On January 14, 2018, I had a chance to talk with the CO of MAG 31.  That interview will be published in the next few weeks.

But we have had the chance to talk with Col. Boniface when he was a Lt. Colonel a few years earlier.

His earlier insights have certainly been validated and we will provide an update on his experience and his insights about the way ahead for the Osprey as it faces its mid-life upgrades, and sustainment opportunities and challenges.

In this interview conducted in 2014, Lt. Col. Boniface looked at the challenge of sustaining ARG-MEU in an era of distributed ops, a challenge which has become even more important with the strategic shift from the land wars to crisis management involving peer competitors.

Sustaining the ARG-MEU in an Era of Distributed Operations

2014-03-30 During the visit of the Second Line of Defense team to New River on February 10, 2014, we had a chance to sit down with Lt. Col. Boniface to discuss his most recent experience as the ACE Commander of the 26^th MEU, which has just returned from the Middle East.

Lt. Col. Boniface is no stranger to readers of Second Line of Defense, and he has provided us with insights with regard to the evolution of the ACE over the past few years.

A key focus of discussions with Boniface in the past and in the current one are the changes, which the evolution of the ACE has introduced to the ARG-MEU.

A major theme has been with regard to shifting a helo centric ARG-MEU thinking in terms of a 200 mile box of operations to one transformed by the Osprey into operating over a 1000 miles.

This has led to the deployment of three ship formations no longer within a 200-mile area but over more than a 1000-mile area.  This leads in turn to a major challenge of re-supplying the ARG-MEU.

And the problem seen here is being replicated by the USMC need to pursue a distributed laydown strategy in the Pacific.

Sustainability over distance is a key challenge as the geography covered expands and the ACE assets can operate over those greater distances as well.

Lt. Col. Boniface highlighted two key challenges.

The first is simply the challenge to the Military Sealift Command to support a disbursed ARG-MEU.

The second is having a responsive and effective parts availability pool to support the deployed but dispersed ARG-MEU.

This is an especially important challenge for the Osprey because of relatively limited locations within which parts are available to be flown or delivered to the ARG-MEU on deployment.

Put another way, the deployment of the ARG-MEU is not constrained by Osprey operations, but the effectiveness of the logistics or sustainment operations.

The carriers get supplied every week; the ARG-MEUs only every 10-14 days.

This disparity no longer makes sense given the reality of ARG-MEU operations under the influence of the Osprey.

In effect, there is a tactical limitation posed by sustainment, which can have strategic consequences.

An additional challenge is the load being placed on the USMC Ospreys by resupply to the Navy ships.

According to Lt. Col. Boniface:

About 20 percent of my flight hours on the MEU were used to help the ARG-MEU to do resupply. 

We need to get into a different way of thinking to release the Ospreys from this mission. 

We need to think through a different rhythm or approach to sustainment from the at sea replenishment system.

SLD: “You were talking about the CV versus the MEU.

The MEU historically has been really defined by the box that you described.

It’s a helo-defined box, more or less.

And, and so as the Osprey now you can operate at a much wider circumference and is much more useful to the joint force with the special purpose MAGTF people are interested from the joint force and the Navy itself is looking at Ospreys for resupplying.

What that tends to mean is that your hermetically sealed Gator Navy makes no sense.

Lt. Col. Boniface: That is exactly what I’m saying.

“And as we transform the ARG-MEU with the F-35B, the CH-53K, the new Cobra and Huey, we need to significantly rethink the logistics support structure for the deployed fleet.

“We have gotten out of the helo mindset with regard to operations; but not with regard to sustainment approaches.

Another problem identified by Lt. Col. Boniface is the constraint of having very few supply locations from which Osprey parts can be generated to the deployed force.

Lt. Col. Boniface: We have gotten to the point where it is a very reliable aircraft, but it needs parts to fly.

“We are at a transition point whereby the flow of parts to the fleet needs to be significantly improved from what will need to become a global supply chain to the aircraft which is being deployed widely now in the Pacific, Europe and the Middle East, and will now be bought by several allies.

“This really raises the benchmark on global supply of parts to the aircraft on deployment.

“It’s not about the plane anymore.

“It’s about the entire logistics enterprise that sustains operational effectiveness

 2012 Interview

We conducted an interview with Lt. Col. Boniface at the time of the Bold Alligator exercise in 2012 as well where he forecast correctly that a “tsunami of change” was coming to the Marine Corps.

Shortly after the Bold Alligator 2012 exercise, Second Line of Defense sat down with Lt. Col. Boniface to discuss his experiences during Bold Alligator 2012.

