The Learning Wars: Meeting the Challenge of Continuous Adaption

Three and a half years into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a quiet but consequential competition is underway. It’s not just about weapons or territory. It’s about who can learn faster from the world’s most closely watched conflict. While China, Russia, and North Korea have formed what one might call a “learning and adaptation bloc,” sharing battlefield lessons and collaborating on military innovation, Australia appears to be falling behind in translating Ukraine’s hard-won insights for Pacific defense.

A new analysis by the well-regarded military analyst and former Australian officer, Mick Ryan, published by the Australian Army Research Centre reveals a troubling gap: while allies like Japan, Taiwan, and the United States have actively incorporated Ukraine lessons into their defense strategies and procurement programs, Australia’s 2024 National Defence Strategy shows “insufficient adaptation,” particularly in uncrewed systems, counter-drone technologies, and long-range strike capabilities.

This matters more than bureaucratic scorekeeping might suggest. The same authoritarian powers threatening stability in the Pacific are actively studying every aspect of the Ukraine war, from national decision-making processes to tactical drone operations. As the 2025 U.S. Intelligence Community Annual Threat Assessment warns, “bilateral relationships, largely in security and defense fields, have strengthened their individual and collective capabilities to threaten and harm the United States” and its allies.

The Authoritarian Learning Advantage

China’s approach to studying Ukraine reveals the systematic nature of this challenge. Unlike the ad hoc learning that often characterizes Western militaries, Chinese analysts have conducted comprehensive reviews covering everything from the national level to tactical operations. They’ve been particularly focused on how Western leaders make decisions about war, watching how the U.S. President, NATO alliance structures, and domestic media influence policy choices during the conflict.

This isn’t academic curiosity. Chinese military theorists believe American technological advantages can be mitigated through “protraction through accepting high human costs,” which could “shift the key factors of victory from modernization level to defense industrial base capacity and national defense mobilization.” In other words, they’re studying how to turn America’s impatience and limited industrial capacity against itself in a prolonged Pacific conflict.

Meanwhile, Russia has been sharing tactical innovations with China and North Korea in real-time. The 2025 threat assessment describes how these nations are “sharing battlefield lessons and collaborating in technology development and sanctions evasion.” North Korean troops fighting alongside Russians in Ukraine aren’t just providing manpower—they’re gaining combat experience that could be applied against South Korea or in support of Chinese operations.

Ten Lessons from Ukraine’s Laboratory

Ryan’s analysis identifies ten critical insights from Ukraine that should inform Pacific planning:

• Mass and National Mobilization represents a fundamental shift in 21st-century warfare. Ukraine has demonstrated how to integrate traditional military forces with massed uncrewed systems and sophisticated influence operations. Ukrainian crowdfunding organizations like Come Back Alive and Brave1 have created direct links between frontline soldiers and defense manufacturers, accelerating innovation cycles in ways Western bureaucracies struggle to match.

• Cognitive Warfare has emerged as a parallel battlefield. Russia’s influence operations affected U.S. congressional debates on Ukraine aid and the 2024 elections, while Ukraine’s strategic communications secured unprecedented Western support. The war has shown that nations must be capable of “concurrently winning both their wars and the narrative of their wars.”

• The People Factor reveals that quality still matters, but quantity can overcome qualitative advantages. Ukraine’s forces have generally outperformed Russian troops in innovation and adaptation, but Russia’s ability to recruit 30,000 new personnel monthly has allowed it to maintain pressure through sheer numbers.

• Meshed Commercial-Military Sensor Networks have created unprecedented battlefield transparency. Commercial satellites, social media, and open-source intelligence have given outside observers extraordinary visibility into military operations. However, this “transparent battlefield” still allows for surprise—satellites cannot “see into the minds of commanders or the hearts of combatants.”

• Ubiquitous Uncrewed Systems have collapsed the traditional distinction between mass and precision. Ukraine manufactures 4 million drones annually, representing what one analyst calls the age of “precise mass” where numerous actors can deploy sophisticated autonomous systems at scale.

• Cheaper, Accessible Precision Long-Range Strike has democratized strategic attack capabilities. Ukraine has developed integrated intelligence and strike systems capable of hitting targets 2,000 kilometers away, using a mix of domestic innovation and adapted foreign systems.

• Alliance Integration has proven essential for sustained operations. Ukraine’s adoption of NATO equipment and processes, even without formal membership, has enabled effective coalition support. This “interoperability” developed through peacetime exercises and training has become crucial for wartime effectiveness.

• Rapid Adaptation occurs at unprecedented speed. Both sides have transformed their military organizations, tactics, and technologies in months rather than years. Ukraine created an independent Unmanned Systems Force that serves as the “central nervous system” for drone operations across all domains.

• Surprise remains possible despite enhanced surveillance. Ukrainian operations in Kharkiv (2022), the Kerch bridge attack (2023), and the Kursk offensive (2024) all achieved tactical and operational surprise against a peer adversary.

• Leadership continues to determine outcomes. The war has reinforced that effective leadership, from national to tactical levels, remains the “cardinal human skill” in military institutions.

