From Partner to Threat: Germany, Russia and the Making of a New European Defense Order

11/16/2026
By Robbin Laird

How Putin squandered the most valuable relationship Russia had in the West, and what Berlin is building in its place

I spent much of the 1980s working on the Soviet Union, at the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Center for Naval Analyses and the Institute for Defense Analyses. In those years I toured West German cities and universities for USIA, and in 1986 I set up a working group at IDA on German unification. The Germans I met wanted two things at once. They wanted protection from Moscow, and they wanted a relationship with it. Ostpolitik was not naivety. It was a bet that engagement could make a divided continent safer.

For three decades after 1991 that bet looked as if it was paying off. It is now over. Germany has named Russia the greatest and most long-term threat to European security, is building toward the largest conventional army in Europe, and has put a combat brigade permanently on the Lithuanian border. This article traces the phases of the relationship since 1991, explains how Vladimir Putin threw away what Russia had in Germany, and looks at the defense relationship Berlin is now shaping inside NATO.

Phase one, 1990 to 1994: Germany pays for the exit

The first phase was a transaction. Under the 1990 Two-Plus-Four settlement the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw its forces from the former East Germany, and Bonn paid to make that possible. The federal government later put its budget outlay for the withdrawal and the troops’ reintegration at over DM 14 billion, of which DM 7.8 billion went to housing for returning soldiers in Russia. The last Russian troops left on 31 August 1994, four months ahead of the treaty deadline, at a ceremony in Berlin attended by Boris Yeltsin and Helmut Kohl.

This was also the era of German generosity toward a collapsing state. Berlin recognized the Baltic republics in the days after the failed August 1991 coup, and German citizens organized a large relief effort during the food shortages of the winter of 1991 to 1992. Germany became Russia’s principal Western interlocutor because it had the most to gain from a stable Russia and the most to lose from an unstable one.

Phase two, 1994 to 1999: partnership with a weak Russia

The Yeltsin years were the period of Russian weakness. German policy rested on the assumption that economic integration and institutional ties would anchor Russia in Europe. NATO enlargement in 1999 tested that assumption, but Berlin sought to manage it through NATO-Russia consultation rather than against Moscow. In the same period Germany itself crossed a threshold, sending soldiers into combat for the first time since 1945 in Kosovo in 1999. Even then, the German public and political class understood the use of force as an exception to a posture of restraint, and Russia as a country to be brought in, not held off.

Phase three, 2000 to 2005: the courtship

The high point came on 25 September 2001, when Putin became the first Russian head of state to address the Bundestag, and delivered most of the speech in German. Deputies applauded repeatedly. The business daily Handelsblatt compared the scene to the uncritical Gorbachev-mania of the 1980s, a comparison those of us who watched the 1980s will recognize. Putin spoke of Russia’s place in a united Europe and of the weight of shared history.

The courtship had a commercial core. In 2005, at the end of Gerhard Schröder’s chancellorship, Germany and Russia signed the deal for Nord Stream 1, an undersea pipeline that bypassed Ukraine. Soon after leaving office Schröder became chairman of the shareholders’ committee of the pipeline company, after having called Putin a flawless democrat. The most important commercial decision in the relationship was made by a chancellor who then went to work for it.

Phase four, 2005 to 2014: interdependence as strategy

Under Angela Merkel the relationship became a managed interdependence, summed up in the German slogan Wandel durch Handel, change through trade. Nord Stream 1 began operating in 2011 and 2012. In 2008 Berlin and Paris blocked a NATO membership path for Ukraine and Georgia, in part to avoid provoking Moscow. German industry deepened its Russian business, and Russian raw materials became the foundation of German energy supply.

This was the period in which the Western alliance’s European pillar stayed unfinished. Germany spent little on defense, relied on the United States for deterrence, and treated Russia as a commercial partner whose security behavior could be moderated. I wrote about the Franco-German effort to build that pillar in the 1980s and 1990s, and I came to see this phase as a strategic holiday, one that later had to be paid for.

Phase five, 2014 to 2021: the warning ignored

Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its war in the Donbas should have ended the strategy. Germany joined EU sanctions, and some German exports to Russia fell. But the core of the relationship survived. In 2015, a year after the annexation, Gazprom and European partners signed the agreement for Nord Stream 2, which would have doubled the flow of Russian gas under the Baltic. The pipeline was completed in autumn 2021.

