Shaping Enhanced Force Effectiveness Now: “Bristle Up” and “Bulk Up”
Recently, I talked with Secretary Michael W. Wynne about the core challenge of how to enhance the “fight tonight” force in the next two to five years.
Secretary Wynne started our discussion on the way ahead for the U.S. military as follows: “The mission of our military is to deter, dissuade or defeat our enemies from abroad.
“We wish to deter, hope to dissuade and shape operational capabilities to defeat our enemies.
“Let us start with deterrence. The most significant is to deter a strategic operation against American territory by maintaining the muscle of our nuclear forces and the operational capability of Air Force and Navy and the submarine force. Deterrence currently is reasonable.”
We then discussed our military credibility in terms of military force – joint and coalition – to dissuade enemies from engaging against us to advance their interests.
Secretary Wynne underscored that we now were shifting to an area where we need to work on enhancing the ready force. He characterized the path ahead as the need to “bulk up” and “bristle up.” This implies responsive logistics and purchasing munitions, with rapid delivery systems.
The ready force will not see significant impact for long term platform investments for a significant time so the question is how do you reorganize and re-set your current force to be more lethal and survivable.
The Ukrainian example highlights how a nation under a core threat to its survival has rapidly innovated using everything they had in their invenstory but doing so while reimagining how there force elements might work together to create more effective outcomes. They operate as a large special forces unit locked to the Observe Orient Deciding Acting loop with Validation and Verification at the operational level.
Wynne characterized the Ukrainian example as follows: “Use what you have inherited, work with your newest materials, and innovate in your operations. Use your guidance systems, your C2 and your ISR systems to deliver innovative solutions in your operations.”
We discussed the question of what the USAF might do in the wake of a decision by the Administration to buy a new air dominance fighter the F-47.
Wynne underscored simply that waiting for a long-term solution to using robotic wingman with a future aircraft was not what we needed to do.
‘Train today for the fight tomorrow.
“The F47 will enhance a penetrating forward element, but we can train today with robotic wingman in all the services. We have the C2, we have the autonomous weapons, but we need the imagination and the authority to make ‘bristling up’ a reality.”
A missile is after all a robotic element as one might point out are the case with satellites. The fifth-generation approach of innovations in the sensor-shooter relationship whereby the manned element identifies targets which another shooter can attack lays down a template for rapid change in introducing over the shoulder fires directed by the manned aircraft element.
Using the Ukrainian example, you use what you have, combined with new ways to direct fires, rather than waiting for tomorrow’s solution.
The fight tonight force needs this capability now.
Wynne underscored: “We have already built the infrastructure to do command and control at a distance.
“We have already created distant devices that can go boom in the night.
“We have already established guidance systems that can bring those systems to within 10 miles of their intended target and then actually give a visual and ask for a final okay over almost 800 miles.
“We can do that.
“But we need to give ourselves permission to do that.
“It took the Ukrainians about a year to give themselves permission to use lethal force in an autonomous way.
“It took them almost a year and a half of combat to finally figure out how to do first person drones, but they had the technology when the war started.
“They never gave themselves permission to do it.
“We need to do so.
“We need to train to give our force structure and our commanders and our soldiers and our sailors and our airmen permission to use a capability that they already have embedded in the force structure.”
This is the “bristle up” part of the equation of enhancing the “fight tonight” force.
As Wynne put it: “When I talk about bristling up, we need to focus on the terminal effect of hitting the target and work your way back to the release point.
“And the release point does not have to be the actual command and control.
“It can be any command and control that you have given permission to fly that terminal mission.
“Think OODA and drive it to the tip of the ground, maritime, and air/space spear.”
The challenge is to enable force multiplication by leveraging distributed C2 and the sensor-shooter revolution.
Put in other words, organizational change is needed to leverage capabilities inherent in the force which can be enhanced as autonomous systems are added to the force.
But it is not just about technology; it is about reorganizing and restructuring the force you have to enable an ability to unleash the power of a distributed force.
The “Bulk Up” piece is about the projectiles available to the force.
Building up the missiles, projectiles and autonomous systems available to the restructured force enhances the “fight tonight” capability but also lays down a future path for force building different from the past.
It is not just about new platforms for the future force: it is about the “fight tonight: force innovating that create new ways to shape that future force and the kinds of platforms and capabilities that force will need to operate with future concepts of operations.
Wynne focused on this central organizational element as what he called a “training and development scheme.”
“You need to reinvent the forces on the model of special forces.”
He argued in effect that C2 transformation allows for diverse force packages to use their information to deliver the effects needed, rather than envisaging large centralized force engagements as the basic energy of the operational force.
You need to train for this and to equip along these lines.
You organize differently; you equip differently; you develop the future force differently.
We concluded by discussing an example which I simply do not understand why we are not exploiting.
The F-35 operating as a wolfpack can control many missiles in terms of targeting way beyond what it carries.
So why are we not doing this?
In part, because we don’t have the missiles or missiles in adequate supplies.
In part, because we still do not get the fifth-generation approach at a strategic level. In part because we wait for the next platform.
And partly, because we are challenged to leverage the reality of having a U.S. and coalition aircraft that can work together in unprecedented ways, but unprecedented ways require paradigm shifts in thinking.
For a look back at Secretary Wynne’s inputs to airpower and defense innovations, see the following: