Marine C2’s Shift from Enduring Bases to Expeditionary Hubs: A Perspective from Steel Knight 2025
The Marine Corps has long understood that the character of warfare is shaped not merely by weapons systems or technological innovation, but by how forces are trained, organized, and conceptually prepared for the operational environment they will face. Steel Knight 2025, was conducted from December 1-14, 2025, across Southern California and the greater Southwest, represented a significant evolution in how I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) prepares for the demands of Indo-Pacific contingencies. This exercise transcends the traditional model of large-scale training events as discrete readiness checks, instead functioning as a “campaign laboratory” or a venue where operational concepts are tested, refined, and validated against the friction of realistic scenarios before they are deployed in actual theater operations.
I was a guest of 3rd Marine Air Wing during the exercise, and I conducted a number of interviews during the exercise. This is the third of the interviews.
Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas Astacio commands Marine Air Control Squadron One (MACS-1), a unit at the forefront of one of the most significant transformations in Marine Corps aviation command and control. His unit is part of the 3rd MAW’s Marine Air Control Group 38.
During my recent visit to MCAS Miramar for the Steel Knight 2025 exercise I had a chance to talk with him about the evolving capabilities and approach of distributed C2 in Marine Corps evolution.
With 28 years in the Marine Corps, including 13 years specializing in aviation command and control, Astacio offers a unique perspective on how technological innovation, operational necessity, and strategic vision are reshaping how Marines detect, track, and engage threats in an era of peer competition.
His journey through the evolution of Marine air command and control capabilities provides a window into both the remarkable progress achieved and the challenges that remain as the Corps works to implement its Force Design 2030 vision in an increasingly contested operating environment.
Astacio’s command and control career began in 2011 at an air traffic control company in Beaufort, South Carolina, where he immediately deployed to Iraq’s Al Taqaddum Air Base. The equipment he worked with then represented what he now calls “big box equipment” or large, mobile radar systems with enormous footprints designed for enduring presence rather than expeditionary maneuver.
“We had large radars, two big radars, one that provided precision approach, one that provided airport surveillance radar,” Astacio recalls. The system included separate command and control systems, all requiring substantial lift capability and extended setup times. “It really wasn’t mobile from point A to point B. You set it up and it’s going to be enduring.”
This equipment paradigm made sense in the permissive environments of Iraq and Afghanistan, where the primary threats were indirect fire and mortars rather than sophisticated air defense systems or long-range precision strikes. Marines weren’t worried about peer adversaries shutting down their command-and-control nodes with electronic warfare or kinetic strikes. Mobility and signature management were secondary concerns to providing reliable air traffic control and airspace management.
The strategic shift toward major power competition changed everything. As potential adversaries developed sophisticated long-range strike capabilities, anti-access/area denial strategies, and advanced sensors, the Marine Corps recognized that large, static command and control nodes would become high-value targets in contested environments. The Corps needed command and control capabilities that could move, survive, and operate within the weapon engagement zones of peer competitors.
Astacio’s tour in Okinawa with the Marine Tactical Air Command Squadron illustrated another phase of evolution. The unit provided command post functionality for First Marine Aircraft Wing but reflected an organizational structure that Force Design 2030 would fundamentally reshape.
“That unit doesn’t exist anymore,” Astacio explains. The transformation wasn’t simply about renaming units but about reimagining how command and control capabilities integrate with distributed operations. The squadron was reorganized into a company-level element within the Marine Air Control Squadron structure, part of a broader effort to create more agile, deployable command and control packages aligned with the emerging Littoral Anti-Air Battalion concept.
The goal was clear: create smaller, more mobile command and control elements that could deploy forward with Marine littoral forces. The reality, as Astacio notes, proved more complex than changing organizational charts. Achieving genuine mobility and survivability required not just organizational redesign but fundamental technological transformation.
The most significant technological breakthrough in Astacio’s experience came with the fielding of the Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR), developed by Northrop Grumman. The impact was immediate and dramatic.
“We replaced five radars with one radar,” Astacio states. This single change revolutionized the logistics and operational footprint of Marine air command and control. Instead of multiple separate systems requiring extensive lift assets to transport and complex infrastructure to support, Marines could deploy a single multi-mission radar system capable of air surveillance, air defense, and counter-battery missions.
The mobility advantages extended beyond just consolidating equipment. A G/ATOR system can be transported by C-130 and potentially carried by the new CH-53K with its enhanced lift capacity and stability. Where previous systems required convoy transport and extended setup times, G/ATOR can deploy rapidly to austere locations.
Returning to the discussion, Lieutenant Colonel Astacio underscored that equally important was the fact that the quality and range of data G/ATOR provides surpassed previous systems. The radar’s ability to track multiple targets simultaneously while providing precision data enabled new operational concepts. However, Astacio acknowledges that “we still have some issues we need to work with that” regarding range optimization, noting the community has identified pathways forward.
The transition wasn’t seamless. Early fielding revealed substantial challenges that offer lessons for any major technology introduction. Marine maintainers trained on the previous AN/TPS-59 radar faced a steep learning curve with the new system. “Trial by fire,” Astacio describes it. Maintenance rates were initially poor as Marines learned to maintain and operate the sophisticated new equipment.
