Strategic Choices in Southeast Asia: Beijing’s Pull Between Economic Convenience and Structural Coercion

In recent years, Southeast Asian leaders have repeatedly affirmed their determination not to choose between Washington and Beijing, but rather to remain “pro-Singapore” or “pro-Indonesia,” according to contingent national interests. As Lawrence Wong stated in 2023: “In some instances, we may make decisions that seem to favor one side versus the other, but that does not mean being pro-China or pro-America. It simply means being pro-Singapore”.

However, the intensifying strategic rivalry between the United States and China, sharpened under the Trump presidency with new tariff measures and reinforced by Xi Jinping’s recent belligerent declarations, has made it increasingly difficult to sustain a position of genuine neutrality.

It is therefore necessary to distinguish among three key factors explaining ASEAN states’ alignment with Beijing: conviction, convenience, and coercion.

China’s narrative, especially since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2017, presents itself as inevitably attractive. Beijing frames its role in the region as that of a natural and indispensable partner. Since 2017, China has financed major infrastructure projects in Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Indonesia, reinforcing the perception of irreversible economic integration (RAND, 2021). Geography and economic interdependence further strengthen this vision: China has been the largest trading partner of most ASEAN countries for over a decade (Shambaugh, 2020).

Beijing’s official narrative highlights the idea of a “community of common destiny”, portraying it as a collective alternative to bloc politics and a framework for deeper regional cooperation (Economy, 2018). In practice, however, this narrative conflates economic interdependence with political alignment. Aside from Vietnam and Laos, no ASEAN state has embraced China’s political model or ideological vision.

For the rest, including Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, and Singapore, the conviction to follow Beijing’s path is negligible, reflecting pragmatism rather than genuine alignment. Despite the apparent rapprochement, no Southeast Asian state can be considered “convinced” by China’s paradigm. Historical experiences of conflict, particularly Vietnam’s with Beijing, continue to foster deep mistrust (Thayer, 2022). Likewise, civil societies across ASEAN remain distant from China’s authoritarian model, while cultural and technological ties with the West remain stronger (Kurlantzick, 2022).

Convenience thus emerges as the main driver of regional alignment. Commercial opportunities, access to financing and technology, and large-scale infrastructure projects have all pushed political and business elites to regard Beijing as an essential partner. In Indonesia and Malaysia, political pragmatism translates into selective cooperation with China, while carefully avoiding a rupture with the United States (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2023).

Coercion, however, represents the darker side of Chinese influence. In the Mekong basin, Beijing’s control of major dams, Jinghong, Manwan, Dachaoshan, Gongguoqiao, Huangdeng, Xiaowan, and Nuozhadu, has turned geography into a powerful instrument of political pressure on Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam (Glaser, 2022). Added to this is the “debt trap” stemming from BRI loans, which constrains the sovereignty of several countries (IISS, 2024). More than voluntary alignment, this reflects a form of soft coercion, disguised as cooperation.

Each Southeast Asian state acts according to its own geopolitical imperatives, aimed at ensuring national security and regime stability.

Singapore seeks constant balance: it wants to preserve its economic and financial centrality and, in the event of an extreme crisis, would most likely rely on U.S. security guarantees.

Vietnam, while cooperating economically with China, systematically strengthens military ties with Washington to counterbalance the threat in the South China Sea.

The Philippines oscillate depending on political leadership: Duterte leaned toward China, while Marcos Jr. has revitalized the partnership with the United States; yet the perception of a Chinese threat remains constant.

Thailand maintains its traditional equilibrist stance, playing both sides, though its armed forces remain firmly tied to Washington.

Cambodia and Laos represent the most evident cases of structural dependence on Beijing, with very limited room for strategic autonomy.

Finally, Indonesia and Malaysia adopt a pragmatic and bilateral approach: they benefit from economic cooperation with China but remain wary of its growing maritime assertiveness.

China’s narrative attempts to depict Washington as “distant” and unreliable.

The United States retains three decisive advantages: security guarantees that no other actor can offer, sustained by formal alliances with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia, military superiority and naval power projection, which still compensates for geographic distance and cultural and technological soft power, which remains more attractive than China’s.

The main limitation for the United States lies in the perception of domestic political volatility: oscillations between Obama, Trump, Biden (and again Trump) have generated uncertainty about the consistency of U.S. regional strategy.

The speech delivered by Xi Jinping during the parade marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II represented a significant turning point: the Chinese leader urged the country to “prepare for new historic struggles” (Xi Jinping, Speech at the 80th Anniversary of the End of World War II Victory Parade, Beijing, September 2025).

This language reflects a confrontational vision of international order and projects China as a power ready for systemic rivalry.

For Southeast Asian states, such rhetoric is not reassuring but alarming: aligning too closely with Beijing risks drawing them into a confrontational strategy that contradicts their core interests of stability and development.

Thus, Southeast Asia’s alignment with China does not stem from ideological conviction, but from a combination of economic convenience and structural coercion.

Beijing’s narrative of a “shared destiny” appears unconvincing in the eyes of ASEAN governments, which instead prefer adaptive and balanced strategies.

In practice, these states cooperate with China on trade and infrastructure while continuing to view Washington as the ultimate guarantor of their security.

In this context, ASEAN as an organization remains marginal: the real contest unfolds bilaterally, state by state.

The future of Southeast Asia will therefore be marked by a permanent tension: China’s economic attraction on one side and U.S. security guarantees on the other.

In this intermediate space, states will strive to preserve their autonomy, while recognizing that complete neutrality is no longer a viable option.