The Air Defence Reality Check: Why Australia Has Less Time Than It Thinks

For decades, integrated air and missile defence has been synonymous with ballistic missile defence, Patriots and Aegis systems standing guard against incoming rockets.

But Professor Justin Bronk of the Royal United Service Institute delivered a stark wake-up call at the seminar: the modern threat spectrum demands a fundamental rethink of air defence, and the timeline for preparation is far shorter than most assume.

Speaking to the Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar on September 18, 2025, Bronk painted a picture of rapidly evolving threats that span the full spectrum from small commercial drones to hypersonic missiles, all requiring different defensive approaches while competing for the same limited resources. His central message was uncompromising: Australia faces a 2-5 year window to prepare for potential conflict, not the 5-10 year timeline many defence planners assume.

The Economics of Modern Air Warfare

The mathematics of contemporary air defence tell a sobering story. When NATO forces intercept $20,000 drones with $1.2-1.8 million missiles, the economic equation becomes unsustainable almost immediately. This cost-exchange ratio, demonstrated in recent encounters with Russian reconnaissance drones over NATO airspace, reveals a fundamental challenge facing Western air defences.

Professor Justin Bronk of the Royal United Service Institute, speaking at the Richard Williams seminar on September 18, 2025.

Russia’s mass production of the Shahed-136 drone illustrates how adversaries are adapting to exploit these economic vulnerabilities. Initially costing $150,000-200,000 per unit, Russian manufacturers have driven costs down to approximately $7,000 through simplified production methods, including visible file marks on actuators and hot glue gun assembly. While crude, these systems work effectively as saturation weapons designed to overwhelm defensive systems.

Ukraine’s experience provides crucial data points. The country faces 5,000-6,000 incoming drones monthly alongside 200 cruise and ballistic missiles. Yet despite this volume, the primary strategic damage comes from the high-end threats, the cruise and ballistic missiles with their larger warheads and precision guidance systems. The mass of small drones serves primarily to saturate defensive channels, forcing defenders to expend expensive interceptors while the real threats slip through.

This reality has forced innovative tactical adaptations. Ukrainian forces have found that helicopters equipped with machine guns and forward-looking infrared sensors represent one of their most cost-effective counter-drone platforms. Meanwhile, crews in light aircraft like Yak-52s armed with assault rifles shoot down hundreds of drones monthly, a decidedly low-tech solution to a high-tech problem.

Lessons from the Laboratory of Modern Warfare

Current conflicts offer unprecedented insights into air defence realities. Israel, despite possessing the world’s most sophisticated air defence network and the luxury of defending a small geographic area, faces stark limitations. Even with overlapping coverage from Iron Dome to Arrow systems, Israeli defence planners acknowledge they would abandon city defence in a multi-vector attack, concentrating resources on protecting military bases essential for counteroffensive operations.

This strategic calculus reflects a harsh truth: no defence system can intercept everything. Countries are large, targets are numerous, and even the most advanced interceptor networks have finite capacity. The Israeli model — focusing on campaign-critical infrastructure while accepting civilian vulnerability — may represent the most honest approach to air defence planning.

Ukraine’s adaptation to sustained bombardment offers another instructive case study. Kyiv continues functioning despite hundreds of missile strikes, with civilian life maintaining surprising normalcy between attacks. Air bases subjected to repeated strikes continue generating sorties through aircraft dispersal and rapid runway repair. The lesson is clear: countries can absorb significant punishment and continue fighting if their essential military capabilities remain intact.

The Revolutionary Air Defence Solution: APKWS

Among the most promising developments in cost-effective air defence is the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS), essentially a laser guidance kit retrofitted to standard 2.75-inch rockets. At $20,000-35,000 per interceptor, APKWS breaks the unsustainable cost curve plaguing Western air defences while providing genuine tactical capability.

The system’s effectiveness was demonstrated during the defence of Israel and protection of shipping against Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. A single fighter aircraft can carry 28-49 APKWS rounds in standard rocket pods, providing sustained engagement capability against drone swarms at a fraction of traditional missile costs.

