Nuclear Weapons in a Multi-Polar Authoritarian World: Assessing the Challenges

The rise of the 21st century authoritarian states and movements has driven change in the global situation to which the liberal democracies have responded incoherently. And conflicts within our societies are providing significant rifts and distractions which provide enhanced opportunities for multi-polar authoritarianism to further enhance their position.

The ”second nuclear age” of Paul Bracken has blended with this strategic shift in which authoritarian powers are increasingly significant and active in the reshaping of the global order. That is to say, nuclear weapons in a bi-polar world are part of a very different system of managing the nuclear threat than is the case in a multi-polar authoritarian world.

I recently discussed these shifts with my friend and colleague Paul Bracken, a long-time analyst of nuclear weapons. We first met when he was working for Hermann Kahn, and I was working for Zbig Brzezinski. The world at that time was threatening enough, but now we face a whole new ball game without the rules book of how to play the game being clearly established.

We started by discussing reports that Ukraine which now occupies Russian territory would be given longer range strike weapons by the West and the authority to use them against targets on Russian soil. In the Cold War days, such decisions would always be considered in a nuclear weapons calculus. In this case, it does not appear to be the case.

Paul Bracken: “There are conflicting stories about whether this will happen but assuming it would we can consider the situation from the standpoint of escalation. And it is clear that in such a situation we can not easily control escalation management. We cannot assume the Ukrainian government would follow a script that the United States would wish to write about escalation management in the use of such weapons.

“But what mechanisms or patterns are we following?

“It would seem to be the same pattern we used in Vietnam, namely, incrementalism. We dial up the pressure and pain on the adversary and see what he does. Each upward move of the dial is small – incremental – so as to keep the conflict under control. This pattern did not work well in Vietnam and in this case the question of whether or not the Russians will use tactical nuclear weapons in response is a real question. So, the idea is to ratchet up the pressure, and let the other side make the decision about a counter escalation response.

“But this decision would be made on the Russian side in a very dynamic and fluid situation within Russia itself. Something dramatic could happen inside the Russian system, not directly related to the war which could affect the decision itself, such as conflict in Chechnya. In other words, the dynamic context within Russia will affect their counter escalation decision and not necessarily be driven by a narrowly considered U.S. decision on the conduct of war with Ukraine.”

We then moved to a discussion of the very different dynamics from when we worked on the Soviet-U.S. nuclear arms race to the one today of a diversity of actors possessing or nearly possessing nuclear weapons. I simply made the point that there has been the emergence of several states that have nuclear weapons whose own calculus is not easily understandable in western terms.

Paul Bracken: “That certainly is the case. DoD years ago, put nuclear weapons in a special box which is not connected directly to actual warfighting which is only conventional. We do not want to think about them except in unimaginable circumstances. However, if you’re in government dealing with important decisions, you cannot focus only on the most likely developments. It’s too controversial to think about, too different from everyday strategy which in this case is incremental. So, in Washington people reduce the decision to something politically digestible and manageable. Nuclear weapons use is not politically digestible or manageable for Washington or its allies. It’s out of bounds. I think this even extends to projecting this attitude onto our enemy, in this instance, Moscow.”

And the situation today is not the same as during the Cold War.

Bracken underscored this point as follows: “During the Cold War, neither side ever seriously contemplated a calculated nuclear strike on the other. You cannot say that today about the non-Western nuclear powers.”

“It doesn’t take a genius to figure out that if you have a calculated first strike with conventional weapons, what happens if you don’t cover all of the remaining enemy nuclear weapons? I mean, if I’ve thought of this so has the U.S. commands. It’s hard to believe that China and India don’t have calculated strikes considered on each other in a crisis or that North Korea doesn’t have planned calculated strikes on Japan and South Korea in a severe crisis. So, the situation is now very different from the Cold War.”

I commented that two changes especially affect such a shift. The first is the growing precision of conventional weapons and the focus on attriting the adversaries decision-making cycle not only for conventional but nuclear strikes as well.  The second is the effect a demonstration strike or event would have on a social media driven Western world where control of the narrative would be virtually impossible about what to do in the case for example of a low-yield strike by an adversary to provide perceived escalation dominance.

We then shifted to a discussion of the very significant Chinese nuclear weapons buildup.

Paul Bracken: “I think it’s very interesting that the Chinese went ahead with building their advanced technology for their conventional forces first and that the nuclear part is coming after as sort of a burst to minimize the U.S. reaction time with programs like Columbia submarines, Sentinel, and B-21.

“The U.S. doesn’t know how to think about this. We have a multi-front threat with China, Russia and North Korea that we have to consider. And I think there are enormous strategic and geopolitical implications of this force, notably the end of any credible policy of extended deterrence provided by the United States to allies.

“Multi-polarity is the normal state of global affairs, not bipolarity. It is not surprising that nuclear weapons are a key part of this shift as well.”

This is very challenging for rethinking the way ahead for U.S. and allied defense postures.

Bracken underscored that “what our investments at defense are really doing is trying to “freeze dry” the world of five or 10 years ago. This is very different from deterrence of China and attempting to stabilize the Middle East. Other countries are beginning to see this, especially in Asia, that the U.S. is attempting to use its military to stop or reverse structural change of the international order. This is also a reason China has for its nuclear breakout: to demonstrate that freezing the world to a 2015 form is impossible.”

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Chess pieces made from flags of China, Russia, North Korea.