America’s Defense Supply Chain Challenge: How Chinese Dependence Threatens U.S. and Allied Military Readiness
I am focused on how we can enhance the capabilities of the ready force or the “fight tonight force.”
It is important to focus upon future platforms, but the current force needs augmenting rapidly in order to be able to engage in deterrence or conflict scenarios.
The foundation of doing so is shaping a SUSTAINABLE “fight tonight force.” This means having robust supply chains for the United States and its allies which allow the force to have confidence in its ability to prevail with the right supplies, delivered at the right time, and at the right place.
Not only does the United States and allies need to focus on the priority of logistical supply capabilities (things like CH-53Ks or CMV-22bs matter) but building an arsenal of democracy across the U.S. and allied defense industrial landscape is a key and urgent priority.
And this means enhanced attention to supply chains and how to diversify defense production to do so.
The United States military faces a sobering reality: despite years of bipartisan efforts to reduce economic dependence on China, the Pentagon’s defense industrial base remains dangerously reliant on Chinese suppliers.
A new analysis reveals that nearly one in ten major subcontractors supporting America’s defense primes are Chinese firms. It does not take a genius to understand that such dependency could prove catastrophic in a potential conflict with Beijing.
The findings, released in Govini’s annual “National Security Scorecard,” paint a troubling picture of American military preparedness.
Using proprietary Defense Department spending data, the analysis examined not just prime contractors but also the critical “Tier 1 suppliers” that form the backbone of the defense supply chain.
What they discovered should alarm policymakers: Chinese firms represent 9.3% of these major subcontractors across nine critical mission areas, from aviation and missile defense to nuclear deterrent systems.
In some sectors, the dependence runs even deeper Chinese suppliers account for over 11% of missile defense subcontractors and nearly 8% of those supporting America’s nuclear arsenal.
“Defense supply chains today are incredibly brittle. They’re not resilient. They’re very, very intricately tied to foreign suppliers,” warns Tara Murphy Dougherty, CEO of Govini, the analytics firm behind the study.
“Roughly half the parts have at least one major risk factor,” Murphy Dougherty explains. “And since a complex military platform like a warship, aircraft, or ground combat vehicle has hundreds or thousands of parts, it’s almost certain that any given platform has multiple such at-risk parts.”
The Chinese connection extends far beyond direct suppliers. The report highlights America’s dependence on critical minerals predominantly mined in China, as well as concerning trends in patent filings where Chinese entities increasingly dominate key defense-related technologies.
This multifaceted dependence creates compound vulnerability or a situation where disruption in any single area could cascade through the entire system. In a conflict scenario where China would be able to weaponize economic dependencies, these interconnected vulnerabilities could prove devastating.
The ongoing conflict in Ukraine offers a preview of what these vulnerabilities could mean in practice.
Western defense firms have struggled to meet the surge demand from Ukraine’s needs, exposing production bottlenecks and supply chain weaknesses that have taken years to partially address.
“A war with China would be much worse,” Murphy Dougherty warns bluntly. “The data is unequivocal: The United States is not prepared for the war that we may have to enter if China said, ‘today is the day.’ It’s not that I think we would automatically lose, but I do not believe that the industrial base is prepared to support the material demands of the Department of Defense.”
Addressing these vulnerabilities presents policymakers with a complex challenge that defies simple solutions. .
“I’m not even sure that eradicating China from the supply chain is the right goal,” Murphy Dougherty acknowledges. “I think it’s about dissecting these platforms into what’s critical and what’s not.” This would be a process that would require detailed analysis of which dependencies pose genuine security risks versus those that remain manageable.
The challenge is compounded by the global nature of modern manufacturing. Even components ostensibly made by allied nations often rely on Chinese raw materials or sub-components, creating hidden dependencies that are difficult to track and eliminate.
The Govini report serves as a wake-up call for both Pentagon leadership and Congress.
While recent legislation like the CHIPS Act and various “Buy American” initiatives represent steps in the right direction, the scale of the challenge demands more comprehensive action.
As tensions with China continue to escalate, particularly over Taiwan, the urgency of addressing these supply chain vulnerabilities grows more acute.
The lesson from Ukraine is clear: modern warfare consumes vast quantities of precision munitions and advanced systems at rates that peacetime production cannot sustain.
America’s industrial foundation shows dangerous cracks. Fixing these vulnerabilities will require sustained political will, significant investment, and years of patient work to rebuild domestic capacity and trusted international partnerships.
Discovering these weaknesses in the midst of conflict could prove catastrophic for both American security and the broader international order that depends on U.S. military strength.
The time for half-measures has passed. America’s defense industrial base needs fundamental restructuring to meet the challenges of an increasingly dangerous world.
And doing so is part of a broader strategy to enhance the capabilities of the “fight tonight force.”
This involves multiple strategic initiatives which go beyond the concern simply about the engagement of Chinese firms in the American and allied supply chains.
First, there is a need to have complete visibility into its supply chains, extending well beyond Tier 1 suppliers to understand the full web of dependencies. With the data and AI revolution it is possible to implement advanced tracking and predictive analytics to foresee and mitigate potential disruptions.
Second, there is both the opportunity and necessity to localize and diversify suppliers. We can reduce reliance on vulnerable supply chains by increasing local production and diversifying suppliers, particularly for critical components.
This is especially possible when it comes to new AI/Software systems associated with the evolving unmanned or autonomous systems capability being woven into the force structure. These new capabilities can be sourced within the United States or with trusted allies from the ground up. In fact, this could be a magnet area to drive broader change in supply chain security.
Third, The arsenal of democracy is no longer solely about America. Developing trusted supplier networks among allied nations to reduce dependence on potential adversaries. There is a clear strategic need to work closely with allies to create shared stockpiles and logistics frameworks to ensure a steady flow of crucial supplies during conflicts.
Fourth, based on assessments of critical need in times of crisis, building reserves of critical components and materials that could sustain operations during supply chain disruptions is returning as a priority as it was during the Cold War.
Fifth, with regard to new platforms — digital twins — provide a key capability enhancing capabilities for shaping a more sustainable force as predictive maintenance can be built in. Implementing predictive maintenance techniques will augment the capacity to keep equipment in top condition and reduce downtime.
Sixth, logistics delivery is a key part of a reliable supply chain. There is a need to shape rapid deployment frameworks by which quick-reaction logistics units can rapidly deploy essential materials and personnel where needed.
Seventh, security capabilities are the foundation for defense capabilities. This is especially important in shaping and evolving cybersecurity measures to protect logistics and communication networks from cyber threats.
By focusing on these strategies, the military can significantly enhance the readiness and effectiveness of the “fight tonight force” to deter or quickly respond to conflicts.
For the report, go to the following link:
https://www.govini.com/insights/2025-national-security-scorecard
For Sydney Freeberg Jr.’s excellent article from which I took the quotes, see the following:
Also, see the following:
Rebuilding Our Arsenal with Allies: A Strategic Imperative for U.S. Security and Prosperity