Irresponsible Escalation to Test NATO’s Reaction

Recently, General Pasquale Preziosa was interviewed by La Stampa on the recent Russian drone attack on Poland.

This is the English translation of that interview from the original Italian.

Question: General Pasquale Preziosa, after many warnings, the eastern front is now under attack. As a technical expert, what are your thoughts?

Preziosa: NATO is currently investigating to determine responsibility.

As far as I know today, what happened in Poland falls into the category of hostile UAV incursions, which occurred in conjunction with a massive attack on Kyiv and other Ukrainian regions.

It was therefore a violation of an Ally’s airspace, to which Polish forces, with NATO support, responded by shooting down several drones.

This is the first kinetic use in direct defense of Alliance airspace since the start of the war: a serious event, but one that, in my opinion, remains below the threshold of Article 5, since, based on the information available, it cannot be classified as an “armed attack.”

From a technical point of view, it will be essential to develop a common ISR framework, validate radar tracks, and proceed with the collection and forensic analysis of the wreckage in order to arrive at a correct and shared attribution.

Question: Are we close to war, or was this an isolated provocation?

Preziosa: This is an irresponsible escalation, which can be placed in the so-called gray zone, rather than the beginning of a NATO-Russia war.

The most plausible scenario is that of a test of the reaction times and integrated radar and missile coverage of the allied defense system, with trajectories that in some cases also involve Belarus.

In such situations, the most appropriate response is measured deterrence: increased air patrols, persistent radar aircraft orbits and, if necessary, layered air defense reinforcement to cover low, medium, and high altitudes.

It should be emphasized that a similar escalation, should it recur, will increase the risk of a wider conflict.

Question: The Italian reconnaissance aircraft based in Estonia: what is it? Is it true that it has Israeli technology?

Preziosa: It is the Italian Air Force’s Gulfstream G-550 CAEW aircraft, designated E-550A, one of the most advanced systems currently in service with European air forces.

It is an AEW&C (Airborne Early Warning and Control) and BM&C (Battlefield Management & Communication) platform, designed to provide air surveillance, command, control, and communications.

The heart of the aircraft is the ELTA EL/W-2085 electronic scanning radar, manufactured by Israel’s IAI-ELTA Systems, with conformal antennas integrated into the fuselage, flanked by a complete package of electronic systems for data collection and analysis.

This set of technologies allows for 360° situational awareness, in real time and at long range.

In addition to aerial surveillance, the system is also designed for maritime surveillance and battlefield management tasks, thanks to its compatibility with ROVER systems, which allow direct transmission of images and videos to forces deployed on land or at sea.

The CAEW does not just observe, but acts as a real command and control node: it processes the common ‘picture’ for interceptors and missile batteries (SAM), acts as a communications relay, and ensures a constant link with NATO operational centers (CAOC) and national commands.

Question: What should we expect from NATO now? And what about the role of the Trump administration?

Preziosa: From an operational point of view, NATO is responding with a decisive strengthening of integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) along its eastern flank: deployment of Patriot, SAMP-T, and IRIS-T SLM batteries, increased ISR surveillance orbits, higher air readiness assets ( ), and extended political consultations under Article 4 (NATO).

Politically, the Alliance has raised the bar for its ambitions: the goal of allocating up to 5% of GDP to defense by 2035 is a strong signal, lending credibility to the implementation of already approved regional plans.

The White House, despite some initial messages that were not always clear, has maintained its bottom line, namely that deterrence remains solid, with a renewed commitment to Article 5 and constant encouragement for Europe to increase its capabilities and take on a more decisive role in collective security.

Question: Eastern Front vs Southern Front: can the Mediterranean and Africa wait?

Preziosa: No! That would be a strategic mistake.

The Southern Front is an integral part of the security equation: it is where challenges such as forced migration, Russian and Chinese competition, instability in the Sahel and the Levant, and large-scale trafficking across the Mediterranean are concentrated.

The response must be two-pronged: while the integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) network is being closed in the East, maritime, air, and cyber capabilities must be strengthened in the South: from maritime surveillance to the fight against drones and coastal anti-ship missiles to the protection of underwater energy infrastructure. For Italy, balancing the East and South is not a luxury: it is a strategic imperative and a matter of national interest.

Question: War is moving to the skies: drones, missiles, aircraft. How do we defend ourselves?

Preziosa: Today, defense is primarily played out in the skies and requires a truly integrated and layered air defense system.

This means building a diversified network of sensors, ranging from long-range active and passive radars to medium- and short-range radars, infrared sensors, and surveillance platforms such as CAEW, all connected to a resilient data network.

But sensors alone are not enough: tracks must be fused in real time, there must be clear rules of engagement and a command system that is fast, secure and, above all, interoperable with allies.

In terms of response, modern defense must be multi-level.

First, an attempt is made to neutralize drones using “soft-kill” techniques such as jamming or spoofing; if this is not enough, “hard-kill” techniques are used, employing short- and medium-range missile systems or kinetic and non-kinetic air interceptors.

Added to this is the protection of critical points and the distribution of resources to prevent a saturation attack from crippling the entire system.

This is the logic of contemporary defense: multi-layered, integrated, and resilient, capable of dealing with different threats in increasingly complex scenarios.

Question: Underestimated missile/air defense in Europe: first steps?

Preziosa: Missile and air defense has been underestimated for too long: today we need layered systems, real stocks, NATO interoperability, and civil resilience.

General Conserva has clearly indicated the way forward: transforming air defense into aerospace defense, with five pillars: weapon systems, stocks, personnel, airports, and airspace management.

The war in Ukraine shows us the daily saturation of airspace with drones and missiles: we therefore need constant investment, modern infrastructure, and deterrence based not only on technology but also on training, readiness, and allied integration.

Question: Without space, there can be no serious defense. Will national efforts be enough, or will a collective response (NATO or EU) be needed?

Preziosa: Space is now a domain that serves the air, land, and sea.

National efforts are needed to leverage excellence: Italy has assets such as COSMO-SkyMed and SICRAL, as well as a first-rate dual-use industry.

Collective effort is also needed to develop shared Space/Domain Awareness (SDA/SSA), resilient warning and targeting capabilities, programs such as GOVSATCOM and IRIS², common standards, and shared costs.

NATO provides the operational architecture and military integration, while the EU provides finance, standards, and industrial impetus.

The winning formula is therefore a NATO-centric response in terms of deployment and an EU-centric response in terms of investment: in practice, a single space-ground “network of networks” to support alert, command, and engagement.