What are the Prospects for Ending the Conflict in Ukraine?

The war in Ukraine has become the central hub of the new strategic competition between the great powers.

As pointed out by Robert Gilpin, following on from Charles Kindleberger’s insights into the theory of hegemonic stability, major conflicts tend to break out when an emerging power supports or exploits a regional conflict to weaken the hegemon and accelerate its decline.

In this scenario, the United States, Russia, China, and the European Union are moving on different geostrategic planes, while Ukraine is resisting Russian aggression in an attempt to preserve its territorial integrity.

A comparative analysis of the strategies adopted by the main actors allows us to identify the possible points of collapse and the possible trajectories of the conflict’s evolution.

American geostrategy today. Between disengagement and imperfect triangulation

With Trump’s second presidency, the United States has shown a gradual distancing from the Ukrainian conflict.

The meeting in Anchorage between Trump and Putin was little more than a symbolic gesture, revealing the American desire to reduce direct involvement in what Trump himself called “Biden’s war.”

This stance echoes, but in reverse, Henry Kissinger’s historic triangular strategy in the 1970s, when Washington positioned itself as a pivot between Moscow and Beijing, maintaining closer relations with both than they had with each other, so as to maximize its diplomatic flexibility and contain the USSR.

Today, however, the triangulation appears imperfect, in that the United States is no longer the arbiter of Russian-Chinese relations, but observes their consolidation from the outside, effectively ceding to China the negotiating and strategic advantage that once belonged to Washington.

The American position therefore appears ambivalent: on the one hand, it avoids direct involvement and seeks to transfer the burden of support for Kyiv to Europe; on the other hand, this disengagement favors the strengthening of the Russian-Chinese axis, drastically reducing the United States’ ability to influence the future geopolitical order of Eurasia.

Russian geostrategy has two objectives: to resist and to shift the axis towards the East

For Russia, the strategic objective remains unchanged: to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO and to consolidate control over the territories already occupied.

The invasion, although presented by Moscow as a ‘special operation’, is part of a long-term strategy aimed at rebuilding a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space and reaffirming Russia as an essential player in the global balance of power.

On the geo-economic front, despite Western sanctions, Moscow has found a long-term ally in Beijing.

China’s economic, technological, and diplomatic support neutralizes most of the effects of European restrictive measures, reducing them to symbolic rather than truly effective instruments.

The use of Asian markets, energy diversification towards the Far East, and technological cooperation with China consolidate Russia’s ability to withstand the shock imposed by the West.

Putin, aware of the structural weakness of the European front and the growing American disengagement, sees convergence with Xi Jinping as the decisive tool for ensuring Russia’s resilience and strengthening an alternative Sino-Russian-led order.

From this perspective, the war in Ukraine is not just a territorial conflict, but a fundamental piece in the overall redefinition of global power relations, accelerating the shift of the geopolitical axis from West to East.

European geostrategy oscillates between impotence and resistance

The European Union finds itself in a situation of structural difficulty that limits its strategic action.

On the one hand, it supports Zelensky with military, financial, and political aid, defending international law violated by Russian aggression and reaffirming its normative vocation as a “civil power.”

On the other hand, the absence of real strategic autonomy condemns it to oscillate between dependence on the United States and vulnerability to Moscow and Beijing, which exploit internal divisions and European energy weaknesses.

European aid is indispensable for Ukraine’s survival, but without a U.S. commitment comparable to that of the Biden administration, it is insufficient to guarantee military victory.

As a result, Europe appears more as a political and symbolic bulwark than as an actor fully capable of shaping the new geopolitical balance.

This situation reflects the European paradox: a leading economic union, but an unfinished strategic power, forced to resist without being able to decisively influence the outcome of the conflict.

Under the leadership of Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine is adopting a strategy based on two non-negotiable principles: no territorial concessions and no renunciation of national sovereignty. This unyielding line, which reflects the desire to preserve state identity and international law violated by Russian aggression, is supported by key European leaders. However, it clashes with the American logic of progressive disengagement and the Chinese vision of a compromise that, while stabilizing the conflict, would consolidate Moscow’s strategic interests.

Kyiv thus finds itself in a double opposition: on the one hand, against Russia, which aims to impose a peace dictated by its own conditions; on the other, against China, which sees a weakened or defeated Ukraine as an opportunity to ease U.S. pressure on the Asian front.

The Ukrainian position, while fully legitimate in legal and moral terms, risks accentuating the country’s strategic isolation, forcing it to depend increasingly on European resilience and Washington’s fluctuating choices.

Can the peace that everyone is calling for, but which each actor imagines and pursues in its own way, be achieved with the current geostrategic features of the countries involved?

Applying game theory to the dynamics described, with the current external support to the countries in conflict (exogenous payoffs), and considering that a war tends to continue when the reserve value of at least one of the contenders exceeds what it could obtain at the negotiating table, we can see that Russia currently has a high reserve value, thanks to the limited impact of sanctions, while Ukraine maintains a high reserve value both in regulatory terms and through Western aid. It follows that the prolongation of the conflict is, at present, the most likely scenario.

In line with I. William Zartman’s theories of international negotiation, peace becomes possible only when the parties perceive themselves to be in a mutually hurting stalemate, i.e., when the expected costs of continuing hostilities exceed the potential benefits and the war appears to have no concrete prospects of victory. Added to this must be the perception of a mutually enticing opportunity, i.e., the existence of a negotiating opportunity that is sufficiently advantageous to make seeking an agreement preferable to continuing to fight.

Today, however, neither Russia nor Ukraine seems close to such a point of equilibrium: both continue to resist thanks to external support, albeit in different forms.

Under these conditions, the scenario of painful stalemate remains incomplete, making it difficult to open a credible negotiation process.

Ukraine thus remains at the center of a larger game, in which its very survival depends not only on its own resilience, but also on the shifting balances between the United States, Russia, China, and Europe.

Without a truly mutually painful stalemate and without a shared opportunity for negotiation, peace remains distant and the conflict tends to drag on, becoming one of the main fronts of global systemic competition.

This article was published in Italian on the website Formiche on September 1, 2025 and was republished with the author’s permission.