A Perspective on the Way Ahead for the Marine Corps Approach to Distributed Operations: LtGen (Retired) Terri Robling, Former MARFORPAC Commander and Deputy Commandant of Operations

I had the privilege of dealing with Lt General (Retired) Robling both as DCA and as the MARFORPAC commander.

Based in part on my conversations with him and my observations in both Hawaii and Australia of the joint force, this is what I wrote in 2014:

The United States is in the midst of its Pivot to the Pacific. The USMC is really at the center of the pivot to the Pacific. The USMC is not only redeploying in the region but enhancing its role as a rotational force as well.

Some of the USMC forces in Okinawa are moving to Guam and the Marines are shaping a new working relationship with the Australians in Western Australia.  In fact, they are the lead force in re-shaping presence in the Pacific over the next few years.

The Marine Corps in the Pacific faces a myriad of challenges.  The Marines have been directed through International Agreements, spanning two different US administrations to execute force-positioning moves.  This is political, but it’s not partisan.

The U.S. Secretary of Defense has mandated that at least 22,000 Marines in PACOM remain west of the international dateline in the distributed Marine Air Ground Task Force or MAGTF Laydown and he, congress, and the American people are not interested in a non-functional concept for a USMC force.

The US Needs to Operate in Two Strategic Operational Zones: A Triangle In Support of Japan; and a Quadrangle to Support South Korea and Core Asian Allies. 

And, the Obama White House has directed the USMC to make to shift as well of forces from Okinawa to Guam and to a new working relationship with the Australians.

Beyond what is directed, the Marines need to maintain a ready-force in the face of existing training area encroachments, plus they have the requirement for training areas near the new force laydown locations

Within the distributed laydown, the Marines must retain the ability rapidly to respond to crises across the range of demands, from Major Combat operation in NE Asia to low-end humanitarian assistance and disaster relief of HA/DR wherever it occurs. 

Each location for the Marines is in transition as well. From Okinawa and Iwakuni, the Marines can locally train in Japan, Korea and the Philippines, as well as respond with “Fight Tonight” capabilities if necessary.

From Guam, the Marines can train locally in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI)  to the north, the Federated States of Micronesia to the south, and Palau and the Philippines to the west.  Guam and CNMI provide the Marines something we do not have anywhere else in the Pacific:  A location on U.S. soil where they can train unilaterally or with partner nations

The USMC is focused on shaping a distributed operations force to meet these evolving engagement challenges.  For such a force, strike is built into the force but is not the defining quality.  For many, augmenting the precision strike force is the key area for investments for the US in the Pacific.  But the priority ought to be on building up the capabilities for distributed operations within which precision strike is embedded.

As Lt. General Robling, MARFORCPAC has emphasized: “The key is persistent presence and scalable force.  We need to be engaged in the process of reform of the various allied forces as well in the Pacific.  We cannot nor should not do it all on our own.  A distributed force allows for the kind of security engagement we need to do so, as well be positioned for escalation if that occurs.

“Distributed operations and disaggregation is a fact of life in the Pacific.  Rarely do we send an ARG/MEU out now, especially the 31st MEU, into the AOR, where we don’t disaggregate. We distribute them to different missions and then re-aggregate to come back to a large exercise or mission.

“Combine this with new more capable equipment we are buying and you have a substantial stand in force not found anywhere else in the Joint Force.  If we place an MV22 on any one of those amphibious ships or any an MLP or a TAKE, and you have just extended your shoreline north and south 300 miles each direction.”

The Marines are at the forefront of con-ops innovation and have led with the Osprey creating new opportunities and potentially new strategies.   The Commanding General of the 1st Marine Air Wing located at Okinawa has leveraged the capabilities of the Osprey to shape a new and more effective island operational strategy.  This strategy is key to the overall PACOM strategy in the Pacific

“A good case in point would be when we wish to deploy helicopters from Futenma to the Philippines, there are a couple of places that we must land for fuel.  For one leg, there is only one site, which allows us to do this. But when you have an aircraft with greater range and refueling capability you open up a wide range of other deployment possibilities.

“In a time of conflict, if an adversary wanted to deny us the ability to put in a refueling point or intermediate support base, they would have to now take into account a much greater number of islands across an extremely wide operating area.  With only helicopters, an adversary could draw a 100-mile ring around a base and know where we could operate.

“Ospreys, particularly when supported by KC-130Js, would significantly complicate an adversary’s attempts to predict our movements and operations.”

Now the entire joint force is in the throes of working force distribution and the Marines are now again providing a leading edge to such an effort. I recently discussed with Robling his perspective 11 years later as the Marines are working force distribution efforts and doing so with a perspective of operating as an Inside Force.

Robling noted that the Marines air capabilities provided a crucial means for enabling further force distribution with the Osprey providing range and speed, the air refuellable heavy lift component, the CH-53E and its much improvised and more capable digital aircraft replacement, along with the CH-53K and the multi-domain force enabling F-35.

He argued that with both the Navy and the Air Force focused on force distribution, they needed to enhance their capabilities for contested logistics and to network the force as the joint force crafted a broader kill web. As they do so, the Marines capability to work their own approach to force distribution is enhanced as they can reach back from the forward positions they will operate from to have Naval and Air Force support. Or put another way, the Marines by crafting innovative ways to operate as an Inside Force can enable the capabilities of the Navy and the Air Force to operate more effectively in terms of their own efforts,

The challenge is to have an effective joint and coalition concept of operations. The networking is challenging as well as operating in a contested logistics setting.

Robling highlighted that the Marines operating with smaller more agile sensor enabled ships along with flexible strike capabilities associated with the NEMESIS approach would enhance the capabilities of the Marines as a distributed force and in turn enhance the capabilities of the joint force.

We then talked about the essential need to incorporate and integrate unmanned, uncrewed or autonomous systems within the USMC. What these systems can provide if properly integrated is an enhanced capability for the USMC to deliver significant maritime effects which extends the lethality and survivability of the Navy’s capital ships.

He concluded: “I think the Marine Corps has led the way for the entire joint force, the Air Force, the Navy and the Army, to think about force distribution in an entirely new way.”

The featured image is how we put the challenge in terms of force distribution in our 2013 book on Pacific defense.