Forging the Combat Pilot: Lt. Gen. Clark Quinn on the Training Challenge
When Lt. Gen. Clark Quinn opened his conversation with the Mitchell Institute, he said something that is easy to pass over in a session about T-7s, live-virtual-constructive training and a record pilot production year. AETC, he said, exists to supply Airmen to the operational force, and all of the technology “is underpinned by instructors and educators and recruiters.” In his words: it is the human, not the technology.
That sentence frames his whole view of the challenge. Quinn is not describing a training enterprise that needs better gadgets. He is describing one that has to change what it asks of a pilot, while it scales output, ages out its trainers and hands students to operational commands that now shape them earlier than before. This article lays out how he sees each of those pressures.
A Small Part of AETC, an Outsized Share of Attention
Quinn began with proportion. Pilot training is about three to five percent of what AETC does. Of roughly 50,000 Airmen brought in each year, about 1,500 become pilots. His priorities for the command are broader: forging Airmen who see themselves as Airmen first, attracting the next generation, modernizing training for speed and agility, and quality of life for the instructors and families who keep the pipeline running.
He was candid that pilot training gets attention beyond its share, “as it should,” because it is the Air Force’s core business. But the framing matters. The combat pilot is being built inside a command that is also trying to produce air-minded warriors who understand mission command from their first weeks in uniform, and who can make decisions when they are the only one present to make them.
The Pilot as Systems Integrator
Asked what the Air Force needs from future pilots, Quinn answered that he needs them to be “systems integrators, systems managers, decision makers.” Stick-and-rudder skill is the foundation. It is not the point.
The problem he described is a mismatch between the aircraft that teach and the aircraft that fight. The T-38 is a 1950s design, built to prepare pilots for Century Series fighters that were hard to fly. None of today’s aircraft fly like that. What they demand is the ability to manage large amounts of information, process it and decide. Neither the T-6 nor the T-38, as they currently are, can simulate that. So the first time a new pilot meets that workload is in the F-22 schoolhouse, or the KC-46 schoolhouse, not in undergraduate training.
He added a point about selection. Other air forces, he said, are examining whether the tests they give candidates (he cited the AFOQT and related scores) measure the right things. Some are screening for who is best at weighing disparate information and deciding, rather than for raw flying aptitude. The U.S. has not made that shift, he said, but he is aware others have. He noted that his Australian counterpart would be in town later that day.
The T-7A: Do Not Just Swap the Jet
Quinn said the T-7A’s initial operational capability remains August 2027, and acknowledged risk to that date. He defined IOC in AETC’s terms: 14 aircraft on the ramp, a cadre of instructors who are proficient and ready to teach, and a flight envelope expanded far enough to do the T-7’s mission. Of those three, he controls one, the instructors. The aircraft depend on the program office, Boeing and its subcontractors. The envelope depends on the test community. If everything arrives in August 2027, he said, it will be too late, because instructors need months in the jet first.
Where things stand at Randolph: three T-7As, one close to a dedicated maintenance trainer, two flying. About eight initial-cadre pilots have completed an instrument check ride. There is no mission or instructor check yet. That has to be built.
Quinn flew the T-7 at Edwards about ten or eleven months ago, in a restricted envelope. His second landing, he said, was probably better than his average T-38 landing. He admitted wondering whether the jet might be too easy to fly, since he wants to test certain skills early. But his main message was about the syllabus: if the Air Force simply replaces the T-38 with the T-7 in the existing syllabus, “we are really going to miss the mark.”
His illustration was pointed. If a third of the T-38 syllabus goes to teaching pilots not to break the airplane (stalls, no-flap approaches and the other things that make it hard to fly), what replaces that time if the T-7 does not need it? He said his team is working on that now.
He also described the ground-based training system at Randolph. He flew a three-ship in the simulator, with a T-7 as lead and a T-38 as number two. His instructor reminded him that when he spoke on tower frequency he was talking to the actual tower. That, Quinn said, is the difference from current training, where a student talks to tower while looking over a shoulder at the instructor. Networked simulation of this kind is already routine at some allied schools, including Italy’s International Flight Training School with the M-346; for AETC it is new.
On whether the T-7 might eventually replace the T-6 in undergraduate training, he said yes, it is being considered, but not planned. It is premature until more aircraft are on the ramp, instructors are qualified and a few students have flown it. A single-pipeline T-7 force would mean buying many more than are programmed. A decade or so out, when the T-6 needs recapitalizing, may be the natural decision point.
LVC: Pulling Tactics Forward
Quinn described live-virtual-constructive capability from the cockpit. A pilot in a T-7 can have a virtual wingman, a human flying a simulator at Randolph, who appears on the pilot’s heads-down displays but not outside the canopy. There is no visor display, “yet.” A constructive entity is simply an instructor’s input, an aircraft or a ground threat with nobody behind it.
He was careful about where this belongs. In the early phases he wants students flying formation against real aircraft, not virtual ones. LVC matters toward the end of the pipeline, in what is now the fighter-bomber fundamentals phase. There he sees an opportunity to move sorties out of the formal training units and into the T-7. If students arrive having flown enough basic fighter maneuvers in the T-7, the ACC commander might decide four offensive BFM sorties in the F-16 can become three. The same logic extends to surface attack: an air-to-air sweep supported by constructed strikers on the ground, he said, was hard to do in operational units ten years ago, and the T-7 would let the pipeline do it.