As the Osprey squadron commander involved in the exercise, he was in charge of the key toolset, the Osprey, which re-defined the ESG-MEB operationally.

Two images defined how the Osprey had changed things since the last major amphibious exercise in 1996.

In 1996, airborne forces were involved to do the raiding function.  In 2012, a raiding force led by Ospreys from a SUPPLY ship performed the mission.

An assault raid was conducted from the sea base deep inland (180 miles) aboard the Ospreys with allied forces observing or participating.

The Osprey was the key element operating in this exercise, which was not there during the last big “amphibious” exercise.

As the key coalition officer (Lt. Commander Pastoor) in the planning process, a Dutch naval officer, underscored: “We had Dutch observers and they were very impressed with the game changing capabilities of the Osprey in terms of range and speed.

“Normally, in such an exercise we would take the beach and operate 30 miles inland.  With this new capability we can operate throughout the entire battle space and move forces as if across a chessboard.”

Let us hover over this image.

Instead of assaulting the beach, the forces aboard the sea base are maneuvering within and over the battle space inserting, moving and withdrawing forces.

This is a far cry from just looking at photos of the landing ships and assault vehicles.

The second image was the Osprey landing on a SUPPLY ship and then conducting the raid.

The MV-22 landing on a T-AKE ship means that the ability of this new aviation asset to connect the supply ships with the combat ships can potentially allow a much more efficient use of those combat ships.

Supplies can be re-configured off of the combat ships to the supply ships and with the MV-22 have e saving delivery capabilities enhancing speed and agility of the battle group.

What this in turn means is that by building more of these new supply ships, the combat power of the fleet can be enhanced, and the USN-USMC team gets its ship numbers up.

This is not a substitute for adding new amphibious ships to the fleet, it is not.

But with the new approach and new con-ops the combat capabilities can become extended and more sustained.

It is about sustainable maneuver warfare from the sea.  And the new VM-22 T-AKE combination is a potential war winner.

In earlier conversations with the Osprey commander, we discussed the use of the Osprey in the Libyan operations.

Here the Osprey went from a key base in Italy to the USS Kearsarge off of the Libyan coast and this rapid resupply meant that the small number of Harriers aboard of the Kearsarge could triple their sortie generation rates.

SLD: It has oft been repeated that Bold Alligator 2012 is the biggest exercise in more than 10 years.

You would have to go back to 1996 to find that exercise.

And one of the biggest differences between then and now is clearly the Osprey.

How important is the V-22 in defining the con-ops of the ESG-MEB operation in Bold Alligator 2012?

Lt. Col. Boniface: I think that first of all, the comparison of the MV-22, to the CH-46 is a dead argument and we need to move on.

“The MV-22 is here to stay, it is bought and being paid for, and its sheer capabilities alone are causing us to rethink how we can and should perform expeditionary/amphibious  operations from the sea.

“The MV-22 and its capabilities are changing how  we should be doing business.

“Traditionally our MEU concept focuses on a radius of about 100 NM.  With the speed and range of the Osprey, why can’t we change this radius to, 500, 1,000, or even 1500 miles?

“We should be able to support a concept like this and we need to think in these terms.

“I sort of think of it  like a game of chess.

“I think of a traditional or legacy ARG-MEU as being able to move a pawn one space at a time towards the enemy.

“If you have ever played chess it sometimes take a while to engage your opponent.

“We now have the ability to move a knight, bishop, or rook off of this same chess board and attack 180 degrees towards the rear of our enemy.

“We can go directly after the king.

“Yes, it’s not really fair, but I like that fact.

“The speed, range, and don’t forget the reliability of the MV-22 allows me to do this.

“We talk about staying ahead of the bow wave.

“Well there is a tsunami of change coming when we talk about the ability to fight an enemy and to support Marines ashore.

“We can increase our area of operations (AOR) exponentially because we can spread out our ships; now we have an aviation connector that can move Marines a tremendous amount of distance and in a very short amount of time.

“We can also use this capability to leverage our other aviation assets like our AV8-Bs, CH-53’s, AH-1Ws and UH-1Ys to support the MAGTF and ultimately damage the enemy’s will to fight.

“Let’s not just move 50-100 miles ashore, but let’s move 200-500 miles ashore, and do it at an increased speed, range and lethality.

“There are still a lot of naysayers who will cast doubt on this.

“How are you supporting those Marines ashore?

“How will the fire support piece work?

“Harriers and the F-35 concept along with a CSG can easily answer the fire support question for limited time until organic assets like artillery catches up.

“I think we need to challenge the autonomy of the CSG in regards to how it fits into a modern ESG concept.

