From Paradigm to Production Line: Testing Training for the High-End Fight Against Quinn and McCoy
When I finished Training for the High-End Fight last year, the argument was a paradigm shift. Combat pilot training had to move from teaching the aviator to fly a platform toward building a decision-maker inside a kill web, using integrated live, virtual and constructive training (LVC), a living curriculum and partnership with industry.
The evidence came principally from the Italian International Flight Training School (IFTS) at Decimomannu, an operational multinational school training pilots for fourth- and fifth-generation fighters, where I had watched the future operating in the present tense.
A year later two senior American training commanders have laid out, in their own words, what it takes to run the real pipelines.
Lt. Gen. Clark Quinn commands Air Education and Training Command (AETC), which produced 1,518 pilots in fiscal 2026. Rear Adm. Max McCoy is Chief of Naval Air Training (CNATRA), still fighting to bring time-to-train back to entitlement. Their accounts test the book’s argument against the two largest U.S. pipelines, which operate at a different scale from an allied multinational school.
Three findings stand out. The diagnosis in the book has been accepted. The architecture it described is arriving in pieces. And the binding constraint for both commanders is not where the book spent most of its attention.
What the Book Argued
The book’s core claims can be stated briefly:
- The kill chain has given way to the kill web, and the pilot has become what Tom Webster called a quarterback in the cockpit: a systems manager and decision-maker, with stick-and-rudder skill as the foundation, not the pinnacle.
- Legacy trainers cause negative transfer. Hours spent compensating for a 1950s-designed aircraft build habits that must be unlearned in a fifth-generation squadron.
- LVC should be one integrated ecosystem, governed by what the Italians run as a “one simulation” principle: the software in the aircraft is the software in every simulator.
- The syllabus must be a living document. At IFTS, instructors from operational F-35 and Eurofighter squadrons meet their training counterparts every six months, and students reported four to five major curriculum changes in seven months.
- Government keeps accountability for syllabus, standards and examinations, while industry delivers infrastructure and aircraft in a genuine partnership.
- The metric should be whether training produces pilots who can win, not throughput or cost per student.
The Diagnosis Has Been Accepted
Quinn’s description of the pilot his command needs is nearly the book’s. He wants “systems integrators, systems managers, decision makers.” He says the T-38, a 1950s design built for Century Series fighters, cannot teach the management of information and systems, so new pilots first meet that workload in the F-22 or KC-46 schoolhouse. That is the negative-transfer problem and the cognitive-bandwidth problem, stated by the person who runs the pipeline.
In the book I reported Quinn’s recollection, as a T-38 instructor, that about a quarter of the syllabus went to teaching students to land without crashing, and I asked what else remains in the syllabus simply because it has always been there. Last Monday he asked that question himself, in a slightly different form: if a third of the T-38 syllabus goes to not breaking the airplane, what replaces it once the T-7 arrives? He said his team is working on that now. He also warned that swapping the T-7 in for the T-38 inside the existing syllabus would “miss the mark.”
The book also noted that the Air Force had dropped formation takeoffs and landings, which operational commanders no longer use. Quinn’s answer on Monday suggests that audit has moved from a single skill to a design principle.
McCoy’s version, in the book’s first chapter, was spoken when he was chief of staff to the Navy Air Boss: training “has to develop young aviators who appreciate their role within a larger maneuver/combat element.” The distinction is that the intent has not changed. What changed is that he now runs the machine that has to deliver it.
The T-7 and the M-346: Aspiration Versus Operation
The most direct test of the book’s thesis is the T-7A. At IFTS the M-346 costs roughly a third as much per hour as a Eurofighter, and the economic argument was that shifting tactical training from the operational jet to an advanced trainer improves outcomes while cutting cost. Quinn made the same argument about the T-7 in 2025: he hopes to move training now done in F-16s, F-35s and F-15EXs into it, avoiding costs on the order of $50,000 an hour.
Last Monday he made it concrete. If the T-7 flies basic fighter maneuvers as well as an F-35 or F-16, a student might complete enough sets before graduation that the ACC commander could cut four offensive BFM sorties in the F-16 to three. The same logic applies to air-to-air sweeps with constructed strikers on the ground. This is the book’s logic of LVC substituting for expensive live sorties in operational aircraft, now proposed inside the American pipeline.
The comparison also shows a difference in readiness. On this capability the Air Force is still aspirational, because the M-346 already has it. At IFTS, instructors on the ground inject synthetic aircraft, surface-to-air threats and emitters directly into the pilot’s cockpit displays, sensors and helmet, and the aircraft and pilot react as if the threats were real. That is routine operation today. That is fielded capability, not a development goal.
The Block 20 upgrade I described in the book is a separate, forward step that builds on that baseline with augmented reality in the helmet, AI-enabled coaching and biometric monitoring. Quinn said the T-7’s LVC will put a virtual wingman and constructed threats on the heads-down displays, with no visor display and none in the requirements, “yet,” and he described the requirements as written in a different time and place. The American trainer is still working toward what the Italian trainer already runs every day.
Timing is the second difference. The book observed that the first non-test T-7A would arrive in December 2025 and students would not begin training on it until early 2028, leaving at least two more years of T-38 habits. Quinn confirmed the August 2027 IOC date while acknowledging risk. Three aircraft are at Randolph, one nearly a dedicated maintenance trainer, about eight instructors have completed an instrument check ride, and there is no mission or instructor check yet. Beyond that, he expects the T-38 to keep flying pilot training until about 2037 or 2038 and says a single-pipeline T-7 is not planned. So the interim is longer than the book described, and the question I raised then, what offsets negative transfer in the meantime, applies for a decade, not two years.
