems, but turns them to destabilizing effect. When introduced into missile and missile defence strategies, fabricated content can generate dangerous confusion and miscalculation.

Even a conventional pre-emptive strike could escalate into full-scale conflict if decision-makers are acting on falsified threat assessments shaped by deep fake content.

Fabricated audio or video of nuclear-armed state leaders appearing to authorize the use of nuclear weapons could be generated and disseminated with relative ease, even in scenarios that carry no genuine justification for such action.

In active combat operations, deep fakes could be deployed to depict the destruction of critical assets that remain, in reality, fully intact. A state possessing such an asset might leverage fabricated evidence of its destruction to justify offensive strikes; conversely, adversaries might circulate such imagery to erode public morale and political will.

Information warfare is a central pillar of hybrid conflict and has grown increasingly dominant in contemporary security affairs. Deep fakes simulating missile strikes are being used with greater frequency to spread disinformation and degrade the security environment.

As the 2026 Iran-Israel-U.S. campaign illustrates, could also become a norm for content creators such content has also become a vehicle for monetization among opportunistic content creators.

States may also exploit deep fake technology during missile tests to obscure their true capabilities from adversaries. In crisis situations, fabricated imagery of attacks could be used to trigger false alarms, overwhelming air and missile defence networks with responses to threats that do not exist.

This strain would be particularly severe given the already-demanding challenge of simultaneously intercepting drones and missiles. Beyond simulated strikes, deep fake footage depicting the elimination of senior missile force commanders could generate significant strategic and psychological disruption.

In an active conflict environment, fabricated footage of missile strikes can trigger panic-driven civilian behavior, including the stockpiling of essential goods. The resulting shortages of food, medicine, and basic hygiene supplies can compound the humanitarian burden of conflict.

Social media remains the primary vector for the rapid dissemination of deep fake content relating to missile strikes and interceptions. Such material spreads quickly and is frequently accepted as authentic.

As AI capabilities grow more sophisticated, distinguishing fabricated content from genuine footage will become increasingly difficult not only for ordinary citizens, but at times for policy makers as well.

Conclusion

In an era of accelerating technological change, military planners and policy makers face mounting challenges from adversarial applications of AI-driven tools.

Deep fakes represent one such challenge, one that is not confined to the military domain. Ordinary individuals can generate and share this content through social media, amplifying instability far beyond what any single state actor could achieve alone.

Addressing this challenge will require coordinated efforts spanning technical, doctrinal, and policy dimensions.

Debalina Ghoshal is the author of the book Role of Ballistic and Cruise Missiles in International Security.

She is our regular commentator on missile issues as well.