Two Pipelines, One Problem: Quinn and McCoy on Training the Combat Aviator

11/19/2026
By Robbin Laird

Two commanders, one in blue and one in Navy service dress, are running the machines that produce America’s combat aviators. Both inherited pipelines built for a different threat. Both have spent several years fighting chronic underproduction. And both, when asked what the real challenge is, give the same first answer: it is the people who teach, not the technology that supports them.

Lt. Gen. Clark Quinn told the Mitchell Institute on November 16 that AETC’s technology “is underpinned by instructors and educators and recruiters,” and that it is the human, not the technology. Rear Adm. McCoy described CNATRA to me in August as a conveyor belt in a factory, in which every pool of stagnation signals a machine that is not working, and in which instructors are the scarcest and hardest-worked leg.

The agreement is real, but the two commanders are at different points in the same story, they own different pieces of the problem, and they draw their lines in different places.

This article compares how they see the challenge across seven dimensions.

Two Production Machines, Two Production Equations

Quinn’s frame is a production equation. AETC produced 1,518 pilots in fiscal 2026, the first time the Air Force has verifiably hit 1,500 since 1991. He treats flying hours as an input to production: hours per student, re-flies, weather attrition, instructor support sorties. Capacity is aircraft, instructors, hours and bases, and at 1,500 a year he calls it essentially maximum production for today’s fleet and facilities.

McCoy’s frame is a three-legged stool: airplanes, instructors and students. None of the legs, he said, is where it needs to be. There are not enough airplanes or instructors, and paradoxically too many students, not because CNATRA is over-accessing but because time-to-train has stretched until students pool rather than flow.

The structure is the same. The difference is the metric. Quinn’s headline number is the annual count. McCoy has deliberately moved off the production percentage. The prior decade’s logic produced 105 percent of requirement by 2024, reportedly across every type-model-series, and the result was not a solved problem but a new bottleneck downstream. McCoy now measures time-to-train against entitlement: the interval between commissioning and arrival in the Fleet that the syllabus says a student is owed.

That difference matters for how the two services read their own success. Quinn can say he has met the goal and now turns to quality. McCoy cannot yet say the pipeline works, because a number met by an exhausted instructor cadre flying seven days a week is not a stable result.

The Seam After Wings

The most striking convergence is where each commander locates the next problem.

Both place it immediately after the student earns wings.

Quinn said his greatest concern is the break between graduation and the formal training unit. Leaders chose, three or four years ago, to “pressurize the system” by making 1,500 pilots before building absorption capacity, partly because few believed the number was reachable. Now a winged pilot waiting for a seat is burning an active-duty service commitment without being productive, and one who reaches an operational unit not ready to fly them has the same problem. Quinn was careful to say that absorption is beyond his purview, and that the Air Force A3 and the Chief of Staff are working on it.

McCoy described the same dynamic in Navy terms. Fixing production in the earlier stages exposed the constraint at the next: the fleet replacement squadrons are now the ones underproducing, a new log-jam just before a winged aviator becomes useful. Students reach their first Fleet tour late, career milestones do not move, and junior officers are pulled for disassociated sea tours or to fill gaps before they have delivered a full production tour. The officers who would have come back as instructors are the ones diverted, so, in McCoy’s words, the system feeds on itself.

Both men are producers whose product only becomes combat power in someone else’s hands. The organizational answers differ. In May the Air Force moved the F-16, F-35 and MQ-9 formal training units from AETC to Air Combat Command, so the operational command shapes pilots from day one in the front-line aircraft. Quinn said mobility and AFSOC units stayed because their owning commands saw no benefit in moving them. McCoy is the single accountable flag officer for Street to Fleet, but his authority stops where the pipeline changes owner. NIFE and the schools command sit under Naval Education and Training Command, and once an aviator reaches a replacement squadron they belong to a Type Wing commander. He works the whole enterprise through influence, not command.

The lesson is that neither training command can fix its own throughput by looking only inside its own gate.

Production Versus Standards

Quinn and McCoy both reject the idea that scale and quality are a trade, but they approach it from opposite directions.

Quinn said the focus now is “refining the training to ensure the quality of our graduates matches the scale.” He is a strong supporter of competency-based training, and inclined to end a six-month course at five months if competence is shown, because “nobody joins the Air Force to be in training.” His caution is that competence is not proficiency. A T-6 student who lands perfectly twice has shown competency, but nothing in the syllabus has put him on a wet runway in a 17-knot crosswind. The syllabus needs enough events to build experience to fall back on.