A Living Curriculum, and Who Owns It
The book’s strongest claim about agility was that curricula can change in weeks because operational squadrons feed IFTS directly. Both American commanders are working the same problem through structure.
The Air Force moved the F-16, F-35 and MQ-9 formal training units from AETC to Air Combat Command. The stated rationale is that AETC teaches foundational skills while ACC shapes pilots from day one in the front-line aircraft. Quinn’s 2026 AETC Strategy asks that syllabi be checked against operational needs. McCoy describes his method as reverse engineering from what a first-tour junior officer must be able to do in the Fleet, back through the replacement squadron, advanced and primary training.
These are the right instincts, but they are slower mechanisms than the six-month harmonization I saw at IFTS. Italy kept the operational feedback loop inside one air force with a standing meeting. The American approach moves ownership of the final stage. Quinn also described AETC’s syllabus process as running through career functional managers, with the planning for a new counter-drone career field not starting until January 2027. The book’s yardstick, weeks instead of years, is still some distance from what either command can claim.
Partnership: Where Industry Sits
At IFTS the Italian Air Force retains accountability for syllabi, standards, examinations and instructor selection, while Leonardo and CAE provide aircraft, simulation, civilian instructors, logistics and facilities. Industry is a co-developer at the tactical edge of the pipeline.
The American commanders use outside capacity differently. Quinn offloads the foundation: students now arrive from civilian Part 141 schools with about 110 flight hours and three FAA credentials, leaving military instructors to teach formation, low-level flying and aerobatics. McCoy has CNATRA running entirely on contracted logistics support, expands contract instructor pilots, and uses the contract-operated rotary primary program, but says he does not want to outsource large parts of the enterprise more than necessary, because ship-based naval aviation carries a culture the syllabus alone cannot.
The contrast is instructive for the book’s recommendation to “embrace partnership models.” The U.S. has partnered where work is generic and scarce capacity is the issue. Italy partnered where work is fast-changing and technology-heavy. The two approaches answer different problems, and the book was written about the second.
McCoy’s concern about culture is also worth reading against the Italian model itself. At IFTS the air force did not outsource its standards or its culture: it kept the syllabus, examinations and instructor selection, and used industry for aircraft, simulation and support. Partnership on that model adds technology and capacity while leaving the service’s ownership of the aviator intact.
Standards, and What “Good Enough” Means Now
Webster’s critique in the book was that training produced pilots rated “good enough” and should aim for war winners. McCoy’s winging message, as I reported it, was that “good enough” is never acceptable, and he has rebuilt his approach around standards and earlier attrition decisions rather than a production percentage. His goal is time-to-train measured against entitlement.
That is close to my recommendation to measure what matters. The book asked for metrics that show whether training produces pilots capable of winning, not simply throughput. McCoy has moved off throughput as the main number. Quinn is earlier in that shift: he said the goal is for graduate quality to “match the scale,” but the number he is held to remains 1,500.
Quinn adds a complication that the book’s framing did not capture. Competency-based training shortens courses, but competence is not proficiency. A student who lands perfectly twice has shown competence, not the experience for a wet runway in a 17-knot crosswind.
This echoes a caution in the book’s chapter on Vice Admiral Cheever, who wanted a competent aviator ready to start high-end tactics on arrival at the fleet replacement squadron, but acknowledged that precision landing modes might leave pilots less able to fly manually when automation fails. The book’s argument to move beyond stick-and-rudder is right about the priority, and these commanders add a floor beneath it: enough repetition that experience backs up the cognitive skills.
Open Questions the Session Did Not Answer
A few themes in the book were absent from the November 16 session with Lt. Gen. Clark Quinn.
- Human-machine teaming. The book closes by asking what the human in the cockpit will do as aircraft grow more automated, and whether pilots should learn to employ collaborative combat aircraft in training. Quinn did not address crewed-uncrewed teaming last Monday.
- Quinn did raise something the book does not take up as far as I could find: other air forces are testing candidates for decision-making over flying aptitude. If the pilot is a decision-maker first, the front end of the pipeline may need to change as much as the syllabus.
- Coalition training. IFTS trains pilots from fifteen nations. Quinn’s 1,500 includes roughly 150 to 175 international students, and McCoy treats allied students as central to interoperability. The U.S. has the coalition element, but does not yet treat it as a design principle in the way the Italian model does.
What the Three Accounts Show Together
The diagnosis is no longer contested. Both commanders describe a pilot who manages systems and decisions, a legacy trainer that teaches the wrong habits, and LVC that must be built in. That is the book’s thesis, repeated by the people who control the budgets and the schedules.
The architecture is real but unevenly distributed. The M-346 system runs it routinely today at IFTS. The Air Force’s T-7 is still building toward that point, with a less advanced training suite and a longer road to full use.
The remaining gap is production capacity. Italy showed that a high-end training environment can be run as a working system, not a demonstration. Quinn and McCoy show what it takes to run one at national scale: aircraft, instructors, hours and a clean handoff to the operational force. The paradigm shift the book described will be delivered on those production lines, and the more mature the training system the services bring to them, the sooner it will arrive.
In a chapter on fifth-generation transition, I quoted Lt. Col. Chip Berke asking in 2015 why the community spent a decade debating “should we” instead of “how do we.”
A decade later the “should we” is settled.
The “how do we” is what Quinn and McCoy are now answering, one constraint at a time.
