Import the Yard, Not the Hull: Toti’s Answer to the Frigate Question
At his Senate Armed Services Committee nomination hearing for undersecretary of the Navy, Toti drew a line that the current shipbuilding argument has mostly blurred.
On one side is building warships in foreign yards, which he declined to back beyond auxiliaries. On the other is a foreign shipbuilder investing in a new American yard devoted to frigates and large surface combatants. That second path, he argued, is the fastest route to the ships the Navy needs, and he put the operational case in one sentence: “We have destroyers today doing frigate work.”
According to Stancy’s account, Sen. Angus King observed that the proposal differs from building ships overseas, and said the conversation would continue.
The distinction matters because Congress is legislating against the first idea while the second has barely been named. In August, the president signed a memo broadening the “Finland model,” the approach used for the Coast Guard’s Arctic Security Cutters, in which the first ships are built abroad and follow-on ships at home. Under the memo, foreign builders that commit to moving future work to the United States could build up to two ships in each of three classes at their home yards first. The administration has also asked Congress to let the Navy commission foreign yards for two surface combatants and two auxiliaries.
The two chambers have answered differently. The House’s FY27 NDAA bars foreign construction of both warships and combat logistics ships. The Senate Armed Services version limits warship construction abroad but permits up to two auxiliaries from foreign yards that invest in the US maritime industrial base. The final bill has not passed. Toti’s answer sits in the space between those texts: auxiliaries abroad as a bounded concession, combatants at home, but built in a yard whose process is borrowed from the best in the world.
Stancy reports that Toti singled out Korean and Japanese yards as the world’s best at production, while being careful to add that this was a judgment about production and not about the quality of the ships. The precision is the point. He is not proposing to import a design, a hull or a fleet. He is proposing to import a production system: the sequencing, the workforce practices and the discipline of serial output, and he argued that bringing those skills to American soil would strengthen the American workforce and industrial capacity.
There is a precedent in the administration’s own thinking. Acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao told lawmakers in May that the United States wants foreign yards to invest in US shipbuilding, and pointed to South Korea’s Hanwha, which bought a Philadelphia shipyard in 2024. The Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Daryl Caudle, said the idea would get a full hard look from him and his advisers. His May message to Congress was blunt about the pressure: ships, now, and capacity.
The administration is still keeping the harder option open. It has requested $1.85 billion in reconciliation funding to study using foreign yards for US warships and possibly to pay for an initial vessel built in Japan or South Korea. Toti’s testimony suggests a path that avoids that politics altogether, which may be why King noticed it.
The fiscal context makes a new yard harder, not easier. In the Congressional Budget Office assessment that Stancy reported on November 20, the Navy’s 2027 shipbuilding plan would average about $53.8 billion a year in appropriations. That is roughly 41 percent above the $38.1 billion the Navy has secured annually over the last five years. Senate appropriators, meanwhile, have proposed $41.6 billion for shipbuilding, which the report describes as about $18.5 billion below the Navy’s request.
CBO also notes that construction would be fastest over the next decade, slow from the mid-2030s to the mid-2040s, and ramp again in the late 2040s and 2050s as ships with 20- to 25-year service lives come due for replacement.
That profile is my main concern with any new yard, foreign-led or not. A yard dedicated to frigates and large combatants needs an order book that survives the trough as well as the peak. A foreign investor will price that risk, and Congress will have to decide whether it is willing to offer the multi-year commitments that make the investment rational. The report does not say what terms Toti has in mind, and that is the first thing to ask about when his nomination moves forward.
Toti’s line about destroyers doing frigate work is a description of exquisite scarcity applied to the wrong tier. A fleet built around a small number of very capable hulls ends up spending those hulls on missions that a cheaper, more numerous ship could carry. A frigate yard addresses that mismatch directly, and that is a real contribution.
But the harder question is what the yard is for in a fleet that is turning into a mesh. In the capital-ships work I have argued that shipbuilding is bifurcating. One track is the traditional yard and drydock model for large crewed hulls. The other is dispersed, mold-based manufacturing for autonomous vessels, closer to boat building than to shipbuilding. A yard organised around frigates and large surface combatants sits squarely on the first track. That is not a criticism, because the Navy needs those hulls and needs them built better. It does mean the design of the yard matters as much as the nationality of its owner.
The ideal outcome would carry the imported process lessons across both tracks: modular construction, stable designs, serial output, and a workforce trained in methods that transfer to commercial-derived hulls, motherships and the larger autonomous vessels that will carry intelligent mass. If the new yard is built only to produce one more exquisite surface combatant faster, the Navy will have improved its production without questioning what it is producing.
The report does not say when a new yard would deliver its first ship, and no yard stood up from scratch does so quickly. The hull gap that allied navies have been living with, which I have traced in the Australian and Philippine cases, is a problem of this decade. A yard organised around frigates answers the 2030s. It does not answer the next several years, where legacy hull transfers, commercial hulls and autonomous vessels are doing the bridging.
That is not an argument against Toti’s idea.
It is an argument for being clear about which problem it solves.
Four tests to watch
- The order book. Does Congress offer a multi-year commitment that carries a new yard through the lean years CBO describes?
- The terms of transfer. Who owns the process knowledge, how is the American workforce trained in it, and does it spread beyond a single yard?
- The design. Serial production needs a stable design. Which frigate does the yard build, and who holds design authority?
- The reach. Can the yard’s methods extend to commercial-derived and autonomous hulls, or is it fixed on one class of crewed ship?
The larger point
The argument over foreign-built warships has been loud because it is about sovereignty and jobs.
Toti’s answer is quieter because it is about method. Building ships overseas moves the work.
Building a yard on American soil with foreign process knowledge moves the capability.
Whether that capability serves a fleet of exquisite hulls or a fleet that mixes crewed ships with autonomous mass will be decided by the choices made about the yard, not by who owns it.
Sources: Diana Stancy, Toti pushes new foreign-built shipyard in the US to focus on frigates, large surface combatants, Breaking Defense, November 19, 2026; Diana Stancy, Navy’s shipbuilding plan would require massive hike in annual appropriations: CBO, Breaking Defense, November 20, 2026.