McCoy came back to standards more than any other topic. His fix for the pipeline is faster triggers to attrition, so that struggling students reach a review board sooner and leadership makes the call earlier. Attrition in advanced training will still happen, he said, but at lower rates because students reaching that stage have cleared a higher bar. He described a reciprocal contract with students: he owes them the best training environment available and clarity about expectations, and they owe full effort every day. In his winging speech, as reported, he said “good enough” is never acceptable.

The contrast is instructive. Quinn’s tool for protecting quality is accumulated events, enough repetitions that experience backs up demonstrated competency. McCoy’s is early, firm selection, which puts the standard at the gate rather than relying on time to build it. Quinn is working to compress time in the syllabus once competency is shown. McCoy is working to compress time between stages while holding the standard fixed. Each fears the other’s failure mode, which is why both said the standard and the number must both be met.

Instructors: The Linchpin and the Bottleneck

Quinn’s standard for instructors is a wingman test. Instructors returning from a major weapon system are asked to graduate students they would want on their wing, or as their co-pilot. If they would not, then “we need to adjust what we’re doing,” largely through pilot instructor training at Randolph. They come from the operational Air Force, typically for three years or less, and Quinn depends on a partnership with the Air Force Personnel Center and the other major commands that supply them.

McCoy describes the same linchpin under much greater strain. His instructor cadre is built from first-sea-tour rollers, permanent instructors who have left the normal command track, a reserve component, Marine Corps instructors and some Coast Guard. He leans harder than before on selectively retained graduates, high performers kept as instructors while they wait for a replacement squadron seat, with 15 Marine instructors of that kind flying jets at Kingsville and Meridian. He is expanding contract instructor pilots into primary training. And the cadre is, in his account, flying seven days a week to reach 105 percent. He called being a CNATRA instructor one of the hardest jobs in naval aviation.

The pattern in the Navy is a cycle: earlier underproduction thinned the year groups that would have become instructors, and late arrival at the Fleet keeps diverting the next ones. The Air Force’s version is milder because the instructors come back from operational tours rather than being drawn from the student output itself, but Quinn also named instructor shortages as a long-standing constraint that FUPT was built to overcome.

One point of agreement is the value of operational experience. Quinn wants instructors who are relevant. McCoy expects aviators returning from recent deployments as real combat veterans to move into his instructor cadre, and said there is no substitute for a student sitting across a briefing table from someone who has employed weapons in combat. Neither wants to run a training system staffed by people who have not recently fought.

Outsourcing: Where Each Draws the Line

Both commanders use outside capacity, and both defend it, but for different reasons.

Quinn’s front end is civilian. Students now arrive from Part 141 flight schools holding a private pilot certificate, an instrument rating and a multi-engine rating, with about 110 flight hours. His logic is that a combat-ready C-17 or F-22 pilot should not be teaching an ILS approach, a universal skill. Offload weather, GPS and navaids to civilian instructors, and military instructors can concentrate on low-level flying, formation and aerobatics. He anticipated the objection that the world’s best air force should not need civilian schools and answered that this is how the force was built in World War II.

McCoy said he does not want to outsource large parts of the training enterprise more than necessary. Naval aviation, in his framing, is not a normal air force: flying from ships, operating inside a carrier strike group and supporting amphibious groups impose requirements a generic model does not capture. He uses outside capacity in a bounded way. In the contract-operated rotary primary program, an active-duty O-5 supervises, and CNATRA sends personnel through frequently so students see people in Navy and Marine Corps flight suits who can carry the culture the syllabus alone will not. The program also relieves T-6B hours for students who need them.

The difference is the unit of what counts as transferable. For Quinn, basic airmanship is common across the profession and can be outsourced. For McCoy, the culture and the ship-based mission are not common, so the outsourcing needs a Navy presence inside it. The Air Force can carve a clean line between generic and military-specific flying. The Navy’s line runs through the middle of the carrier environment. Read that way, McCoy’s line governs who owns the syllabus, the standard and the culture, not where the aircraft and simulators come from.

Technology: Assist, Don’t Replace, and Build It In

On technology the two commanders are nearly in unison. Quinn said immersive technology should assist instructors, not replace them, and described adaptive tutoring that sends a student back to the material without an instructor watching. McCoy described live-virtual-constructive training as complementary to flight hours: ground systems build habits so that students reach the aircraft ready and get first-pass yield instead of re-flying events. Both used nearly the same phrase about integration. At AFA in 2025, Quinn said LVC “has to be built in as opposed to bolted on.” McCoy said LVC delivers its value only when woven into the curriculum, not treated as a module added to an unchanged syllabus.