His consistent line on immersive technology is that it assists instructors and does not replace them. A headset lets a trainee see an aircraft engine before touching one, so the learning curve is steeper. An adaptive tutor on a tablet can detect where a student is weak and send them back to the material, without an instructor watching.
Scale: 1,518 Pilots and the Question of Quality
AETC produced 1,518 pilots in fiscal 2026. Quinn put that in historical context. The last verifiable year at 1,500 was 1991, when Reese and Williams were open and the Air Force had about 200 more trainer aircraft. Theoretical capacity then was well over 2,000, so 1,500 was roughly 75 percent of what the system could do. Today, with fewer bases and aircraft, 1,500 is essentially maximum production. The extra 18 were not from lower attrition, he said, but from people put into the system in fiscal 2025 who graduated a year later.
Of the 1,500, just under 1,000 are active duty, with Guard, Reserve and roughly 150 to 175 international students making up the rest. The number is driven by the health of the career fields, the captains and field-grade officers needed across platforms.
The hybrid model with civilian Part 141 schools is how the command reached that scale. Students arrive with a private pilot certificate, an instrument rating and a multi-engine rating, and about 110 flight hours. Quinn anticipated the objection: a leading air force had to go to civilian flight schools to make pilots? He answered that this is how the force was built in World War II. His logic is that a combat-ready C-17 or F-22 pilot should not be teaching an ILS approach, a universal skill. Civilian schools can handle weather, GPS and navaids, while military instructors focus on low-level flying, formation and aerobatics.
He did not claim the question is settled. There is, he said, a lot of emotion about how it was done. AETC will keep evolving the T-6 syllabus to make sure the quality of graduates is what the operational force expects.
Competency Versus Experience
Quinn is an advocate of competency-based training, with a stated caution. If a six-month course can reach competency in five, he is inclined to end it early. “Nobody joins the Air Force to be in training,” he said, and the job is to get students to the operational force.
But he illustrated the limit with a T-6 student who lands perfectly on his first flight. The instructor does not give the top grade, and a second perfect landing shows competency. That does not mean the student is ready for a wet runway and a 17-knot crosswind, which is not in the syllabus and comes only from experience. Competency is demonstrated capability; proficiency is the experience a pilot can fall back on. The syllabus needs enough events to build both.
Flying Hours as a Production Equation
For operational units, Quinn said, peacetime flying hours measure readiness. For AETC they are a production equation: hours per student, re-flies, weather attrition, instructor support sorties, instructor currency. If the hours do not arrive, production drops directly. AETC flies about a quarter to a third of the Air Force’s flying hours at roughly ten percent of the cost, because T-6 and T-38 hours are the cheapest the service flies. He expects the T-7 to cost about the same as the T-38, perhaps a little more. He also pointedly asked for a fiscal 2027 budget.
Instructors: The Wingman Test
Quinn’s standard for the instructor force is simple. Instructors must have operational experience and be relevant. Those returning from a major weapon system are asked to graduate students they would want as their own wingman or co-pilot in that system. If they would not, “we need to adjust what we’re doing.” Adjustments flow largely through pilot instructor training at Randolph. Supply depends on a partnership with the Air Force Personnel Center and the other major commands that provide the people.
The Seams: Formal Training Units and Absorption
Quinn spoke carefully about what lies beyond AETC’s gate. The F-16, F-35 and MQ-9 formal training units now belong to Air Combat Command. Mobility and AFSOC units stay in AETC, a decision briefed to the Chief of Staff at the Corona meeting and accepted by the owning commands because there was no operational benefit to moving them. He noted AETC has never owned all the FTUs.
His concern is the break between wings and combat-rated status. Three or four years ago, leaders chose to “pressurize the system” by producing 1,500 pilots before building absorption capacity, partly because few believed AETC could do it. Now that it has, the risk is lost time: a winged pilot waiting for an FTU seat is burning an active-duty service commitment without being productive, and an FTU graduate arriving at a unit not ready to fly them has the same problem. He said the Air Force’s A3 and the Chief of Staff are working on it.
An Aging Trainer
On the T-38, Quinn said mission-capable rates are around 50 percent and unlikely to improve for a 65-year-old, out-of-production aircraft whose engines are overhauled repeatedly. Engines were the limiting factor when he arrived at 19th Air Force, forcing cuts in flying. That has been corrected. He expects the T-38 to keep flying pilot training missions until about 2037 or 2038, with the caveat of an unforeseen failure. Most pilots now get their wings in the T-6, so the T-38 was not what constrained the 1,500 goal. The Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training program at Sheppard, about 180 students a year, still needs it for wings.
The Challenge as Quinn Frames It
The following synthesis is the author’s reading of the session rather than Quinn’s own wording.
Three pressures run through his remarks. The first is capacity: aircraft, instructors, hours and bases, now at their practical ceiling at 1,500 a year. The second is content: the pilot of the future is a decision-maker and systems manager, and the training aircraft cannot yet teach that. The T-7, LVC and a rewritten syllabus are his answer, but they are not in place, and August 2027 depends on parts of the enterprise he does not control. The third is the seams: where AETC’s work ends and ACC’s, the FTUs’ and the operational squadrons’ begins, and whether students are absorbed without losing the time and talent the pipeline just produced.
Underneath all three is his opening point. Technology multiplies instructors and does not substitute for them. A training system that tries to run faster, with younger and more digitally native students, still depends on experienced aviators coming back to teach and on a standard of whether graduates are people they would fly with.
