Putting the Nature of the Military Capability Threat from the Multi-Polar Authoritarian World in Perspective

In assessing how the question of how to balance long-term force development versus the need to prioritize ways to enhance the ready force in the short to mid-term, a critical consideration is the nature and scope of the military and security threat posed by the global players – the multi-polar authoritarian world — changing the nature of the world order.

This can be difficult as the threat is complex and very specific to discrete challenges and global situations. There are questions of how to deal with “gray zone” threats, direct confrontations but through surrogates as is the case of the NATO-Russian war in Ukraine, and in the escalatory encounters which could lead to a global confrontation between the democracies and the authoritarians.

At the seminar, a comprehensive look at the nature of the threat being posed was provided by Professor Justin Bronk. The speaker came from the United Kingdom for the seminar, and he is, among other things, the Editor of RUSI Defence Systems. His presentation and his engagement on one of the panels provided a very well received and persuasive examination of the challenges which needed to be faced.

And unlike many presentations I have heard in the past on such issues, it really was comprehensive and connected a realistic view of Western forces with the kind of decision making which would need to be made in dealing with the authoritarians which threaten us and are crafting an alternative global order to that shaped by what we use to call the West.

Let me first turn to Dr. Bronk’s presentation, then to the Q and A session, and then to his comments on the panel on which participated to give a wholistic view of his perspective.

The Presentation

Bronk’s central thesis is that while Western nations debate future technologies and maintain diverse mission sets inherited from counterinsurgency operations, adversaries are focused on the specific problem of defeating Western air power. He warns that without immediate prioritization of stockpiles, training proficiency, and core combat capabilities, Western forces may be unprepared for the high-intensity conflicts they’re likely to face in the near term.

This is what the ready force or the “fight tonight force” needs to deal with and to do so on a national and coalition basis.

The scale of the authoritarians commitment to defeating Western airpower is sobering. China produces over 100 fighters annually alongside dozens of AWACS platforms, maintaining approximately 55 KJ-500 airborne early warning aircraft in service. Far from viewing crewed aviation as obsolete, they’re simultaneously developing multiple sixth-generation platforms while expanding their fleet of conventional fighters like the J-16 and J-20.

This isn’t the frantic scrambling of nations trying to catch up – it’s the methodical buildup of powers that understand exactly what they need and are willing to pay for it. When Russia, with a GDP roughly the size of Italy’s, can produce nearly 200 long-range precision missiles monthly while fighting an existential war, it demonstrates that capability production is often more about political will than economic capacity.

Faced with these sobering realities, Bronk argues that Western air forces have increasingly turned to technological solutions that promise to solve numerical disadvantages through innovation. The appeal of AI-enabled autonomous systems and “loyal wingman” concepts is understandable – they offer the tantalizing possibility of multiplying combat power without multiplying pilot training costs or political risks.

Bronk provides a reality check to such a vision. Scratch beneath the surface of these technological promises, and troubling realities emerge. The widely publicized AI victories over human pilots in dogfighting scenarios rely on a crucial cheat – the AI receives real-time data about enemy aircraft positions that wouldn’t be available in actual combat. Once two aircraft merge in close combat, radar becomes useless, and human pilots rely on visual cues and instinctive understanding developed through thousands of hours of experience. Programming an AI to replicate these almost subconscious skills would require camera systems and processing power that simply don’t exist.

Even the most optimistic projections for “cheap mass” autonomous systems suggest unit costs of $20-30 million each – hardly the swarming capability many envision. When you need AESA radars, secure data links, and 1,000+ nautical mile range, physics and economics impose harsh constraints on how “cheap” these systems can actually be.

Bronk then highlighted a key area which affects the question of core competence of the Western forces against a growing ad increasingly credible adversary threat. While we debate future technologies, a more immediate crisis unfolds in our training pipelines. Western pilots increasingly fly 100-120 hours annually, far below the rates of their adversaries. Worse, much of this limited flying time is consumed by routine patrol missions that offer minimal training value for high-end combat scenarios.