“Innovative thinking with our Ospreys will enable proper support of the MAGTF ashore – the capability does exist.

“Logistics are always going to be a factor especially as we expand the AOR, and bring into service more technologically capable aviation platforms.

“With that being said, the T-AKE has some real capabilities.

“This ship needs to be looked as more than a MAGTF logistic ship.

“It can function as an enhanced Marine Aviation I-Level (NavyAIMD) intermediate maintenance department afloat for an ESG with MAG level and Regimental level supportability.

“From an aviation standpoint the ability to repair, reissue, and supply major components and end items will be essential to the success or failure of the ESG.

“In regards to the MV-22, I would like to see this capability expand to where I can repair/overhaul an engine, possibly look at a prop-rotor gear box, or conversion actuator repair capability, and have the necessary technicians on board to support sustained operations in a littoral region- without having to reach back to CONUS for almost everything.

“I am sure our logistics and infantry planners are thinking the same concepts.  That’s where we need to be going with this.

“From 1996 to the Bold Alligator are light years apart.

“And the big questions are how do we command and control it?

“And how do we integrate surface navy?

“And how do we integrate big aviation and big navy into that concept?

SLD: At the heart of the change is a shift in mindset.

And in earlier pieces, we have discussed the cultural change rooted in understanding a plane called Osprey, which can land like a helicopter.

But it is not a helicopter and we do not want the operational constructs inherited from the past to limit the innovation possible now and in the future.

Lt. Col. Boniface: With legacy aviation assets we have had to think inside the ARG-MEU 100NM operational box.

“We have to get out of this mindset.

“And we are starting to do so by operating a more disaggregate ARG-MEU and relying on the MV-22 as an aviation connector.

“Now we can move from a few hundred miles away in our operational sphere to more than a 1,000-1500 in our area of influence (AOI).  We need to adjust our operational mindset to align with this new capability, especially with the coming of the F-35B.

“We also need to look at the Passengers, Mail, and Cargo (PMC) requirement amongst ARG shipping.  Because of the increased capability of the MV-22 a lot of this requirement is being levied on the MV-22.  This is both good and bad.  While I can support not only the MAGTF (MEU/ESG), I can support the Navy as well.  I can move Marines and sailors back in forth in bad weather, I can carry a lot of cargo, I can do it over long distances and very quickly.

“However as we expand this ESG concept we need to look at the aviation connector for the Navy.  The SH-60 will struggle to keep up with these distances.

“While yes, I can do a lot of this for the ARG, I only have so many sorties allotted for this kind of mission.  At some point I will not be able to support this mission when it will really count- I think the Navy needs to look at what we are doing here with the MV-22 and hopefully replicate our success.

“This also applies to the SAR/Medevac aspect.

“As we increase these distances, we need to be able to get our Sailors and Marines to the correct level of medical care within the “golden hour” should any injury occur.  The MV-22 can do that; the SH-60 cannot from long distances.

“From a SAR standpoint: as an ACE commander I get very nervous knowing my AV8-B pilots could have to ditch overwater and we (ACE MV-22s) are the only guys who can go get them over these long distances.

“I am not trying to throw anybody under a bus, but these are two areas which we struggled with during Operation ODYSSEY DAWN and UNIFIED PROTECTOR.

“It isn’t a wave of change; it’s a tsunami of change coming.”

SLD: Obviously, C2 becomes very different in this context.

What is your take on these challenges?

Lt. Col. Boniface: How do we command and control this monster?

“And I can tell you that I feel like some of these LHD class ships aren’t ready.

“They don’t have the bandwidth and the throughput to be able to do the command and control, when you’ve got assets 1,500 miles away.

“I think that’s something we need to look at.  Our command control needs to be bullet proof and I don’t think it is right now.

“The concept is there and will and desire is there.

“But when you come down to basic zeros and ones a lot of the equipment (hardware and software) we use in the MV-22 community have exceeded the bandwidth and throughput capability of a LHD.

“Whether right or wrong the Aviation Combat Element of a MEU or ESG comes with a big intranet requirement and 100mb LHD networks will struggle to keep up especially as the F-35 comes into play.

SLD: There were several ships in play in this exercise which creating many moving parts in a difficult ballet to orchestrate.

Lt. Col. Boniface: There were.

“We had every east coast amphibs out there within 150 miles to 200 miles of each other.

“You had all four large deck amphibs out there, which I don’t think we’ve ever done before.

“We also had a smattering of support ships- the Lewis and Clark was out there, and the new LPD-17 was out there.

“You also had a number of allied ships; the French ship Mistral was working with us.  Overall it was extremely impressive.

