Imperatives for Australian Combat Readiness and National Resilience in a Contested Indo-Pacific

The comfortable certainties of the post-Cold War era have dissolved. They have been replaced by a period of “perpetual competition” and “unprecedented uncertainty”, a reactive scramble that defines our era as the “anarchy of the moment.” Unlike the grand ideological struggles of the past, today’s global disorder is characterized by an endless succession of urgent, interconnected crises that demand immediate response, leaving little room for long-term strategic thinking.

This analysis argues that the convergence of a compressed threat timeline, the brutal lessons of contemporary warfare, and critical vulnerabilities in Australia’s national support base creates a strategic imperative to abandon platform-centric gradualism in favor of a whole-of-society model of continuous, threat-informed adaptation.

This article will first examine the evolving strategic environment and the compressed timeline for action that it imposes. It will then distill critical lessons from contemporary conflicts that are redefining the nature of modern warfare. Subsequently, the analysis will assess the technological frontiers of non-kinetic, uncrewed, and artificial intelligence capabilities that Australia must master. The article will also analyze the national support base, the industrial, societal, and institutional foundations upon which credible military power is built. Finally, it will conclude by outlining the core imperatives for achieving combat readiness and national resilience in an era where the choice is between adaptation and vulnerability.

1. The Evolving Geopolitical Landscape and the Compressed Timeline for Action

An accurate assessment of the current geopolitical environment is the essential starting point for sound defence planning. A failure to recognize the fundamental shift in global security dynamics, from an era of relative stability to one of “unrestricted competition”, will lead to inadequate and dangerously reactive policy. The comfortable assumptions that guided Western nations for decades have been rendered obsolete by the rise of authoritarian powers actively seeking to reshape the international order.

The contemporary strategic environment is one of persistent complexity and technological acceleration, where the lines between peace and conflict are increasingly blurred. Authoritarian regimes are waging sophisticated campaigns across economic, political, social, and technological domains, designed to fracture democratic decision-making processes before the first shot is fired. This reality demands a renewed sense of urgency and a clear-eyed understanding of the specific threats facing Australia.

The armed forces of the People’s Republic of China have been growing at an “almost exponential” rate, a degree of military expansion unmatched by any other power. This buildup is not merely quantitative; it includes significant qualitative improvements in areas such as fifth-generation fighters and long-range precision missiles. The PRC’s declared intent to incorporate Taiwan, its creation of “manufactured islands” in the South China Sea to assert unlawful territorial claims, and its material support for Russia’s aggression in Ukraine are all clear indicators of malign intent that must be taken seriously.

The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine served as a “brutal awakening” for Western democracies, shattering the “optimistic notions” about global stability that prevailed after the Cold War. The conflict explicitly identifies Russia as the primary threat in Europe and has provided a real-world laboratory for modern high-intensity warfare, offering sobering lessons on industrial capacity, attrition, and the character of contemporary combat.

These threats are not isolated. Professor Justin Bronk of the Royal United Service Institute argues that Australia faces a severely compressed threat timeline, asserting that the nation has a 2-5 year preparation window, not the commonly assumed 5-10 years. This urgency is driven by converging factors. In the Indo-Pacific, Chinese leaders may perceive a temporary military advantage before new American capabilities, such as the B-21 bomber, come online around 2030. Simultaneously, in Europe, Russian production has created a temporary conventional superiority, yet this expansion is economically unsustainable beyond 3-5 years, creating pressure for action before economic constraints bind. The interconnectedness of these potential conflicts adds to the urgency; as Bronk notes, a “Chinese move on Taiwan would likely draw American forces from Europe, potentially encouraging Russian aggression against NATO.” This stark reality demands that Australia not only accelerate its preparations but also learn rapidly from ongoing conflicts to inform them.

2. Redefining Readiness: Lessons from Contemporary Warfare

Contemporary conflicts, particularly the war in Ukraine, serve as a “laboratory of modern warfare,” laying bare the brutal mathematics of high-intensity combat. They offer critical, real-world lessons that must inform a fundamental reorientation of Australia’s approach to combat readiness, challenging long-held assumptions about force structure, industrial preparedness, and strategic endurance.