The consequences are already visible. Twenty-one of the twenty-five U.S. fighter losses in the past decade resulted from spatial disorientation in poor weather conditions – pilots losing control of their aircraft in clouds. This represents a failure in one of aviation’s most basic skills, instrument flying, and reflects the broader trend of training to currency rather than proficiency.

Meanwhile, Russian pilots emerge from three years of intensive combat operations with vastly improved skills and confidence. Chinese pilots conduct increasingly sophisticated joint exercises, practicing coordinated operations between air and naval forces that would have been impossible just five years ago. The experience gap that once heavily favored Western pilots is rapidly narrowing.

Bronk underscores his concern that Western responses have often been to push more training into simulators, justified by both cost considerations and the classified nature of many advanced tactics. While simulation certainly has its place, it cannot replicate the stress of flying a heavy, fuel-critical aircraft in actual weather conditions after hours in the cockpit. The fear of running out of fuel in a storm, the physical buffeting of turbulence, the disorientation when your inner ear contradicts your instruments – these realities shape pilot decision-making in ways that no simulator can fully capture.

The training crisis is compounded by fundamental geographic realities that require different solutions in different theaters. European nations possess abundant airfields and can adopt distributed operations concepts – Finnish and Swedish air forces demonstrate the effectiveness of refueling and rearming at regional airports within adversary targeting cycles. But Indo-Pacific operations face tyrannical distances with limited basing options, demanding different approaches entirely.

This geographic split increasingly drives Allied nations toward divergent capability development paths. European forces can optimize for shorter-range, more distributed operations, while Pacific allies require longer-range systems and different operational concepts.

For Professor Bronk the challenge is to be able to train for enhanced  interoperability and yet to avoid the inefficiencies of completely separate development programs.

Then there is the heavy cost of prioritizing the land wars and the approach to airpower used in those wars. Over twenty-five years, Western air forces transformed from Cold War combat organizations into forces optimized for intervention and counterinsurgency operations. This meant substantial investments in intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and lift capabilities – valuable assets that inevitably create constituencies resistant to change.

But the luxury of maintaining broad mission sets may be ending. If the choice is between retaining current force structures across all missions or concentrating resources on core warfighting capabilities, the mathematics of potential conflict suggest some painful cuts may be necessary. Every helicopter, ISR platform, or transport aircraft we maintain represents resources not invested in combat aircraft, pilot training, or munitions stockpiles.

The counterargument – that our forces are already too small to cut anything – ignores the reality that these force structures were designed for different threats and missions. The question isn’t whether we’ll have to make trade-offs, but whether we’ll make them deliberately now or have them imposed through combat losses later.

Then Bronk turned to what I consider a very critical challenge which is to have a more sustainable ready force.

Western air forces are only now beginning to procure significant quantities of standoff weapons specifically designed to defeat advanced air defense systems – capabilities that should have been priority purchases decades ago. The S-300 and S-400 systems now proliferating globally were designed in the 1990s and fielded in the early 2000s. Why are we only now buying the weapons needed to defeat them?

The answer often comes back to cost, but this reasoning becomes circular when our adversaries demonstrate that political will can overcome economic constraints. If Russia can sustain massive munitions production while fighting an existential war, surely Western nations can afford the weapons they need for deterrence during peacetime.

The Question-and-Answer Session

First Question – Air Superiority vs. Mutual Denial Strategy:

The questioner asks about balancing investment between air superiority and defensive capabilities. Bronk explains that Russia is still actively trying to achieve air superiority in Ukraine by targeting Ukrainian air defenses, particularly Patriot systems. He emphasizes that mutual denial currently benefits Ukraine because Russia has greater resources to exploit air superiority if achieved.

Investment Balance Recommendations:

Bronk argues for a mixed approach, drawing on Israel’s experience with integrated air defense systems (Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow). Despite Israel’s massive investment – about 40% of GDP in defense spending with substantial U.S. subsidies – their layered defense system only buys time (days to a week) for offensive operations. The key insight is that even comprehensive air defense is meant to enable offensive operations, not replace them.

