France and Chad Restore Defense Cooperation on New Terms

10/23/2026
By Defense.info

France and Chad have signed a letter of intent to restore defense cooperation, less than two years after N’Djamena ended the defense agreements that had linked the two countries since independence. According to Laurent Lagneau’s report in Zone Militaire on October 14, 2026, French Armed Forces Minister Catherine Vautrin and her Chadian counterpart, General Issakha Malloua Djamouss, signed the document during President Mahamat Idriss Déby’s second official visit to Paris this year.

The rupture came in November 2024, shortly after a visit to N’Djamena by Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot. Two months later, French forces handed over the Sergent-chef Adji Kosseï base and completed their withdrawal, while Chad strengthened military ties with Turkey and Hungary. Explanations varied, from a French judicial inquiry concerning President Déby to a rapprochement with Moscow, disputes over operations against Boko Haram and disagreements over Sudan. Senator Ronan Le Gleut said Paris had repeatedly asked Chad to stay neutral in Sudan’s civil war, amid reports of indirect Chadian support for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also backed by the United Arab Emirates (Zone Militaire).

Chad’s security situation has worsened since then. The war in Sudan has driven close to one million refugees into eastern Chad, fueling security and community tensions, particularly among the Zaghawa. In April, Africa Intelligence reported that the French military was making a “low-key return,” with cooperation quietly resuming in training and intelligence. Zone Militaire suggests this may reflect Turkey’s support for the Sudanese Armed Forces of General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan against the RSF (Zone Militaire).

The new letter covers “cooperation on defense capabilities.” The French ministry said it aims to support the development of Chadian forces’ capabilities “in innovative fields.” President Macron called it a step toward “a renewed relationship.” The details remain to be defined. Before the 2024 break, France had planned to cut its presence in Chad from 1,000 to 300 personnel, and the new arrangement could take the form of a joint liaison detachment, as in Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon (Zone Militaire).

The significance lies in the model. France is shifting in Africa from permanent bases and large garrisons to smaller, partner-led arrangements focused on capability building, training and intelligence. Chad shows the logic from the partner’s side: a fragile state facing rebellion, refugee flows and a regional war values a reliable security partner, but on its own terms and alongside others such as Turkey.

The caution is that a letter of intent is not a strategy. Paris now competes for influence in a crowded field that includes Turkey, the UAE and Russia, and Chad’s position on Sudan remains a source of friction. The new partnership will be judged by whether it delivers capability without recreating the dependence that ended the old one.

Source: Laurent Lagneau, “La France et le Tchad signent une lettre d’intention pour rétablir leur coopération en matière de défense,” Zone Militaire, October 14, 2026.