By then the dependence was deep. Bilateral trade reached about €59.7 billion in 2021, making Germany Russia’s second-largest trading partner after China. Russia supplied roughly 55 percent of Germany’s gas, about a third of its crude oil and around half of its hard coal. The German historian Bastian Scianna has identified excessive dependence on Russian energy and the rejection of military support for Ukraine among Berlin’s cardinal mistakes since 1991. That is a fair summary of where Germany stood on the eve of the invasion.

Phase six, 2022 to today: rupture

Putin’s full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022 ended the relationship in a week. Within days Chancellor Olaf Scholz suspended Nord Stream 2 certification, approved weapons deliveries to Ukraine, and in his 27 February Bundestag address announced a €100 billion special fund for the Bundeswehr and a commitment to spend more than two percent of GDP on defense. He called the invasion a Zeitenwende, a turning point.

The economic unwinding was as fast as the political one. Russian pipeline gas stopped flowing to Germany by the end of September 2022, the month the Nord Stream pipelines were wrecked by explosions. German imports from Russia fell from €36.4 billion in 2022 to €1.8 billion in 2024, and German exports from €14.5 billion to €7.6 billion, according to figures from the German Eastern Business Association. Russia dropped from twelfth to fifty-ninth among Germany’s suppliers.

The new government of Friedrich Merz, in office since 2025, has not tried to restore the old model. A Polish Centre for Eastern Studies analysis in May 2026 concluded that Merz’s government regards Russia as the principal direct threat to Germany’s security and does not intend to return to the previous model of cooperation with Moscow. Merz himself has said of Putin that he sabotages, he spies and he murders. During his visit to Vilnius he put it more simply: there is a threat to us all from Russia.

How Putin squandered Germany

Consider what Moscow had in Germany in 2021 and what it holds today.

It had Europe’s largest economy as its second-largest trading partner, a major customer for its pipeline gas, a source of industrial technology and capital, a political class in which major parties and a former chancellor argued for engagement, and a public with deep historical sympathy and a strong aversion to military force. It had a Germany that blocked NATO enlargement to its borders and refused to arm Ukraine. A Russia with a strategic interest in keeping Europe divided and weak could hardly have designed a better partner.

It traded all of that for a war that has not delivered what Moscow sought. Germany is now Europe’s largest military donor to Ukraine, with roughly €40 billion provided since 2022 as of late 2025, a record €11.5 billion in the 2026 budget, and a planned €8.5 billion a year from 2028 to 2030. The nature of the support has changed from handing over stocks to co-producing weapons, through the Build with Ukraine initiative and joint ventures on German soil. The energy leverage is gone, the gas market has been rebuilt around Norway and American LNG, and the Russian share of German trade is a rounding error.

Two points of balance belong here. First, Germany’s own responsibility is real. Berlin chose the dependence, ignored the warnings of its eastern neighbors, and paid a high price to correct it. Second, the correction has created a new exposure: about 92 percent of Germany’s LNG imports came from the United States in 2025, at a time when Washington’s own strategic priorities are shifting. The lesson of the Russian episode is that dependence on any single supplier is a strategic vulnerability, whoever the supplier is.

But on the central question the answer is clear. Putin did not just lose a customer. He turned the one large European state that had the strongest interest in a stable relationship with Russia into the state most committed to defending Europe against it.

The new defense relationship inside NATO

Germany’s response is now visible in doctrine, money and deployments.

Doctrine. In April 2026 the defense ministry and the Generalinspekteur published the General Concept of Military Defence. It treats Russia as the greatest and most long-term threat to security in Europe. It sets a path in stages: improving existing capabilities across all branches through 2029, significantly increasing troop numbers and capabilities by 2035, with a planned total of 460,000 soldiers and reservists, and making the Bundeswehr the largest and most technologically advanced conventional army in Europe by 2039. The document also says Germany intends to take on a larger share of the role the United States has played in European security. Chancellor Merz had set out the same ambition in November 2025, citing what he called a real threat from Russia.

Money. The 2027 draft budget lifts core defense spending to about €109 billion, up from about €82 billion in 2026, with a finance ministry projection of 3.5 percent of GDP by 2029. This rests on the 2025 constitutional change that exempts defense spending above one percent of GDP from the debt brake. Industry has responded, with Rheinmetall alone reporting an order backlog of about €80 billion.

Forward presence. The 45th Armoured Brigade in Lithuania is the first German combat brigade permanently based outside Germany since the Bundeswehr was founded in 1955. It is to reach about 4,800 soldiers in five battalions by the end of 2027 and has taken command of the NATO multinational battlegroup in Lithuania. Lithuania borders both Kaliningrad and Belarus, and Berlin’s own defense ministry has called it the most endangered state on NATO’s eastern flank. Germany’s Support Command chief, General Gerald Funke, has warned that a Russian attack on NATO’s eastern flank is possible within two years and that Germany would be the alliance’s main logistics hub in any such conflict.