In his work, Translating Ukraine Lessons for the Pacific Theater published by the Australian Army Research Centre, MAJGEN (Retd) Mick Ryan synthesizes ten core lessons that provide a framework for understanding the changing character of war:

• Mass and National Mobilization This represents a fundamental shift in 21st-century warfare, demanding the engagement of entire societies.
• Cognitive Warfare as a Parallel Battlefield Modern conflicts are won as much in the information space as on traditional battlefields.
• The Enduring Importance of the People Factor The quality, training, and morale of personnel remain a decisive advantage.
• Meshed Commercial-Military Sensor Networks These have created unprecedented battlefield transparency and compressed decision-making timelines.
• The Collapse of Mass and Precision The proliferation of ubiquitous uncrewed systems has collapsed the traditional distinction between these two concepts.
• Democratization of Long-Range Strike Cheaper, accessible precision weapons have democratized strategic attack capabilities beyond major powers.
• The Essential Role of Alliance Integration Sustained high-intensity operations have proven to be impossible without deep alliance integration and support.
• Unprecedented Speed of Adaptation The pace of tactical and technological adaptation is now measured in weeks or months, not years.
• The Persistence of Surprise Despite enhanced surveillance, the potential for strategic and operational surprise remains a key feature of warfare.
• Leadership as the Determinant of Outcomes Ultimately, the quality of leadership at all levels continues to determine victory and defeat.

Recent conflicts have also laid bare the unsustainable economic realities of modern air defence. The cost-exchange ratio of using multi-million dollar missiles to intercept drones costing as little as $7,000 is a losing proposition, particularly against adversaries employing saturation tactics. Ukraine now faces “5,000-6,000 incoming drones monthly alongside 200 cruise and ballistic missiles.” The resulting strategic calculus is harsh: even “Israeli defence planners acknowledge they would abandon city defence in a multi-vector attack, concentrating resources on protecting military bases essential for counteroffensive operations.” In contrast, cost-effective solutions like the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS), a laser guidance kit for standard rockets costing 20,000-35,000 per unit—offer a path to breaking this unsustainable cost curve.

As highlighted by analyst Chris McInnis, these lessons lead to a critique of the traditional “fight tonight” mentality, which can create a “fight tonight fallacy.” Quoting Phillips O’Brien, he argues that wars “are not decided on the battlefield. Rather, the battlefield reveals the states with the powers involved.” Initial tactical victories are meaningless without the national stamina to sustain operations. This perspective demands a shift in focus from immediate tactical capability to strategic endurance. The force must be prepared not only to “fight tonight,” but as AVM (Retd) Robert Denney states, to “fight tomorrow night, next week and next month.” This requires a deep, resilient national base capable of supporting a prolonged conflict, bridging the lessons from current kinetic battlefields to the new technological domains Australia must master.

3. The Technological Frontier: Mastering Non-Kinetic, Uncrewed, and AI Capabilities

Victory in modern conflict is increasingly determined not by platforms alone, but by the mastery and synchronization of capabilities across invisible domains. Cyberspace, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the cognitive realm of artificial intelligence are now central battlefields where decisive advantages can be won or lost before kinetic operations even begin. For Australia, developing and integrating these advanced technologies is not an option but a strategic necessity.

The strategic importance of non-kinetic effects cannot be overstated. According to LTGEN Sue Coyle, Chief of Joint Capabilities, their use “will likely be the deciding factor in who prevails.” These effects, spanning space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum, offer the ability to achieve strategic outcomes with less risk of escalation than traditional kinetic strikes. The core challenge, however, lies in synchronizing these often-invisible effects across different domains and with conventional forces. This requires not only technical integration but also building resilience through robust PACE (Primary, Alternate, Contingency, and Emergency) planning, preparing for a reality where any given system may be degraded or denied.

Australia’s development of uncrewed systems is emerging as a critical force multiplier, offering a way to generate combat mass and project power without placing human crews at unacceptable risk.

• The MQ-28 Ghost Bat: This collaborative combat aircraft represents a transformative capability. As CAF AM Stephen Chappell describes, the Ghost Bat has the potential to turn the RAAF from a “tier one small air force into a tier one medium-sized air force.” By deploying these uncrewed assets across Australian air bases, the RAAF can generate a persistent defensive and offensive presence, preserving its highly trained human crews for the most complex missions.
• Maritime “Security Clusters”: In the maritime domain, RADM Brett Sonter is pioneering an innovative approach to managing Australia’s vast exclusive economic zone. His concept of “security clusters” integrates crewed and uncrewed systems, combining the persistence of uncrewed surface vessels, the responsiveness of uncrewed aerial vehicles, and the decision-making authority of crewed platforms—to create a layered and adaptive security network.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) poses a fundamental, dual-edged challenge to democratic societies. John Blackburn diagnoses the immediate danger as a potential “Pandemic of the Mind,” a “bridge phase” over the next 10-20 years where over-reliance on AI for decision-making leads to “cognitive atrophy” and erodes critical thinking skills. The antidote to this is the concept of “augmented intelligence,” where AI serves as a powerful tool to enhance, not replace, human cognitive abilities.