Both also face aging trainers and platform recapitalization. Quinn is building toward the T-7A with initial operational capability planned for August 2027, depending on 14 aircraft, proficient instructors and an expanded envelope, only one of which he controls. His T-38 is around 50 percent mission capable, with its engines overhauled again and again, and expected to fly to about 2037 or 2038. McCoy retired the TH-57 for the glass-cockpit TH-73A, is replacing the T-44C with the T-54A, and has groundwork under way for a successor to the T-45, whose problems drove much of the strike-pipeline underproduction. Both are pushing modern cockpits earlier so training aircraft resemble operational ones.

But they stand at different stages. Quinn warned against swapping the T-7 in for the T-38 in the existing syllabus: “we are really going to miss the mark.” He is already asking what replaces the third of the T-38 syllabus that goes to not breaking the airplane. He wants to move basic fighter maneuver sorties out of the formal training units into the T-7. That is a design argument made from a position of having hit the production goal.

McCoy was explicit about sequencing. Fixing the current production shortfall is a precondition for, not a substitute for, a dynamic, threat-responsive training system. A system in crisis makes innovation hard because so much energy goes to keeping the machine running. His stated ambition is to hand his successor a pipeline with the right airplanes, the right instructors and time-to-train at entitlement, so that the next officer can accelerate modernization on a working production line.

In one sense, Quinn is where McCoy hopes to be. In another, Quinn’s modernization still depends on aircraft and test progress he does not control, and McCoy’s triage still includes real modernization in parallel.

What They Are Training the Pilot to Be

The deepest comparison is about the human product.

Quinn wants a systems integrator, systems manager and decision maker. The T-38 is a 1950s design that taught Century Series fighter handling, none of which applies to today’s fighters. What new pilots need is the ability to manage information and decide, and the trainers cannot yet teach it, so the first exposure comes in the F-22 or KC-46 schoolhouse. He is also looking upstream: other air forces are testing candidates for decision-making over flying aptitude, and he is aware the U.S. has not made that shift. He frames the broader mission as forging air-minded warriors with a mission-command mindset, and recalled that Marines say “I’m a Marine” while Airmen say “I’m a pilot.”

McCoy approaches the same question through standards and culture. His method, which he said he has used at every command, is reverse engineering: start from what a first-tour junior officer must be able to do in the Fleet, then work backward through the replacement squadron, advanced and primary so each stage builds the habits the next requires. His winging message was that expectations “skyrocket” the morning after wings, and that naval aviation relies on “mutual trust and brutal honesty.” The age of urgency, as he put it, leaves no clean line between crisis and peacetime, and requires a dynamic training system, not a custodial one.

The overlap is that both see the pilot’s cognitive role changing while the foundation of discipline stays. Quinn emphasizes what the aircraft cannot yet teach and the selection methods behind it. McCoy emphasizes how each stage should be derived from the demands of the next, and how culture carries the standard. Each supplies a missing half of the other’s view. Quinn’s decision-maker needs McCoy’s reverse engineering from the Fleet; McCoy’s reverse engineering needs Quinn’s clarity about what the new job actually is.

What the Comparison Shows

The following is the author’s reading, not either commander’s wording.

First, throughput is a system property. Both found that fixing one stage exposed the next, and that the critical seam is the one after wings, where one command hands to another.

Second, the instructor is the scarcest asset in both services, and the shortage reproduces itself. The Navy shows what happens when it is allowed to compound.

Third, sequencing separates the two. The Air Force, having met its number, is moving to content. The Navy is still stabilizing. The risk for the Air Force is declaring victory on volume while the real test, graduates who can manage a fifth- and sixth-generation fight, lies ahead. The risk for the Navy is that triage consumes the time to design the future.

Fourth, standards are where the two meet. Quinn asks whether graduates would be good enough to fly with. McCoy asks whether a winged aviator is ready for the jump the moment they reach the Fleet. Both questions are the same one.

That sets up the next comparison, with the work on air combat training in my book on training the air combat pilot in the 21st century, which pressed the case that training must be built around the high-end, networked fight rather than adapted to it afterward.

Forging the Combat Pilot: Lt. Gen. Clark Quinn on the Training Challenge

The Age of Urgency: Rear Adm. McCoy on Rebuilding the Navy’s Aviator Pipeline