How Soon Will the U.S. Return to Afghanistan?

Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban just announced the country will re-open its embassy in Muscat, Oman.

This follows the United Arab Emirates’ acceptance of the credentials of the Afghan ambassador in August. And in January, Chinese leader Xi Jinping personally accepted the credentials of the Afghan ambassador to Beijing. (China’s new ambassador to Afghanistan was officially received  in September 2023.)

And in July, the Taliban government withdrew recognition from the embassies established by the ousted Islamic Republic, shuttering outposts in several European countries, and bringing the number of embassies and consulates they control to 39.

The countries bordering Afghanistan have taken a different approach than the U.S. and Europe and have maintained embassies in Kabul and actively engaged the government, though none have officially recognized the new government.

There are currently seventeen embassies plus a European Union delegation in Kabul. (Qatar represents U.S. interests in Kabul.)

In Central Asia, Kazakhstan removed the Taliban from its terrorist list in December 2023; Uzbekistan never declared the Taliban an extremist group and in 2018 publicly encouraged the Taliban to start negotiations with the Islamic Republic. Turkmenistan was mum on the topic of the Taliban in line with its policy of permanent neutrality. In September 2024, the chief of Tajikistan’s security service visited Kabul for talks that were described as “productive,” and the same month the Kyrgyz Republic removed the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations.

Uzbekistan’s prime minister visited Kabul in August and the visit resulted in 35 investment and trade agreements worth $2.5 billion, with a goal of increasing bilateral trade to $3 billion. Simultaneously, Kabul hosted a trilateral meeting of  the economy ministers of Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan on ways to enhance regional trade ties.

Two weeks later, Uzbek and Afghan officials attended the opening of the Termez International Trade Center, in the border town of Termez, the location of the Friendship Bridge that connects Termez with the Afghan dry port of Hairatan.

Afghanistan and its Central Asian neighbors are collaborating to ease trade and transport; renovate Afghanistan’s roads and railroads; help Afghanistan improve irrigation projects; ship natural gas from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India; build a railroad from Uzbekistan to Pakistan’s seaports; and build a multi-modal transport corridor from Kazakhstan to Pakistan, terminating in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

So, while the Central Asian republics are busy trying to set the terms for future relations with Afghanistan, when will the Americans return to Kabul?

Probably not for a long time.

The U.S. evacuated its embassy in South Vietnam when Saigon fell in April 1975 and did not lift the trade embargo until 1994, though an arms embargo was in place until 2016. Both countries opened embassies in 1995. That is 41 years to resume “normal” relations and that was probably only because China’s power in the region was waxing.

Why might the U.S. be slow to return to Kabul?

U.S. officials and politicians are still angry and humiliated that after two decades, unlimited funding, and loose rules of engagement, America was bested by the low-tech Taliban. Human rights advocates, diaspora Afghans, 9-11 families, and veteran groups may oppose normal relations, with the latter urging U.S. leaders to “honor the sacrifice” of the dead and wounded troops

The United States has imposed a range of sanctions on the Taliban, dating back to their first time in power in the 1990s. These sanctions were tightened after the 11 September 11 2001 attacks on the U.S. The Taliban and the Haqqani Network were labeled as Specially Designated Global Terrorists, allowing U.S. authorities to block and seize their assets and making it a crime to do business with them.

Additionally, the U.S. has frozen more than $7 billion in Afghan government reserves held in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Unwinding the sanctions will be long and difficult and Western businesses will still be reluctant to deal with a Taliban government unless they get approval up-front, which the U.S. sanctions bosses will refuse to do.

And the U.S. is offering rewards for the capture of high-ranking Taliban personalities, so the Afghan government won’t be motivated to deal with U.S. as long as Americans are offering  bounties for their capture.

Are the Taliban in any hurry to welcome the Americans back to Kabul?

Probably not, as they feel they won the war and they shouldn’t be the ones asking for anything. They may be able to get investment from China, and Russia and India will offer trade and some diplomatic support. They are busy dealing with Iran and Pakistan over the millions of Afghan refugees they are hosting, and are starting to expel. Pakistan is angry the Taliban haven’t done anything to rein in the Pakistan Taliban, and Kabul needs to keep an eye on Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.

The Taliban are seized with the Qosh Tepa Canal in a quest for food security, and that may drive negotiating water sharing agreements with the Central Asia republics. In addition, Afghanistan and Iran and Pakistan also have outstanding disagreements on sharing water resources. The Taliban also want to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative and that probably won’t happen soon but it burn up a lot of time trying to convince Beijing they are a good bet.

In addition to the 39 embassies and consulates overseas now in its hands, in the past year Kabul has sent  dozens of diplomats to 11 countries, including Turkey, Russia, Iran and Pakistan, according to Taliban’s acting foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi. The Taliban is using diplomacy to ensure the Islamic Emirate is recognized as the de facto government of Afghanistan.

Aaron Zelin observes “the Taliban is far less isolated today than it was during its first iteration.” Since 2021, it has had over 1300 meetings with at least 80 countries, has hosted political and business delegations in Kabul, and, since multilateral for are all the rage, inaugurated the Afghanistan Regional Cooperation Initiative in January 2024, which included China, India, Russia, Iran, and most of the surrounding countries.

By going slow and using intermediaries to engage Kabul, Washington can tsk-tsk about Taliban policies but publicly doesn’t have to do much 0ther than issuing sternly-worded demarches. The Americans may also want to wait for more pragmatic leaders to take over when the hard-liners in Kandahar pass from the scene, but “pragmatic” may not equal interest in power-sharing or a more representative government.

And the diplomats, military commanders, spies, and politicians who presided over the constructive loss of American credibility and prestige are still on the scene in Washington. Though they have yet to give public accounting of what all those dollars and lives (American and Afghan) were for, they and their confederates will advise going slowly on openly treating with the Kabul government as it will renew interest in their actions over the two decades after 9/11 when America privileged a military response over statecraft in response to every challenge.

James Durso (@james_durso) is a regular commentator on foreign policy and national security matters. Mr. Durso served in the U.S. Navy for 20 years and has worked in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia

Credit Graphic: ID 23407126 | Afghanistan © Juan Camilo Bernal | Dreamstime.com