“But folks still do not grasp the impact of the range and speed of the Osprey on operations.

“When I was off the coast of Jacksonville, North Carolina (Onslow Bay), what people need to understand is that I can reach Washington DC in 45 minutes and come back on a single bag of gas with a lot of cargo and a lot of people onboard.

“And I can do this without touching a forward operating base, without having to touch a tanker.  And I am coming back well within my safety margins.

SLD: Could you talk a bit more about the Osprey landing on the T-AKE supply ship?

Lt. Col. Boniface: It was my squadron that landed on the ship.  Both pilots were two young captains.  They were two very competent captains, but two mid-grade captains. I didn’t want it want to be the CO, OpsO, or the most experienced guy we have in the squadron.

“I like the fact that I did it with some very competent mid-grade captains because when we do it for real, that’s who going to be doing it….. At night and in bad weather.

“The proof of concept was successful, we landed onboard, we picked up our supplies, and we launched out of there on our mission.  There is a misnomer that the T-AKE can’t give gas.  It states in the ship’s resume only up to 28 PSI can be given and we’ve corrected that, or at least we’re trying to correct it.

“Because of this we actually planned to not take gas from USNS Robert E. Peary (a Lewis and Clark class ship).  However, once aboard (the Lewis and Clark class ship) said no, we can provide fuel up to 55 PSI. That’s the PSI the MV-22 and most of the other ACE aircraft need.    Like I said, we are trying to fix it this misnomer.

“We arrived on the USNS Robert E. Peary, where they took approximately 5,000 pounds of gas, and we still maintained a 10-percent torque margin, and we were able to lift between 12,500 to 13,000 pounds that day.  So you are looking at 7000 to 8000 lbs of cargo in the back.

“It’s not a hard approach for our pilots, and we found it to be very routine.

“The Lewis and Clark ship has so much capability and we haven’t even tapped the surface of it- especially the supply and repair capability.

Colonel Chris Boniface

MAG-26 Commanding Officer

Colonel Boniface is a 1994 graduate of the University of South Alabama and entered the Marine Corps through the Platoon Leader’s Class Program.

After completing flight training in December 1997, First Lieutenant Boniface was assigned to Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM) 365, where he served as the Assistant Logistics Officer, Current Operations Officer, and Squadron Weapons and Tactics Instructor.  During this tour he completed two deployments with the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) supporting Operations JOINT GUARDIAN and ALLIED FORCE during the 1999 Kosovo War, Turkish earthquake relief operations for Operation AVID RESPONSE, and a 2001-2002 deployment to Afghanistan for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.

In 2003, Captain Boniface reported to the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Anti-Terrorism) for duty as the Air Officer.  In October of that year, he transferred to the 8th Marine Regiment to serve as the Regimental Air Officer and deployed to Port-au-Prince, Haiti as part of SPMAGTF-8, CJTF Haiti for Operation SECURE TOMORROW.

Major Boniface reported to HMM-264 in September 2004.  During this tour he served as the Logistics Officer and deployed to Iraq for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.  Between deployments, Major Boniface assumed the duties of the Squadron’s Aviation Maintenance Officer, and in January 2007, deployed with the 26th MEU to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.

Upon completing his second deployment with HMM-264, Major Boniface reported to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Training Squadron (VMM) 204 for training on the MV-22 Osprey.  After his initial training, he remained onboard as an instructor pilot and Fleet Projects Officer before assisting in the stand-up of VMM-264 as the Operations Officer.

Following his selection to command, Lieutenant Colonel Boniface was directed to report to VMM-266 to serve as the Executive Officer and subsequently deployed with the 26th MEU.  During this deployment he participated in Operations ODYSSEY DAWN and UNIFIED PROTECTOR off the coast of Libya.

From May 2011 until December 2013, Lieutenant Colonel Boniface commanded VMM-266.  During his command tour, VMM-266 (REINFORCED) deployed as the Aviation Combat Element, 26th MEU to the U.S. Central Command, U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. European Command areas of responsibility.

Before taking command of MAG 26, Colonel Boniface served as the Branch Chief of the Iran Division on the Joint Staff, Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5), Middle East Directorate.

Colonel Boniface is a 2003 graduate of the Expeditionary Warfare School, a 2008 graduate of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and a 2015 graduate of the National War College.

The featured photo shows n MV-22B Osprey executes flight operations to Vaernes Garrison, Norway, Oct.26, 2018. Marine Air Group 29 transported personnel and equipment from USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7) to an established air base in Norway in order to better support the Trident Juncture 18 scheme of maneuver. The aircraft is with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 365, MAG-29. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Margaret Gale)