Leadership. The appointment of Lieutenant General Christian Freuding, who ran the ministry’s Ukraine staff, as Generalinspekteur from February 2027, alongside General Carsten Breuer’s move to chair NATO’s Military Committee, gives Berlin the senior military post inside the alliance and the senior military post at home at the same time. Freuding’s Army is already building a drone regiment that applies what the Ukraine war has taught about unmanned systems, electronic warfare and rapid iteration.

Seen together, these steps point to a new institutional geometry inside the alliance, one I have argued for in The Unfinished Pillar. Germany becomes the logistical and mobilization hub. Poland, the Nordic states and the Baltics form the operational frontier. France and Britain, with their nuclear forces and expeditionary capacity, provide the strategic reserve. This is not the Franco-German engine that Europeans talked about for decades. It is a networked pillar in which Germany’s weight is industrial, logistical and, increasingly, conventional-military.

What could go wrong

The direction is clear. The delivery is not. Three tests stand out.

People. The Bundeswehr stood at 186,705 soldiers in July, its largest in about 13 years, against a target of 260,000 active soldiers by the mid-2030s. Press reports in September said Berlin was preparing to order up to 1,000 serving soldiers into the Lithuania brigade, even as voluntariness remains the stated principle. Public will is thin: an August Forsa poll cited by the Polish Institute of International Affairs found that only 16 percent firmly said they would defend Germany, while 59 percent expressed varying degrees of refusal.

Money. The special fund was a one-off. From 2028 the build-up depends on borrowing the Bundestag authorizes budget by budget, and fiscal conservatives are already asking how long defense can stay outside the debt brake.

Politics. Analysts at the Polish Centre for Eastern Studies note that rising economic costs may increase pressure on the Merz government to resume some dialogue with Russia. The chancellor has not ruled out future contact. A Germany that is rearming against Russia while its economy struggles and its far-right opposition grows will have to hold a consensus that has not yet been tested by a long, expensive peace.

The closing of a circle

In 1994 Germany paid to see the last Russian soldier leave German soil. By the end of 2027 the Bundeswehr will have some 4,800 soldiers on the border of Kaliningrad and Belarus. Between those two dates Germany tried engagement, trade and energy interdependence, and each of those instruments was turned against it. Putin’s war ended Ostpolitik more completely than any German critic ever could. What replaces it is not hostility for its own sake. It is a Germany that has concluded, after thirty years, that Russia can be deterred but not trusted, and that it must carry the larger part of that deterrence in Europe itself.

Sources

  • Bundesregierung, statement by the Federal Finance Minister on the farewell to Russian troops, 31 August 1994; Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, chronicle entry of 9 October 1990.
  • Bundestag, transcript of Putin’s address of 25 September 2001; Meduza, 26 September 2026; World Socialist Web Site, 3 October 2001 (Handelsblatt reaction).
  • Angela Stent, Assessing the Zeitenwende, US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 27 February 2025.
  • Eurozine, The ruins of Ostpolitik; Engelsberg Ideas, How Germany misread Russia for three decades; DGAP, After Ostpolitik, April 2023.
  • Atlantic Council, Experts React: What is behind Germany’s stunning foreign-policy shift; Al Jazeera, 27 February 2022.
  • IEEFA, Germany’s gas dependence weakens its energy security; Clean Energy Wire, Germany’s dependence on imported fossil fuels; Defence24, Germany no longer trusts Russia (citing Süddeutsche Zeitung and the German Eastern Business Association); The Moscow Times via Charter97, Russia’s trade with Germany.
  • Robbin Laird, Russian Geopolitical Challenges: Economic Relations with Germany, Defense.info, 8 August 2025.
  • Polish Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), A new Ostpolitik? Ukraine as a priority of the Merz government, 13 May 2026; Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), Germany’s new military strategy, Spotlight 22/2026, 27 April 2026.
  • Euronews, 28 August 2026 and Germany stations army brigade in Lithuania amid Russian threat; London Loves Business, 14 September 2026; Kyiv Post; Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Deutschland und Litauen stärken NATO-Ostflanke; eNCA, Merz warns of Russia threat.
  • Anadolu via Yeni Şafak, 7 November 2025 (Merz on building the EU’s strongest army).
  • Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, press release of 5 November 2026, and related reporting on the Freuding appointment, drone regiment, 2027 budget and Bundeswehr personnel figures, as compiled in the companion article From the Ukraine Desk to the Top of the Bundeswehr, 11 November 2026.