For Australia, APKWS represents an opportunity to leverage existing platforms effectively. Super Hornets could serve as interceptor aircraft while F-35s provide sensor coverage, creating a layered defence network capable of engaging threats far from Australian shores. The system’s relative simplicity also makes it a candidate for domestic production, potentially reducing costs further while supporting Australian defence industry capabilities.

Australia’s Geographic Advantage and Strategic Vulnerability

Australia’s unique geography presents both opportunities and challenges for air defence. Any affordable one-way attack system targeting Australia must traverse enormous ocean distances, likely including New Guinea’s airspace. This provides natural warning time and multiple interception opportunities unavailable to more compressed theaters like the Baltic states or Taiwan.

However, this geographic buffer cannot defend against high-end threats. Chinese ballistic missiles and cruise missiles launched from the South China Sea could reach Australian targets, particularly focusing on campaign-critical infrastructure like air bases and ports. The key question becomes: what targets truly matter for Australia’s ability to continue fighting?

Bronk’s analysis suggests Australia should abandon any pretense of comprehensive territorial defence in favor of protecting essential military capabilities. Air bases housing F-35 squadrons, major ports supporting naval operations, and critical command infrastructure represent the real targets requiring active defence. Cities, while tragic to lose, do not determine military outcomes, a lesson demonstrated repeatedly in conflicts from World War II to Ukraine.

The Accelerating Chinese Threat

Perhaps the most alarming aspect of Bronk’s presentation concerned Chinese military development. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force is expanding at a pace that “induces slight panic feelings” in the expert analyst. Current Chinese production includes 120 fifth-generation J-20 fighters annually, with the fleet expected to reach 1,000 aircraft by 2030.

This expansion extends beyond raw numbers to qualitative improvements. Chinese air-to-air missiles have demonstrated range and effectiveness exceeding NATO equivalents, with the PL-15 missile achieving the longest successful air-to-air engagement in history during recent Pakistan-India encounters. That missile represented 11-year-old Chinese technology, raising serious questions about current capabilities.

The Chinese are simultaneously expanding production across multiple aircraft types: advanced J-16 flankers for long-range strikes, carrier-based J-15 variants, and electronic warfare platforms. They are also rapidly expanding their tanker fleet, enabling power projection beyond the first island chain. Most concerning is the emergence of sixth-generation programs like the J-36, currently in flight testing.

This military buildup targets specific American vulnerabilities: tankers, AWACS aircraft, and forward bases within 2,000 miles of China. Fifteen years of focused development and hundreds of PhD graduates annually working on these problems have produced sophisticated solutions to what China sees as the primary obstacle to its regional ambitions.

The Compressed Timeline Reality

Bronk’s most hard-hitting assertion concerned timing. Rather than the 5-10 year preparation window commonly assumed in defence planning, he argued Australia faces a 2-5 year threat timeline. This assessment stems from multiple converging factors.

American military capabilities will improve significantly by 2030, with new platforms like the B-21 bomber and advanced missiles coming online. Chinese leaders likely recognize this window of temporary advantage and may feel pressure to act before American capabilities mature. Similarly, current American political dysfunction hampers intelligence synthesis and decision-making, providing additional incentive for adversaries to act sooner rather than later.

In Europe, Russian production has created temporary conventional superiority, with forces engaged in Ukraine now three times larger than the 2022 invasion force despite massive casualties. However, this expansion is economically unsustainable beyond 3-5 years, creating pressure for action before economic constraints bind.

The interconnected nature of potential conflicts adds urgency. A Chinese move on Taiwan would likely draw American forces from Europe, potentially encouraging Russian aggression against NATO. Conversely, European conflict could provide China with an opportunity to act while American attention is divided.

The Hard Choices Ahead

Perhaps the most uncomfortable aspect of Bronk’s analysis concerned resource allocation. Every new capability requires trade-offs in defence spending, personnel, and focus. The Australian Navy has made its choice, prioritizing submarines over other capabilities. The question remains: what is the Air Force prepared to sacrifice?