Pacific Translation Challenges

But applying these lessons in the Pacific requires careful adaptation. Ryan is very clear and very careful in applying lessons learned. His analysis proposes four “translation filters” that highlight crucial differences between European and Pacific operations:

Geography and Distance fundamentally alter military requirements. While Ukraine’s war primarily occurs on land across relatively short distances, Pacific operations are “inherently joint” due to vast ocean spaces. The distance from Hawaii to Guam alone is 6,400 kilometers, requiring different force structures, logistics systems, and operational concepts than those effective in Ukraine.

Terrain, Vegetation, and Weather create unique operational challenges. Many Pacific nations have forest coverage of 60-90 percent, compared to Ukraine’s 17 percent vegetation cover. Heavy tropical vegetation degrades drone sensor performance and complicates the “ubiquitous surveillance” that characterizes Ukraine operations. Additionally, annual typhoon seasons across the western Pacific can halt military operations entirely, a factor largely absent from the European theater.

Political and Cultural Environment differs markedly from Europe’s established alliance structures. The Pacific lacks an Asian NATO, instead relying on bilateral U.S. alliances and security partnerships. China actively works to “break down relationships and traditional security alliances” in ways Russia cannot match in Europe’s more institutionalized security architecture.

Adversary Capabilities present a fundamentally different challenge. China possesses the world’s largest navy, sophisticated space and cyber capabilities, and manufacturing capacity that dwarfs Russia’s. Unlike Russia’s isolated position, China has built extensive economic relationships globally, providing leverage to coerce neutral states during conflict.

The Speed of Modern Adaptation

Perhaps most concerning is the pace at which adversaries are learning. The Australian report notes that adaptation in Ukraine now occurs “at a speed that is probably incomprehensible to most Western politicians and defence bureaucrats.” Drone companies are becoming drone battalions in months. Electronic warfare systems evolve in weeks to counter new threats.

China, with its systematic approach to military learning since the 1991 Gulf War, is unlikely to start its learning “as slowly in a conflict as Russia did in 2022.” Chinese military organizations have developed what researchers call “a learning and adaptation culture” that has been practiced for decades before any actual conflict.

This creates a compounding problem: while Western democracies debate procurement timelines and budget allocations, authoritarian competitors are rapidly incorporating lessons into their military development. China’s massive industrial base, already larger than the U.S. in key areas, provides a foundation for scaling successful innovations quickly.

Closing the Learning Gap

Ryan’s analysis proposes several steps to address this challenge. First, Western militaries must develop better systems for identifying which Ukraine lessons apply to their specific strategic circumstances. Not every insight from European plains warfare translates to Pacific island operations.

Second, defense institutions need to fundamentally accelerate their learning processes. The report advocates for “problem-centric” rather than “trend-based” adaptation, focusing on specific operational challenges like degrading enemy surveillance, restoring offensive maneuver capabilities, and developing survivable logistics rather than simply copying Ukrainian solutions.

And frankly, my own work on the kinds of “autonomous” systems available today are best understood as tools for missions, not multi-functional capabilities.

Third, alliance frameworks require strengthening to enable faster collective learning. The lack of formal Pacific alliance structures like NATO creates coordination challenges that China actively exploits.

Most critically, Western defense establishments must overcome what Ryan calls their “cultural biases” against rapid change. Military institutions that take years to field new capabilities cannot compete against adversaries adapting in months.

The Stakes of Strategic Learning

The competition over Ukraine lessons represents more than military modernization. It reflects fundamentally different approaches to strategic adaptation. Authoritarian systems, despite their many disadvantages, can sometimes implement lessons faster due to centralized decision-making and reduced institutional friction.

China’s systematic study of how Western democracies make wartime decisions could provide decisive advantages in a Pacific conflict. If Chinese leaders understand American political constraints, alliance dynamics, and public opinion influences better than Americans understand Chinese decision-making, the implications extend far beyond military tactics.

Ryan concludes his report with a stark warning: “The new authoritarian learning and adaptation bloc is likely to intensify its activities in the coming years. This will complicate the learning and adaptation of nations in the Pacific in security, diplomatic, informational, and economic affairs.”

For Australia and its allies, the lesson is clear: in an era where adaptation speed may determine strategic outcomes, falling behind in the learning wars could prove as dangerous as falling behind in the arms race. The question is whether democratic institutions can learn fast enough to keep pace with their increasingly coordinated authoritarian competitors.

The Ukraine war continues, and its lessons keep evolving. But the competition to learn from those lessons and apply them first may ultimately prove as consequential as the battlefield outcomes themselves.

And I would a note of some optimism with regard to the ability of Western militaries do well in this race if they focus on what Ryan is calling for.

China pushes military modernization through AI, autonomy, and rapid prototyping, but true grassroots tactical innovation is stifled by the PLA’s culture and political system.

Chinese military innovation operates through centralized channels, with experimentation confined to designated research facilities and select units under strict Party oversight. Their conception of “bottom-up” innovation essentially amounts to managed testing environments rather than the empowerment of individual soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and junior leader’s characteristic of Western military doctrine.

This approach ensures institutional coherence and maintains political control, yet it may ultimately constrain the PLA’s capacity for real-time battlefield adaptation when facing opponents capable of decentralized, spontaneous innovation.

As military strategist Pasquale Preziosa observed: “Those who still train for risk are preparing for yesterday’s wars; tomorrow’s wars will be fought in uncertainty, inside the cognitive domain that rules them all.”

The study was entitled: Translating Ukraine Lessons for the Pacific Theatre and was published on August 19, 2025.