The FCAS Dynamic: An Italian Perspective

The end of the FCAS (Future Combat Air System) program (in terms of no joint fighter)  signifies much more than the failure of an ambitious aeronautical project. It represents a setback for the very idea of European strategic integration and raises questions that go far beyond the defense sector.

For nearly a decade, FCAS has been touted as the symbol of European strategic autonomy. France, Germany, and later Spain had envisioned a system designed to replace the Rafale and Eurofighter in the second half of the century. This was not simply a new fighter jet, but an integrated ecosystem comprising a sixth-generation aircraft, collaborative drones, artificial intelligence, advanced electronic warfare capabilities, and a combat cloud capable of merging data from different sensors and platforms in real time.

The program’s failure, however, is not due to technological limitations. Europe possesses the industrial, scientific, and financial expertise necessary to develop a system of this caliber. The reasons are essentially political and strategic. The disputes between Airbus and Dassault over industrial leadership, intellectual property, and the distribution of future economic returns were merely the most visible manifestation of deeper differences.

For France, the FCAS was intended to be the successor to the Rafale and a central instrument of its strategic sovereignty. The new aircraft was designed to operate from aircraft carriers and carry out nuclear missions, while fully integrating into the French Force de Frappe. Germany, on the other hand, viewed the project as a genuinely European program, based on a balanced distribution of leadership, expertise, and industrial benefits.

In essence, Paris and Berlin were trying to build the same system based on different conceptions of sovereignty.

This situation bears significant historical parallels. In the 1970s, France withdrew from the program that would have led to the development of the Tornado; in the 1980s, it also pulled out of the project that would become the Eurofighter Typhoon, choosing instead to develop the Rafale independently. FCAS appears to be following the same pattern: France accepts European cooperation as long as it does not conflict with what it considers the core of its strategic autonomy.

The difference from the past is that today the geopolitical cost of such choices is much higher.

To grasp the full significance of this, we must go back to the origins of European integration. When Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman conceived the European Coal and Steel Community in 1950, France and Germany had emerged from three wars in less than eighty years. Yet they managed to pool the very resources that had made war possible. The idea was simple and revolutionary: to share economic sovereignty in order to make conflict not only undesirable, but also materially more difficult.

Today, the paradox is clear. After decades of integration—with a single market, a common currency, and well-established supranational institutions—France and Germany are unable to jointly develop the next-generation European fighter jet. The question is inevitable: How was it possible to share coal and steel in the aftermath of World War II, yet fail today to share patents, industrial leadership, and operational requirements?

The answer is likely that the ECSC was born out of a clear political will to pool sovereignty. FCAS, on the other hand, has stalled because everyone wanted the benefits of cooperation without fully accepting its political costs.

This factor takes on particular significance in light of recent European initiatives aimed at increasing defense spending. In fact, it could be argued that the very mechanisms developed by the European Union to facilitate increased military spending risk producing the opposite effect of what was intended: reinforcing existing fragmentation rather than fostering genuine convergence toward common capabilities and programs. Without a shared vision of strategic interests and European sovereignty, the increase in available resources could simply result in a proliferation of parallel national programs.

The FCAS issue takes on even deeper significance when viewed through the lens of the debate on European nuclear deterrence. In recent years, particularly following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, proposals have emerged in Germany aimed at exploring greater integration with French deterrence, through extended protection mechanisms or more structured European involvement in Paris’s strategic planning.

The failure of FCAS, however, makes this prospect more complex. If France and Germany cannot agree on the design of the future delivery system intended to operate in the nuclear domain as well, it seems difficult to imagine a genuine sharing of the most sensitive aspect of national sovereignty.

Nuclear deterrence is not merely a technology. It is a political relationship founded on trust. And strategic trust requires a convergence of interests and visions that the FCAS case demonstrates is still incomplete . France will likely continue to view its deterrence as a national instrument in the service of European security, but it is unlikely to accept mechanisms that limit its decision-making autonomy.

The affair also has industrial and geopolitical implications. Paris appears set to independently develop the successor to the Rafale, while Berlin will have to decide how to preserve its expertise in the field of next-generation fighter aircraft.

In this context, the GCAP (Global Combat Air Programme), developed by the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan, could become the natural focal point for Germany. If that were to happen, we would witness a significant realignment of the European industrial landscape. The Anglo-Italian-Japanese program would become the leading Western sixth-generation project outside the United States, while France would continue on an independent path.

For Italy, this would mark the beginning of a phase of particular strategic importance. Thanks to the experience gained with the Eurofighter, the F-35, and participation in the GCAP, our country would find itself at the center of the only major Western next-generation multinational program currently fully operational.

The final lesson of the FCAS affair is perhaps the most important one. For decades, European integration has been successful in economic and trade terms. Defense, however, requires something different: it requires the sharing of power and, ultimately, of sovereignty.

FCAS did not fail due to a lack of technology, funding, or industrial expertise. It failed because there was no shared vision of European strategic sovereignty. And if Europe cannot build the aircraft meant to defend it together, it will be even harder to build a deterrent capable of protecting it together.

Note: This was published in Italian on Formiche and is reproduced in an English translation with permission of the authors.