The Challenges of the New Nuclear Age

Beijing’s plan to acquire a large arsenal of nuclear weapons is giving rise to the second nuclear race. This will further destabilize the current strategic framework with increased strategic competition, erosion of strategic deterrence, regionalization of the threat, and will be a destabilizing example for other emerging powers.

The expected geostrategic consequences could be: end of nuclear bipolar stability, acceleration of the technology race, and reduction of space for dialogue and cooperation.

The second nuclear race reflects the deterioration of the rules-based international order, accelerated by the growing rivalry between major powers.

The first nuclear race took off in the aftermath of World War II and the early years of the Cold War. After 1945, the United States was faced with a major problem: the Soviet Union had extremely large conventional forces capable of militarily dominating the European theater. The solution adopted was to offset the conventional gap with nuclear deterrence, a concept that can be described as the first strategic offset. This approach exploited American technological superiority in the field of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union, aware of the need to offset the American advantage, developed and tested its first atomic bomb in 1949: this marked the beginning of the first nuclear race between the two superpowers.

This competition was not only limited to weapons, but also gave impetus to a period of great technological and infrastructural development, influencing both military doctrines and global geopolitics in important ways.

The nuclear offset allowed the United States to deter Soviet expansion without having to invest heavily in conventional forces in Europe, create the basis for the strategic concept of Mutually Assured Destruction ( MAD) , and enhance technological development, which became an important pillar of Western military strategies.

The Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) military nuclear plan embodied the first U.S. strategic offset , was the U.S. national plan for the conduct of nuclear war and was first developed in 1960. The first strategic offset kicked off the new era in the history of geopolitics and strategic deterrence.

The second strategic offset was developed by the U.S. in the 1970s and 1980s as a response to the growing military capability of the Soviet Union, which was reducing the U.S. strategic advantage gained from the first nuclear offset. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviet Union had made significant progress in three main areas: strategic nuclear parity, superiority in conventional forces, and military technological advances.

The United States then found itself again at a conventional disadvantage and unable to depend entirely on nuclear deterrence because of the strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) or (mad) destruction. In response to the growing Soviet threat, the United States (Harold Brown, William J. Perry) developed the second strategic offset, based on the use of advanced technologies to reestablish a qualitative advantage.

The key technologies were: long-range precision guided munitions (PGM ) systems, advanced sensors and C4ISR (command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems), stealth technology capable of evading Soviet radars and penetrating deep into enemy defenses, automation and information technology i.e., the integration of computers into combat systems to improve the speed and effectiveness of military operations.

Thus, the key was the technological advantage, which allowed them to offset the numerical imbalance and bring the United States back into a dominant position.

After the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev shared convergent views on the need to reduce the nuclear threat. During their bilateral meetings, Reagan declared, “A world without nuclear weapons would be the supreme goal we must pursue.” Gorbachev replied, “The nuclear threat must no longer dominate humanity. The Cold War is over, and we must strive for a future without nuclear weapons.”

Both leaders clearly spoke out against the possibility of nuclear war, recognizing its destructive folly and criticizing the strategy of deterrence based on mutual destruction. The collapse of the Berlin Wall was interpreted as proof that dialogue and cooperation could replace military competition.

This spirit of renewed confidence gave impetus to new arms reduction treaties and ushered in a period of relative international stability.

Vladimir Putin ‘s Russia has adopted a profoundly different approach from the international cooperation phase of the 1980s and 1990s. The main reasons lie in the growing rivalry with the West, which Moscow sees as an existential threat to its national security. In particular, Russia perceives NATO’s eastward expansion and U.S. involvement in Ukraine and Georgia issues as hostile developments.

In response, Moscow is investing significantly in the modernization of its nuclear forces. New developments include advanced systems such as hypersonic missiles, which are difficult to intercept with current technologies, and new RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

In addition, Russia has introduced underwater innovations such as the Poseidon, a nuclear submarine drone. On the doctrinal level, Russia has updated the “First Limited Use” strategy of nuclear weapons, which involves the limited use of tactical nuclear devices in regional contexts.

This doctrine, which has emerged in the past, is considered extremely dangerous because it is based on the mistaken belief that a nuclear war can be “limited” or “manageable” through the use of tactical weapons.

For Moscow, nuclear power has returned to a central position in national security strategy, serving as both a deterrence tool and political leverage. In particular, the use of tactical nuclear weapons seems aimed at lowering the psychological threshold against their use in a conflict, thereby increasing the risk of escalation.

