Australia’s “Fight Tonight” Force: If the ADF Can’t Get More Financial Support They Better Have Credible Procurement Reform

The Albanese government’s apparent lack of focus on immediate military readiness or the so-called “fight tonight” force represents a fundamental misunderstanding of Australia’s strategic predicament.

Australia faces what former ADF vice chief Lieutenant General Des Mueller starkly termed a choice between “vision without dollars” as “hallucination” and the reality that we may not have an effective deterrent or fighting force before this decade ends.

But as defence analyst David Fawcett argues in a recent essay, the problem isn’t just money. It’s a procurement system so dysfunctional it actively prevents the deployment of world-class Australian defence technologies already proven in export markets.

The Counter-Drone Wake-Up Call

Nothing illustrates this dysfunction better than Australia’s approach to counter-drone capabilities. Drones have fundamentally changed warfare in Ukraine, the Middle East, and the Red Sea, making effective counter-drone systems an immediate priority for protecting Australian infrastructure and forces from threats ranging from activist disruption to overt military attack.

The Australian Army invested $8.2 million in a consortium of three globally successful Australian companies to develop an autonomous counter-drone system capable of destroying swarming attacks. The system met or exceeded all requirements in live-fire demonstrations at Cultana in late 2024. Separately, another Australian company received $10 million to develop laser-based counter-drone systems, again meeting all requirements and subsequently winning international competitions against 15 global competitors for Canadian military funding.

Meanwhile, Australian company DroneShield has dominated global markets for radio frequency-based counter-drone systems for years, while EOS has secured export contracts worth $178 million for counter-drone systems to European customers. These aren’t experimental technologies for they’re proven, combat-ready systems designed and built in Australia.

Yet instead of leveraging this $18+ million taxpayer investment and demonstrated capability, Defence launched a worldwide tender asking foreign companies to tell Australia what it should buy and integrate it on our behalf. Six months later, the process continues churning while another Defence agency announced additional funding for counter-drone development in the same fortnight EOS announced its $53 million European export deal.

This isn’t procurement; it’s bureaucratic theater that wastes taxpayer money while delaying critical capabilities our forces need today.

The “Fight Tonight” Imperative

Australia’s strategic circumstances demand a fundamental shift in how to think about defence capabilities. The luxury of decades-long procurement cycles belongs to an era when Australia’s geographic isolation provided natural protection and when adversaries operated at technological parity with Western forces.

Today’s reality is starkly different. Chinese naval forces have circumnavigated Australia, demonstrating that Australian isolation no longer guarantees security. Modern guided weapons possess range and accuracy that can threaten Australian territory and forces from unprecedented distances. Most critically, the pace of threat evolution now occurs in weeks or months, not years or decades.

Under these circumstances, Australia needs a more capable “fight tonight” capability or forces that can respond immediately to aggression rather than theoretical platforms that might arrive in the 2030s or 2040s. This doesn’t mean abandoning long-term planning, but it does mean prioritizing capabilities that can deter conflict today while building toward future requirements.

Significant percentages of new Defence acquisition budgets are being redirected toward naval platforms that won’t be operational until after 2030, often at the expense of air, land, space, and cyber capabilities needed before then.

The frustration for defence professionals isn’t that Australia lacks technological capability, rather it’s that Australia possess world-leading solutions Australian forces can’t access due to procurement dysfunction.

Take the Virginia-class submarine challenge. Rather than simply waiting for new construction while 18 US submarines sit idle awaiting maintenance, Australia could partner with U.S. industry to remediate these boats. This would require the U.S. to provide submarine-capable floating docks and training access, but informal discussions defence analyst David Fawcett with U.S. Congressional and Pentagon officials suggest strong interest. Most importantly, this approach would put nuclear submarine capability in Australian hands years earlier while building the qualified workforce needed to maintain them.

Similarly, the MQ-28 Ghost Bat program represents immediate capability potential. Supporting Boeing Australia’s stores clearance work at Woomera could rapidly deliver armed unmanned aircraft in air-to-air, electronic attack, and reconnaissance configurations. Whether or not Australia becomes the lead customer, conducting this clearance work would provide immediate options while deepening Australian aerospace capability.

These aren’t hypothetical future programs, rather they’re concrete steps that could enhance Australia’s “fight tonight” capability within months or years rather than decades.

Systematic Reform for Immediate Impact

Transforming Australia’s procurement system to support “fight tonight” capabilities requires several key reforms:

Fast-Track Proven Winners: Companies that successfully complete taxpayer-funded innovation programs and meet stated requirements should automatically become preferred tenderers. When Australian companies win competitive export contracts from allied nations, this should trigger expedited procurement processes unless compelling reasons exist otherwise. The counter-drone example shows how this principle could put proven capabilities into ADF hands immediately.

Phased Procurement with Decision Gates: Rather than massive, decades-long programs, implement rapid prototyping cycles with clear decision points for low-rate production, scaling, modification, or early retirement. This approach matches the reality that many threats now evolve faster than traditional procurement cycles.

Qualified Personnel Requirements: Following the AUKUS submarine program’s emphasis on qualified personnel, mandate that key procurement positions meet experience matrices developed with relevant professional bodies. Personnel with actual expertise are more likely to make timely, risk-informed decisions rather than blindly following process.

Independent Risk Assessment: Create assessment capabilities that report directly to the Defence Minister rather than through traditional chains of command. This prevents capability assessments from being filtered or delayed by bureaucratic layers, enabling faster deployment decisions.

Dedicated Leadership: Establish a Minister for Defence Capability whose sole responsibility is ensuring Defence has required materials at necessary scale and timeframes. This would separate capability acquisition from broader political considerations that currently slow procurement.

The Strategic Context

These reforms aren’t just about efficiency; they’re about survival. But spending more money through a broken system won’t solve the fundamental problem. As the counter-drone example demonstrates, Australia already possesses world-class defence capabilities but Australia just can’t field them due to procurement dysfunction.

The real question isn’t whether Australia should spend more on defence, but whether Australian can reform our systems to effectively use what Australia is already spending. A nation that takes six months to procure counter-drone systems its own companies have already perfected and exported globally is not prepared for rapid-onset conflict.

Australia’s strategic circumstances demand urgent reform of defence procurement to prioritize “fight tonight” capabilities over distant future platforms. The tools exist and Australian companies are already producing and exporting world-class defence technologies that could enhance ADF capabilities immediately.

What’s missing is the institutional will to implement proven solutions rather than continuing bureaucratic processes that delay critical capabilities. The Albanese government must choose between maintaining procurement systems designed for an era of strategic comfort or implementing reforms that match the urgency of Australia’s current circumstances.

This article was written based in large part on the excellent essay by David Fawcett entitled, “Not just a bigger budget. Here’s how to reform Defence procurement.”

https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/not-just-a-bigger-budget-heres-how-to-reform-defence-procurement/

It also reflects of my book being published next year entitled, Enhancing the “Fight Tonight Force”: An Inquiry into Shaping Ways Ahead.