These problems highlight broader Department of Defense challenges with parts sustainability for new systems. “Expeditionary logistics is a real thing,” Astacio emphasizes. If the operational concept requires positioning radars throughout an area of operations in contested environments, the sustainment enterprise must support that reality.
Eight years into the G/ATOR program, reliability has improved substantially. “We are better than we were three years ago,” The trajectory is positive, demonstrating both the transformative potential of the technology and the time required to fully integrate new capabilities.
The F-35 Lightning II represents another technological game-changer for Marine command and control, The aircraft’s multi-waveform sensor capabilities and data fusion make it, in effect, a mobile airborne command and control node.
“Just having another mobile, airborne sensor to provide target quality data, that’s another game changer,” Astacio notes. The F-35 has sensors that can detect and track threats, providing the ground-based command and control system with additional eyes in the sky.
The fundamental issue facing C2 is being able to manage the complete data flow from these systems from start to finish. The challenge is to ensure that the sensors that pick up targets need to be able to pass that to any relevant shooter, a challenge yet to be fully mastered.
This integration gap has significant operational implications. The Marine Corps has invested heavily in both G/ATOR and F-35 precisely because they promise revolutionary command and control capabilities. But if data can’t flow seamlessly between systems to enable rapid targeting and engagement, the full potential remains unrealized
The challenge isn’t unique to the Marine Corps. Across the joint force and among allies, achieving true multi-domain integration requires overcoming classification barriers, developing common data standards, and creating operational procedures that enable rapid targeting cycles. The technical capabilities exist; the integration framework remains incomplete.
“We have to figure out how to do remote radar, which means I can position a radar forward,” Astacio explains. This requires communications over transmission protocols rather than hardwired connections, allowing the command post to operate from a more protected location while sensors push into the area of interest.
The key to making forward sensors survivable is coupling an active radar with passive detection systems. “Now you couple that radar with a passive system,” Astacio suggests. The passive system provides continuous surveillance without emitting electromagnetic energy that would identify the sensor location, while the active radar can be selectively employed when needed. “The passive data they’re creating rivals a lot of the active in terms of target quality.”
This distributed sensing model creates what Astacio calls “a targeting nightmare for the adversary.” Instead of a single command post to locate and strike, the adversary faces multiple nodes that may or may not be actual command locations. Some might be sensors, others might be decoys, and determining which merits striking becomes significantly more complex.
Given my work on maritime autonomous systems, it would seem to me that such systems offer potential platforms for these forward sensors. A stable autonomous vessel could carry a passive sensor package, operating for extended periods without exposing crewed platforms to risk. The sensor’s passive nature means it’s difficult to detect, and even if discovered, destroying an unmanned platform is less operationally significant than eliminating a crewed command post.
Survivability requires more than just distribution and deception. Astacio acknowledges the need for point defense capabilities to protect command and control nodes from incoming fires, whether rockets, missiles, or unmanned systems. The Marine Corps is fielding a prototype solution: the Medium Range Intercept Capability (MRIC), essentially the U.S. version of Israel’s Iron Dome system. The system fires interceptor missiles to destroy incoming threats, and it uses G/ATOR as its sensor. “The G/ATOR will really play that function,” Astacio confirms.
Even with more mobile equipment, the logistics of deploying command and control capabilities remain substantial. Astacio estimates that moving a Multi-Functional Forward Operating Base or similar command post requires several C-130 sorties to transport power equipment, radars, C2 systems, tentage, and supporting gear.
C-130s, however, are Marine Air-Ground Task Force assets with competing demands across the theater. Astacio frequently requests joint lift assets – C-17s or C-5s – to supplement organic Marine airlift. This dependency on joint or theater assets limits operational flexibility and requires advance coordination that may not be feasible in crisis response scenarios.
The CH-53K’s enhanced lift capacity may offer new options. While its ability to sling-load G/ATOR remains to be fully demonstrated, the aircraft’s stability during hover operations could make it viable for transporting sensitive radar components that previous helicopters couldn’t safely carry. These incremental improvements in deployment options enhance operational flexibility and reduce dependency on fixed-wing airlift.
Astacio’s assessment highlights that the Marine Corps has made substantial progress in creating more mobile, capable command and control capabilities. G/ATOR represents a genuine revolution in Marine air surveillance and control. F-35 offers unprecedented sensor capabilities. Force Design 2030 organizational changes align structure with new operational concepts.
Most fundamentally, the transition Astacio describes, from thinking in terms of bases to thinking in terms of hubs with distributed nodes, requires conceptual innovation as much as technological capability. The platforms and systems largely exist or are in development. What’s needed is imagination about how to employ them in ways that create dilemmas for adversaries rather than vulnerabilities for Marines.
“We’re heading in the right direction,” Astacio concludes. The baseline exists. The path forward is visible.
Lieutenant Colonel Astacio and Marines like him are working to ensure that when the nation needs expeditionary command and control capabilities in contested environments, the Marine Corps will be ready with solutions that are mobile, survivable, and effective. Their progress over the past decade suggests optimism is warranted, even as significant work remains.