Traditional air force missions, transport, air-to-air refueling, intelligence collection, all serve important peacetime functions but may become secondary to survival in high-threat environments. Investing in long-range air-to-air missiles, counter-drone capabilities, and defensive systems requires either dramatically increased spending or conscious decisions to reduce other capabilities.

The American Marine Corps provides a model for such transformation. Recognizing the need for distributed operations in contested environments, the Marines eliminated their tank battalions, reduced artillery, and restructured around island-hopping operations. Similarly, Australia may need to make painful choices about current force structure to prepare for future threats.

The Passive Defence Solution

One area where Australia could make immediate progress involves passive defence measures, hardening, dispersal, and early warning systems. These approaches offer several advantages: they use local contractors and materials, supporting domestic economies while improving security; they provide protection against the most likely threats; and they require no complex integration with existing defence systems.

The basic mathematics favor passive defence. Most precision missiles have circular error probabilities of 5-10 meters, meaning roughly half will miss even large targets. Simple aircraft hangars or reinforced facilities dramatically increase the number of missiles required for target destruction, and modern precision weapons are expensive even for major powers.

Israel demonstrates passive defence effectiveness through ubiquitous civilian shelters and early warning systems. Civilian populations learn to assess threat levels through smartphone applications showing attack vectors, taking shelter only when genuinely threatened. Similar systems could provide Australian civilians with realistic protection while avoiding the enormous costs of comprehensive air defence networks.

Industrial and Technological Implications

Australia’s response to these challenges must include industrial considerations. Domestic production of systems like APKWS could provide both cost advantages and supply security. The technology is relatively straightforward — laser guidance packages and standard rocket motors — well within Australian manufacturing capabilities.

More broadly, Australia needs to develop industrial capacity for sustained conflict. Current Western stockpiles prove inadequate for extended operations, as demonstrated in Ukraine. Australian industry must prepare for potential isolation from traditional suppliers, requiring domestic capabilities for ammunition, spare parts, and basic military equipment.

The timeline pressure makes this particularly challenging. Industrial development typically requires years or decades, but the compressed threat timeline demands rapid adaptation. Australia may need to accept interim solutions and suboptimal systems to maintain capabilities during the critical period.

Strategic Recommendations and Realism

Bronk’s analysis suggests several priorities for Australian defence planning.

• First, abandon comprehensive territorial defence in favor of protecting campaign-critical assets.

• Second, invest immediately in cost-effective systems like APKWS that can address the most likely threats.

• Third, develop passive defence measures using local resources and contractors.

• Fourth, prepare for sustained conflict through industrial planning and stockpile development.

Perhaps most importantly, Australia must develop realistic expectations about air defence. No system can provide perfect protection; every defensive network has limits; and adversaries will adapt to exploit weaknesses. The goal should be raising the cost of attack while maintaining essential military capabilities, not achieving invulnerability.

Conclusion: Facing Hard Truths

Professor Bronk’s presentation offered no comfortable solutions or easy answers. Instead, it provided a sobering assessment of contemporary air defence realities and the compressed timeline for preparation. Australia faces unprecedented challenges from rapidly developing threats, constrained resources, and limited time for adaptation.

The path forward requires abandoning comforting myths about comprehensive defence in favor of hard choices about priorities and trade-offs. It demands immediate investment in proven, cost-effective systems while developing longer-term capabilities. Most critically, it requires honest assessment of what Australia can and cannot defend, focusing resources on truly essential capabilities rather than spreading them ineffectively across impossible missions.

The window for preparation is closing rapidly. Whether Australia can adapt quickly enough to meet these challenges may determine not just military outcomes, but the nation’s future security and sovereignty. The time for comfortable assumptions and gradual adaptation has passed; the era of hard choices and rapid transformation has begun.

Also, see the following:

Combat Readiness at the Speed of Relevance: Preparing for Tomorrow’s Conflicts Today