The Shipbuilding Context of the Kill Web Maritime Warfighting Paradigm Change

The challenge of ramping up the capabilities of the fleets of the democratic nations to deal with global security and defense threats is significant. But in the paradigm shift to operating with a maritime kill web is more than about building up numbers of legacy ships. For with the paradigm shift, it also embraces the shipbuilding enterprise.

There is no country that understands this more than Denmark. This is not a place that naturally comes to mind for most naval analysts when thinking of naval shipbuilding powerhouses, but in fact there is no country clearer minded about the impact of modularity, the kill web, rapid payload innovations and the coming of maritime autonomous systems than the Danes.

At the Euronaval exposition held in Paris from Nov. 4-7 2024 I had a chance to discuss the paradigm shift in naval warfare which decisively affects the way ahead for shipbuilding with Rear Admiral (Retired) Nils Wang, the former head of the Danish Navy and now director of Naval Team Denmark. We have discussed the forces leading to a paradigm shift in earlier interviews  but now it is clear that such a shift in under way.

Our conversation centered on the shift from traditional platform-centric naval warfare to a more flexible, technology-driven approach. The discussion highlighted the challenges of integrating autonomous systems and modular capabilities into naval operations, emphasizing the need for adaptable platforms that can evolve with technology. Examples include Denmark’s modular land-based mine countermeasures setup and the potential for small, versatile ships to perform complex tasks.

The conversation also touched on the resistance from traditional naval thinking and from the defense industry which tends to prefers specialized, high-maintenance platforms. The need for a new acquisition model focused on payloads and rapid integration is stressed, along with the impact on doctrine.

Nils Wang emphasized that we are looking at a paradigm shift in maritime combat operations.

“The technology landscape we are looking at is changing dramatically and it will impact both doctrine and organization. And when you start to change the way Navies are organized you will inevitably change the organizational power-grid where you give somebody something, and take something away from others. In other words, there are “winners” and “losers.”

The classic triangle of doctrine, technology and organization means that when technology changes decisively, it impacts on both doctrine and organization. In this case the technology drives rapid change in modular payloads and autonomous systems and push doctrine towards an increased  distribution of maritime operations.

How then do the technology drivers intersect with DMO and how do both require changes in the organization of navies?

One change is the conceptualization how capabilities can be placed on a variety of platforms rather than uniquely located on specialized ships.

Wang drew upon his own experience as head of the Danish Navy 15 years ago. For budget reasons, he was ordered to get rid of the dedicated Danish Mine Counter Measure (MCM) ships. Of course, for a country like Denmark at the entrance to the Baltic Sea, the loss of such capability would be a disaster.

They had come up with a solution. The focused on how to have a MCM capability which could be placed on a variety of platforms rather than simply on a specialized ship. They did so and have crafted a modular MCM concept, enabling the team of experts to operate the autonomous mine drones and specialized equipment on a variety of platforms.

The team needs obviously to have operational experience at sea which they have for several months a year on various Danish vessels and allied ships. However, when these ships are not allocated to the MCM Team they can perform other tasks.

And the same approach would make sense in several other operational areas where capabilities – with or without attached specialists – can be added to boost an existing flexible platform. Sea Bed Warfare modules, Special Operations modules, Drone based ISR modules, Mine Laying modules, One Way Attack USV modules just to mention a few.

As Wang noted: “Remember, the operational output is delivered by a relatively small part of  a ships crew. The rest simply sail, maintain and repair the platform and make the food.. .

So, if you can add “Plug and Play” capabilities to existing platforms, you will not only create more versatile ships suited for the mission, you will also utilize your workforce more effectively and improv your “combat-power-to-manning” ratio. However, it requires that you embrace the technological reality and re-think how you do things.”

A modular approach means as well that one could think of more at-sea time for the capital ships. Both the ordinary repair time and the longer up-grade periods designed to enhance capability can be reduced, as the modules can be maintained, repaired and upgraded outside of the ship itself..

This means as well one could ramp up other ships which could perform “capital ship” functions, so that supply ships can expand their concept of support to a combat fleet.

As Wang put it: “If you have the right platform that is designed to host modular payloads and to work with the new autonomous systems, whether launched from the ship or simply available to the ship via the Combat Management System, you can with a fairly small ship be quite capable of delivering capabilities that a larger more specialized ship would do in a legacy fleet. This is a paradigm shift.”

The ship through its pairing with autonomous systems can have a much better domain awareness. Drones operating within a littoral region, for example, can provide communications and ISR reach which give that ship an ability to operate as a much more capable fleet asset.

And by doing so, you are forced to push naval doctrine in new directions. That ship can plug in and enable the kill web operating maritime force. The commander of the ship has a suite of tools at his disposal and can combine with other similarly configured ships to deliver effects only a legacy fleet with many specialized capital ships could do.

But it is not only the need for naval officers to change their approach, so does the acquisition approach of governments.

Wang argued: “There’s also friction on the industry side, because when you start to build ships that are so adaptable then you can basically upgrade them incrementally during the whole life cycle by adding new modules and pulling the old out.”

It could be done in weeks or even days. This business model is not necessarily attractive for the entire  shipbuilding industry because there is also big  money in big overhauls where naval ships are teared apart and out of operational service for 1-3 years. And interestingly enough, no civilian merchant shipping company would allow such a huge amount of down time where ships are unable to make money for their owners.

“Those who are doing acquisitions should prioritize having platforms adaptable enough to enable rapid payload innovations. And the intellectual capacity should be vested in how we can bring capabilities on board that can really affect the battle.”

Featured graphic: Blueprint and design of a modern warship in detail. This image shows a detailed blueprint and side view design of a modern warship, highlighting its structural elements and features used in naval engineering. AI generated. ID 324198325 | Shipbuilding © Gearstd | Dreamstime.com