The Uptick in Swedish Defense Efforts

When we published in 2020, our book The Return of Direct Defense in Europe, we highlighted the on the ground changes occurring in the Nordics.

This what we wrote on Sweden:

Sweden is both a neutral state and a member of the European Union. As noted earlier, the EU contains a security cooperation agreement while not as strong as the Article V commitment in the North Atlantic Treaty clearly implies a requirement to act different from an historical understanding of neutrality.

And it is clear that the Swedish leadership has woken up to the fact, that being neutral, does not mean that you will not be at the center of the fourth battle of the Atlantic given the nature of the new combat systems, and the Russians lowering the nuclear threshold in their declaratory strategy and force acquisition. Neutral be nice but not if your society is nullified by military action going through the region.

And in 2017, Exercise Aurora 17 clearly expressed the new Swedish situational strategic awareness.  Aurora 17 was the largest Swedish exercise in more than 20 years and was clearly intended to exercise Sweden’s defense capability against a larger, sophisticated opponent.

According to the Swedish Ministry of Defence:

“In order to increase military capabilities, Swedish Armed Forces will conduct Exercise Aurora 17 – a national exercise that will build a stronger defense and increase the overall capability to face an attack on Sweden. The overarching mission of the Swedish Armed Forces is to defend the country´s interests, our freedom and the right to live the way of our choice. Deterrence lies at the core of a strong defense, one that rises to all threats and overcomes all challenges. It is designed to deter potential attackers and force them to carefully consider the risks of attacking our country.

For a deterrent to be effective, it needs to be credible and visible. Through frequent and extensive training and exercise, especially with other defense forces, Sweden is strengthening its deterrence effect and makes it more credible. “Aurora 17 will be conducted in the air, on land and at sea. Units from all over Sweden will be involved, but the main exercise areas will be the Mälardalen and Stockholm areas, on and around Gotland, and the Gothenburg area.  The Exercise will contribute to the development of Sweden’s total defense capabilities. Therefore, it is planned that around 40 other agencies will participate. ”

It should be noted that Sweden is reintroducing conscription as well.  In other words, as seen in the Swedish case, the Russians have created their own impact from their actions in Ukraine and elsewhere which is creating significant concern and strengthening of defense capabilities in Northern Europe.

The Russian major ZAPAD 17 exercise highlighted the capability and intentions of the Russian military to threaten directly the Baltic and Nordic states. And it also underscores the question of providing operative reminders of the Russian ability to threaten these states might not be short sighted.

It is not unusual for Russia or the United States to exercise their forces and to test them in various scenarios. Zapad 2017 was such an exercise but given its relative size and proximity to an area of clear European and American concern (the Baltics) significant political sensitivities are raised.

The challenge always is to ensure that an exercise is not a prelude to an actual military operation something which Baltic states have more than a little historical reason to be concerned with. And as the most significant area of NATO undergoing modernization is Northern Europe, the exercise is likely to enhance the positions of the Nordics, the UK and other NATO states about the need to reinforce Northern European defense. That is why the political and military cost to Russia might well outweigh whatever training benefits might accrue to the Russian forces.

Nordic Defense and “Clusterization

Nordic defense and security cooperation are part of a broader global trend in which clusters of states are working together to enhance their ability to enhance their defense and security against the return of Russia and the rise of China. Clusterization as the next phase whereby liberal democracies do more for themselves in their joint defense rather than simply relying on diplomatic globalization initiatives through organizations like the EU or NATO to do that for them.

“Clusterization” is a key to generating enhanced capabilities that can work interdependently with key allies outside of a regional cluster to reinforce the capabilities in a realistic and effective way to deter core adversaries. In the case of the Nordics, clearly the United States is the key outside power, with Brexit Britain and those states within continental Europe which have capabilities which can show up effectively to bolster the underbelly of the Nordic region.

But at its heart, the Nordics need to bolster their own capabilities as well to work more effectively with their offshore allies and their continental European partners. But to be blunt: this requires looking more realistically at what the defense of the Nordic region means against the evolution of Russian policies, strategies and capabilities rather than simply to assume that NATO as multi-member alliance simply shows up.

The Trident Juncture 2018 exercise in Norway is a good example of how a leading Nordic nation is rethinking its policies. On the one hand, Norway is working their national mobilization approach. On the other hand, they hosted several allies within Norway and in part it is a question of what capabilities can be brought in a timely manner that would really make a difference in a crisis.

It is not simply a question of showing up; it is about blending those domestic and allied capabilities into an effective crisis management force against specific and targeted Russian threats. But the challenges of providing for enhanced Nordic capability within a broader trans-Atlantic framework remains a work in progress, notably when measured against Russian activities, behavior and evolving capabilities.

Of course, since that time Sweden and Finland have joined NATO and have ramped up their collaborative efforts.

And in our book on the making of the maritime kill web which we published in 2022, we highlighted the rebuilding of the 2nd Fleet under President Trump which was stood up in part to reinforce Northern European and Arctic defense for the United States and NATO.

Recently, The Wall Street Journal has posted a video which focuses on a key geographical location where Sweden and Russia intersect in a possible invasion route, namely, Gotland island.

As one source underscored: “Gotland’s proximity to Russia and the Baltic states—Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia—makes it strategically valuable for protecting NATO’s eastern flank in the event of a Russia–NATO military conflict. Its proximity to the Russian Kaliningrad exclave, where Russia maintains a significant military arsenal, further underlines its importance.”

This WSJ video highlights the upsurge in defense activity on the island and the general change in Swedish defense policy.