He concludes that air power is “fundamentally offensive” and that gaining air superiority over contested areas remains essential for joint force operations to succeed.

Second Question – Australia’s Range Challenge:

How to deal with Australia’s specific challenge of limited combat aircraft range (700-1000km) compared to China’s J-35 with 3000km range?  What about investment priorities between long-range bombers (B-21), land-based missiles, or long-range drones?

Bronk’s Response on Range Extension:

Bronk emphasizes that solutions depend on timeframes and highlights Australia’s smart investment in electronic warfare capabilities. He explains that extending range requires disrupting Chinese targeting chains, as their long-range threats rely on third-party sensors rather than launch platforms alone.

For immediate needs, he suggests focusing on electronic warfare support, forward tanker operations, and using existing decoy systems rather than expensive new uncrewed platforms. For longer-term solutions, he sees the B-21 bomber as particularly suitable for Australia due to its security relationship with the U.S., though this relies on American orbital support capabilities.

The overarching theme is that range extension comes with significant costs, and max takeoff weight remains the best predictor of both acquisition and operating expenses.

Participation in Panel on Cost Per Effect

Professor Bronk participated in a panel discussion which focused on cost-effectiveness in multi-domain air power operations. The panel featured senior Australian Air Force leaders discussing how to optimize defense spending while maintaining credible deterrence capabilities.

Professor Bronk highlighted a critical strategic evolution from “deterrence by punishment” (threatening retaliation after invasion) to “deterrence by denial” (preventing initial success). This shift reflects the reality that against nuclear adversaries, you can’t credibly threaten their centers of gravity, and certain territories (like Taiwan or Eastern Europe) can’t be traded for time.

This also was a key way to characterize what the focus of air power operations would need to be in case of a general conflict with authoritarian powers.

Professor Bronk returned to an issue which he dealt with in his presentism. He provided detailed analysis of the tension between cheap mass capabilities (like commercial drones) and robust military systems. While a commercial quadcopter might cost $2,500, a military-grade equivalent with all-weather capability, encryption, and survivability features costs $50,000 or more. The panel emphasized that both high-end exquisite systems and lower-cost mass capabilities have roles, but neither alone is sufficient.

Conclusion

Bronk is not sanguine about the time frame facing Western forces. Long range plans will deliver capabilities but not when they are needed in his perspective, one that is based in my view on a realistic reading of the current threat envelope.

The most sobering aspect of current trends is their timing. Multiple indicators suggest the next two to three years represent a particularly dangerous period. Adversary capabilities continue growing while Western readiness faces structural challenges. Historical patterns suggest that nations start wars when they believe they can win quickly and easily – a calculation increasingly favorable to our opponents.

The United States faces the historical challenge of preparing for potential conflicts in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific simultaneously, a task that has consistently proven difficult for American forces. Our adversaries understand these constraints and have strong incentives to coordinate their actions to maximize pressure on overstretched Western capabilities.

None of these challenges are insurmountable, but they require acknowledgment that current trajectories are unsustainable. The path forward demands several uncomfortable admissions:

First, technological solutions alone cannot substitute for adequate numbers, proper training, and sufficient stockpiles. AI and autonomous systems will play important roles, but they cannot replace the fundamental requirements of air power.

Second, our adversaries’ focus and determination represent strategic advantages that we must match through our own prioritization and resource allocation decisions. We cannot afford to spread resources across every mission and capability when facing opponents who concentrate on defeating our core strengths.

Third, the window for gradual adjustment may be closing. The luxury of maintaining current force structures while slowly building new capabilities assumes a timeline for change that may not exist.

The choice is stark but clear: maintain comfortable assumptions about Western air power superiority and risk catastrophic failure or make hard decisions about priorities while we still have time to implement them effectively. The adversaries we face have already made their choice – the question is whether we’ll make ours before it’s made for us.

Note: I have released recently an edited book looking back at the past 15 years with regard to the rise of the multi-polar world. which is entitled, The Emergence of the Multi-Polar Authoritarian World: Looking Back from 2024.