Beyond Cyber Defense: Building a Resilient Nation

The bill on strengthening national defense introduces a new regulatory framework for the protection of military cyberspace. This step paves the way for a broader reflection on the security of the nation as a whole, the protection of critical infrastructure, and the ability to withstand external pressures. From artificial intelligence to cooperation among institutions, industry, and the Armed Forces, resilience becomes an essential component of deterrence and Italy’s strategic autonomy.

Government Bill A.S. 2028, “Provisions for the Strengthening and the Adaptation of National Defense Capabilities,” currently under consideration by the Senate, represents an important step in the evolution of Italian security. Article 7 proposes to include in the Military Code a definition of cyberspace of national interest for the defense and military security of the State. It entrusts the identification and updating of this definition to the Minister of Defense and specifies the responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, designated as the Ministry’s cyber authority. The text provides for the protection of this space even in peacetime, through defensive cyber operations, without prejudice to the powers of other authorities and agencies responsible for national security.

This decision is consistent with the evolving strategic landscape and strengthens the regulatory framework for capabilities already present within the military. Operations in cyberspace are recurring tools for exerting pressure, gathering intelligence, conducting sabotage, and preparing for military operations. Assigning specific responsibilities and defining a clear chain of command is therefore a necessary step. The next step concerns the ability to link these actions to the resilience of the entire national system.

The transformation of national security requires, in fact, that the state continue to function when it is simultaneously subjected to pressures and attacks from different domains.

The defense of the territory and its borders remains essential. National security, however, also encompasses the protection of the functions and interdependencies upon which the country’s survival and its freedom of decision depend. Strengthening capabilities in the land, maritime, air, space, and cyber domains must therefore go hand in hand with a comprehensive understanding of the relationships that connect them.

Strategic competition can aim either to gain control of territory or to disrupt the functioning of the national system. A disruption of energy grids, an attack on satellite communications, the disruption of a logistics chain, a disinformation campaign, or a cyber operation against the financial system can have effects even without a conventional military offensive. The objectives may be multifold: disrupting services, damaging infrastructure, undermining citizens’ trust in institutions, increasing economic costs, and limiting the state’s ability to respond.

For this reason, national security must also be assessed in terms of the ability of the entire national system to maintain its essential functions, restore those that have been compromised, and adapt to changing conditions. Interdependencies enable the effects to spread from one sector to another: a power outage can compromise communications, transportation, and financial services, thereby amplifying the consequences of the initial attack.

Strategic competition also unfolds below the threshold of armed conflict. Economic, technological, informational, cyber, space-based, and military tools can be combined, with varying intensity, to exert pressure and alter strategic balances. This continuity of competition requires capabilities for prevention, response, and adaptation even in the absence of open hostilities.

Such a reality calls for a security architecture capable of linking the Armed Forces, intelligence, and cybersecurity with industry, research, universities, critical infrastructure, the energy sector, space, telecommunications, the financial sector, and public administration. National security thus becomes the responsibility of the entire national system, to be built through defined responsibilities and the ability to cooperate.

This is an approach already recognized by NATO. The resilience requirements updated in 2026 emphasize the continuity of government and essential services, civilian support for military operations, and coordination among government agencies, businesses, and society. The challenge lies in translating these principles into shared planning, available resources, and exercises that test the robustness of these interdependencies.

The war in Ukraine highlights this need. The country’s resilience also depends on the maintenance and restoration of power grids, communications, production, transportation, and public services, all supported by international aid. Attacks on infrastructure and communication networks demonstrate how military pressure can extend to the very conditions that allow society and the economy to function. None of these components, considered in isolation, can ensure national resilience.

China’s strategic guidelines also place emphasis on the integration of national capabilities. In March 2023, Xi Jinping explicitly highlighted the need to coordinate strategic resources, scientific innovation, infrastructure, reserves, and the resilience of industrial supply chains. This approach underscores the importance Beijing attaches to mobilizing the various components of national power. Competitive advantage also depends on the ability to make them cooperate and to adapt their use to changing conditions.

In this process, artificial intelligence could play a significant role, especially if it is developed on a solid foundation of science, technology, and domestic industry. For Italy, cultivating this capability means strengthening its autonomy in data management, system development, and support for strategic decisions. In addition to automating certain activities, it can support decision-making, contribute to the analysis of large amounts of data from different domains, identify vulnerabilities, simulate scenarios, and help recognize the interdependencies among critical infrastructures. Its contribution will depend on the quality and protection of the data, the verification of results, and the ability of institutions to maintain independent judgment and accountability for their decisions.

The strategic advantage will therefore depend on the quality of individual capabilities and the speed with which a state can understand their interactions, coordinate their use, and adapt the behavior of its national system. The effectiveness of a technology must also be evaluated in terms of the contribution it makes to the continuity of essential functions.

For this reason, resilience contributes to deterrence. A state that continues to function under pressure reduces the likelihood that the adversary will achieve, through coercion, the political objectives it pursues. The ability to absorb an attack, limit its effects, and restore services therefore influences the strategic calculations of those considering whether to attack.

Strengthening cyber dominance is an essential step in this process. The challenge lies in building an architecture capable of integrating defense, industry, research, critical infrastructure, space, artificial intelligence, the economy, and political leadership within an adaptive system. This integration must be accompanied by redundant capabilities, operational autonomy, and the ability to restore compromised functions.

Italy’s ability to face strategic competition will depend on the quality of its capabilities across various domains and their integration into a national system capable of remaining operational, cohesive, and adaptable.

Translated from the Italian from the original article published on Formiche. net on October 30, 2026 and published with the author’s permission.