The Navy Hasn’t Become an Army. It’s Been Fighting the Wrong War With the Right Fleet

11/18/2026
By Robbin Laird

Eric Lies has done the sea services a service with “The Armyfication of the Navy.” His central worry that the fleet has drifted into fixed op-boxes, tethered to carrier air ranges and vulnerable ports, trading away the mobility that once made it strategically distinct is worth taking seriously. He is right that a force built to loiter off a coast in support of a land war is not the same force that needs to survive and fight a peer competitor. And he is right that the sensing revolution he describes, persistent radar, satellite constellations, cheap loitering autonomous sensors, has made the ocean a far less forgiving place to hide than it was even fifteen years ago.

Where I’d push back gently is on the diagnosis of cause. Lies treats the Navy’s problem as a doctrinal choice, a set-piece mentality inherited from Iraq and Afghanistan that the service simply needs to unlearn.

I think the deeper issue is that the fleet he’s describing was built around a single organizing principle: the multi-mission manned platform as the source of combat power. That principle, not any particular doctrine written on top of it, is what produces fixed op-boxes. A carrier air wing has a range. Once you’ve built a fleet whose fighting power lives inside a handful of large, expensive, sensor-and-shooter-integrated hulls, you have already decided where those hulls need to sit, and the enemy only has to work out where that is.

This is the argument Ed Timperlake and I have been making for several years now under the heading of kill webs rather than kill chains, and more recently in payload-utility terms: the question is not whether a platform can sense and shoot, but whether target acquisition and target engagement can be bought separately, from different places, so that no single asset’s position determines the fleet’s exposure.

A capital ship stops being the source of combat power and becomes a payload-utility manager, a C2 node orchestrating a mesh of cheaper, more numerous, more dispersible sensors and shooters. That shift, if it happens, addresses Lies’s fishbowl problem at its root, because it removes the incentive to concentrate expensive, trackable mass in predictable places in the first place. It doesn’t make the fleet invisible. It makes visibility less decisive, because there is no longer one obvious center of gravity to find and kill.

I’d also gently push on his suggestion that studying how the PLA Rocket Force plans to fight is the first order of business. It’s not wrong, but it risks pointing attention toward the adversary’s shooters when the more tractable near-term problem is our own logistics.

The USV wolfpack work I’ve written on, Ukraine’s harassment of the Crimean shadow fleet, and the same logic applied to a prospective Taiwan Strait crossing, suggests that an invasion fleet’s sustainment tail, not its first wave, is where a distributed, unmanned mesh can do disproportionate damage at low cost and low risk to crewed platforms.

If that logic holds for an adversary’s amphibious logistics, it should also discipline how we think about our own: the ports and sustainment chains Lies rightly flags as newly vulnerable are exactly the seam where a distributed autonomous mesh, not a hardened pier, is the answer.

None of this is to claim the problem is solved, or that the mesh-fleet direction is fully built out for it isn’t, and I don’t think anyone seriously working this problem would claim otherwise. The 2016 fleet architecture studies

My own sense, for what it’s worth, is that that the “armyfication” Lies is diagnosing is really the last visible symptom of a fleet still organized around the old logic even as procurement debates and a handful of programs quietly shift toward the new one.

Reversing it will take longer, and be messier, than a change in mindset. But the direction, dispersed, numerous, cheaper nodes married to a smaller number of platforms managing rather than generating combat power, is at least a concrete answer to the question Lies leaves open: what does a Navy that isn’t an army at sea actually look like when it puts to sea?

See the following:

The Armyfication of the Navy