China, historically more cautious in the nuclear arena, is now strengthening its capabilities in response to growing strategic pressures. Key motivations include the presence of U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific, the enhancement of U.S. missile defense, and the need to develop nuclear weapons capable of surviving an enemy first strike, ensuring a devastating response. T

hese include DF-41 ballistic missiles, equipped with multiple independent warheads (MIRVs), and hypersonic missiles, designed to evade U.S. defenses. China’s goal is to achieve strategic parity with the United States, overcoming its status as a “secondary nuclear power.”

These developments point to a new nuclear arms race, fueled by growing geopolitical rivalries and the return of the great powers as major players on the international stage.

Today, there are no meaningful treaties among the great powers to limit nuclear weapons, except for New START, which is scheduled to expire in 2026 and, moreover, does not include China. In a climate of growing distrust and in the absence of binding agreements, the world faces a new unstable equilibrium, reminiscent in many ways of the early phase of the Cold War. The U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty has had a profound and negative impact on the West, prompting Russia to modernize and expand its nuclear arsenal to mitigate perceived strategic vulnerability. This, combined with the collapse of the INF Treaty and rising global tensions, has reignited the nuclear arms race, further exacerbated by the rise of China as a new military power.

The third strategic offset, launched in 2014 with the Defense Innovation Initiative (DII), was conceived as a strategic response to the growing challenges posed by Russia and China, aiming to preserve the U.S. qualitative advantage through the use of artificial intelligence, robotics, hypersonic weapons and other emerging technologies.

However, while the previous two offsets had significantly strengthened U.S. technological and strategic dominance, the third has encountered significant obstacles.

Russia and China have made major advances in the development of hypersonic weapons, which have rendered current missile defense systems obsolete, unable to counter such rapid and maneuverable threats. This development is destabilizing the global strategic balance.

As a result, the United States and its allies are being called upon to accelerate the development of advanced hypersonic defense technologies, including space-based sensor platforms, directed energy interceptor systems, and rapid response capabilities. NATO, in particular, may need to review its defense strategies and strengthen coordination to meet these new challenges.

The adoption of hypersonic weapons also requires a rethinking of existing military doctrines, with a focus on adapting to an increasingly complex and unpredictable threat environment. In addition, China’s program to acquire a massive strategic nuclear arsenal, coupled with its increasingly close collaboration with Moscow, is profoundly transforming the geopolitical landscape. The United States, in the 21st century, faces two nuclear powers simultaneously.

To meet these challenges, the United States has embarked on an ambitious strategic triad (air, land and naval) modernization program, with an estimated investment of $1.5 trillion. This program includes the development of new warheads and launchers (bombers, submarines, missiles), as well as advanced logistics support and multi-domain command and control systems.

However, the confrontation between the three superpowers takes place in a much more dangerous environment than during the Cold War, with reaction times for hypersonic defense reduced to minutes. In this scenario, traditional command and control systems are no longer sufficient to handle the complexity of decisions required.

The use of artificial intelligence (AI) in multi-domain command centers is becoming inevitable. However, this advanced automation brings with it significant risks: AI algorithms, while advanced, can be prone to misinterpretation, especially in ambiguous situations.

In addition, AI systems are vulnerable to cyber attacks, which could manipulate data or decisions, increasing the risk of catastrophic errors. Driven automation could also reduce or eliminate direct human control in certain circumstances, jeopardizing the fundamental principles of nuclear weapons management.

This scenario highlights how increasing dependence on technology requires a delicate balance between innovation and control, lest the dynamics of global competition spiral out of human control. The increased speed of hypersonic weapons and automated decision-making drastically reduces the time available for human intervention or diplomatic initiatives to prevent escalation.

The balance between speed and security emerges as one of the most critical challenges for geopolitics and arms management in the coming years.

Despite the lessons of history and awareness of the futility and devastation that nuclear arsenals entail, fear and distrust continue to shape international politics.

The second nuclear arms race demonstrates that the folly of the first has not been overcome, but is recurring in new forms, further exacerbated by technological advancement and an increasingly complex and unstable global environment.

This article was originally published in Italian on the Italian publication Formiche on December 22, 2024.

LT Gen (ret.) Pasquale Preziosa is the former Chief of Staff, Italian Air Force, and a noted European strategist.

The image is AI generated.