Illusion of Reset: Why the White House’s Outreach to Russia Keeps Failing

If the White House believes that conciliatory gestures toward the Kremlin will convince Russia to undertake a radical, long-term, and candid shift in its foreign policy – let alone abandon its alliance with China – it must remember one crucial lesson. Every attempt by successive U.S. administrations to reset relations with Russia has failed.

Donald Trump is not the first president to start his term by attempting a reset with Moscow. Joe Biden, frequently ridiculed by Trump, did the same. Early in his presidency, Biden lifted sanctions on Nord Stream 2, the controversial gas pipeline linking Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea. In 2021, he extended the New START treaty for five years and explicitly stated that the White House would not speed up Ukraine’s NATO membership negotiations.

At the same time, the United States made NATO reject the candidacy of Estonia’s Prime Minister Kaja Kallas – a staunch critic of Russia – for Secretary General, opting instead for Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte. Rutte, notably, had been a strong proponent of Nord Stream 2 (now, State Secretary Marco Rubio has declined to meet with Kallas, who currently serves as the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission)

Negotiations with Russia were conducted without consulting NATO’s Eastern Flank member states. It was only after pressure from Poland that Biden met with regional leaders at a NATO summit.

But Washington’s overtures – offering goodwill, extending a hand to the Kremlin, and even suggesting that a “minor incursion” by Russian forces into Ukraine would not trigger a strong response – backfired. Instead of de-escalating, Russia grew bolder, pursuing its geopolitical and imperial ambitions with even greater energy.

Even the prospect of fully unblocking Nord Stream 2, which would have provided Russia with substantial financial gains, failed to persuade Moscow to change course. Unlike Donald Trump, who appears to view diplomacy through a transactional lens of costs and financial gains, the Kremlin operates under a different modus operandi. In Russia’s strategic thinking, the United States is a hated adversary – one that humiliated them by dismantling the Soviet Union without firing a single shot.

Barack Obama’s administration followed a similar trajectory. Resetting relations with Russia was a key pillar of his early foreign policy, yet it neither fostered a genuine partnership with Moscow nor prevented Russia’s growing alignment with China.

The Obama administration also made concessions, including scrapping a missile defense system planned for Central Europe – a project that Russia had long opposed. The timing was particularly telling: on September 17, 2009, the anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939, the U.S. formally abandoned the Bush-era missile defense plans. Yet, both then and later, Putin proved to be an untrustworthy partner, unwilling to honor commitments.

Now, Western and especially Central and Eastern European nations fear that to win the Kremlin’s favor, the Trump administration may offer concessions – perhaps in the form of Ukrainian territory or even by reducing or withdrawing U.S. forces from the region. But there is little reason to believe that Putin would respond differently than he did to Biden or Obama. The Kremlin has consistently interpreted Western overtures as opportunities to push its agenda further, not as incentives for compromise.

If there is any hope that Russia will honor its commitments, it lies in dealing with Moscow from a position of strength. However, that scenario seems unlikely when Europe remains passive and disoriented, lacking sufficient military capability, while the U.S. alienates its allies and signals a reduced commitment to the region.

The idea of “civilizing” Russia would require profound changes in the Kremlin’s mindset -something unlikely to happen in a country that has harbored imperial ambitions for centuries, seeking dominance over Central and Eastern Europe while exerting influence over Western Europe from a position of strength. Russia’s leaders have always operated on the premise that respect and obedience are earned through power.

In the 1970s, Richard Nixon successfully drove a wedge between China and the Soviet Union – but only because Beijing and Moscow were already bitter rivals at the time. Today, China and Russia enjoy strong ties. While it is true that Moscow has reasons to fear China’s growing power, Washington has no credible offer that could entice Russia to truly and permanently alter its foreign policy.

For the Kremlin, China – not the United States – is the key economic partner, the primary market for its resources, and a nation willing to engage with Russia despite its authoritarian nature.

The Biden administration eventually recognized that its policy of concessions was leading directly to war. But by then, it was too late to deter Russia. The result was emboldened Russian aggression, culminating in the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.