European Defense and Foreign Policy Entry Points, 2017 versus 2025: Trump 1.0 and Trump 2.0
Dateline: Paris, France
This week I returned to Rome to spend time with the Italian Air Force. The last time I was there was 2016 and there have been notable changes as the Air Force has led the way in shaping a fifth generation Air Force, firmly establishing an F-35 assembly and repair facility at Cameri and a very innovative training center established in 2022 in Sardinia.
Sitting in the same office I sat in years ago talking with the current chief of the Italian Air Force, I could not fail to think of the near decade of developments in the F-35 global enterprise or in the development of the leadership role for the Italian Air Force.
I also could not fail to think of the broader political developments and how different the entry points for the 47th U.S. President into European defense next year than when he entered office as the 45th U.S. President.
When Trump entered office in 2015, Brexit was the thing and he was enamored of it and took his cues on how to deal with the EU from his support for Brexit. But Brexit was a dead end policy and this also brought him to direct conflict with the Chancellor of Germany, the powerful Angela Merkel.
There were many aspects of her leadership which Trump opposed: her commitment to the Russians and Russian energy, her open borders policy, and her emphasis on trade with China. It might be noted that each of these policies are viewed by many European governments today as major policy failures.
Fast forward to 2024 and his entry into office in 2025. The United Kingdom is led by a left-wing government which has openly not supported Trump and its Foreign Minister a clear liability in terms of relations with the incoming Administration. So we can check off the box the relevance of the current government to anything of interest to the Trump Administration.
And I would pause a moment over that thought – we are talking Administration now as Trump became president because of a coalition, not just his personal ability to challenge “Sleepy Joe.”
The main issue of importance to Trump 2.0 with regard to European defense is the war in Ukraine and the need to terminate the conflict. No American president can negotiate an end to the conflict and this is where it gets interesting and where as usual the main stream media does not get it right.
How will Europe stimulated by Trump 2.0 realistically approach the war and the future of Ukraine? Simply continuing the war will see the end of the Ukrainian youth who are the seed corn of the nation. Simply rewarding Putin for his aggression is equally unpalatable.
The reality is that an armistice is simply a pause in Putin’s war with Europe, but certainly does not mean that he is in a good position to pause and strike. He has lost Northern Europe, he has put himself into dependencies with China, a country which does not want to share dominance of Asia, and has left him in a challenging domestic situation with regard to the future not only of himself as ruler but any regime built on his principles.
It is also the case that governments in Europe which were supportive of Trump 1.0 (especially Poland at the time and most of Northern Europe) have been joined by Italy and its conservative Prime Minister and her success of border policies.
And the politically damaged Macron may see a chance to play a role in shaping a Western policy towards Ukraine as a means of repairing his stature in the West.
And while this is going on the German government has collapsed. The next government will certainly see their core interests involved in a Ukraine negotiations and coming to terms with Trump 2.0.
How this will play out is an open question.
But what is clear is that entry points into European defense issues are very different for the 47th compared to the 45th President. He just happens to have the same last name.
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