Looking beyond this immediate challenge, innovator Tom Hanson predicts the potential long-term outcome: a “trans-humanist integration with AI” may become a “technological necessity.” This elevates the current debate beyond technological choice to a question of strategic preparation. In this light, augmented intelligence becomes “essential preparation for a new trans-human species future that may be inevitable but need not be involuntary.” However, these advanced technological capabilities remain irrelevant without a robust national foundation to develop, sustain, and deploy them in a crisis.

4. The National Foundation: The Imperative for Industrial Mobilization and Whole-of-Society Resilience

While Australia’s technological and operational capabilities are formidable, they are built upon a national support base that is dangerously brittle, revealing a critical disconnect between the nation’s frontline military prowess and its strategic endurance. In an era of great power competition, the assumption that conflicts can be managed by professional forces while civilian society remains insulated is no longer tenable. The central thesis of modern defence is the need for the “active engagement, preparation, and resilience of entire societies.”

History offers stark lessons on the importance of industrial mobilization. During World War II, Bill Knudsen, President of General Motors, successfully orchestrated America’s “Arsenal of Democracy” by harnessing industrial giants with government backing and a sense of urgency before the nation was fully at war. In contrast, Australia’s Essington Lewis, despite his vision, struggled against bureaucratic inertia to mobilize Australia’s industrial base, demonstrating the cost of delayed action. This history reinforces the core argument from industry expert Matt Jones: “Waiting for crisis to justify investment leaves us with money, but no time.”

An honest assessment reveals critical vulnerabilities in Australia’s current defence industrial base. These include:

• An industrial base that is “underweight, fragmented, and reliant on extended global supply chains,” posing significant risks if those lines are disrupted in a conflict.
• The “reservist dilemma,” starkly illustrated by Boeing Defence Australia, which employs around 900 active reservists. If these individuals were called to military service, critical sovereign capabilities, such as the training system for the E-7 Wedgetail, would “cease overnight.” This creates a debilitating paradox where a national crisis would trigger the removal of the very specialists required to sustain the nation’s most critical defence capabilities, causing a self-inflicted wound at the moment of greatest need.
• The “lock-in effect,” an insight credited to AVM (Retd) Robert Denney, which describes the reality that it is nearly impossible to insert Australian companies into mature global supply chains after they have already crystallized. Early government investment and strategic intent are required to secure a place for domestic industry from the outset.

Addressing these challenges requires a “whole-of-society” approach to defence. As outlined by Colonel Dave Beaumont, the national support base rests on four essential pillars: industry, workforce, social cohesion, and institutional decision-making capacity. Each must be deliberately cultivated in peacetime to ensure the nation has the strategic endurance to weather a protracted conflict. This resilient national base is the prerequisite for the strategic choices and actions the Australian Defence Force must now undertake.

5. Conclusion: Strategic Imperatives for an Era of Perpetual Competition

Australia stands at a decisive moment, confronting a strategic environment more dangerous and unpredictable than at any time in recent memory. The comfortable assumptions of the past have been replaced by the stark reality of perpetual competition. In this new era, the choice is between proactive “adaptation and vulnerability.” The insights gathered from military leaders, strategic thinkers, and industry experts converge on a clear message: business as usual is no longer a viable option.

This analysis distills into three primary strategic imperatives for the Australian Defence Force and the nation it defends. These are not merely recommendations but essential shifts in culture, posture, and planning required to secure Australia’s interests in a contested Indo-Pacific.

• Prioritize Continuous Adaptation Over Static, Platform-Centric Planning The ADF must shift its fundamental model from long-term, platform-centric acquisition cycles to one of continuous, “threat-informed innovation.” As argued by Chief of Army LTGEN Simon Stuart, the character of warfare is now changing month by month. Success will belong to the force that can learn and evolve faster than its adversaries. This requires an acquisition system that prioritizes speed, flexibility, and software-enabled upgrades over the pursuit of perfect, decades-long platform solutions.
• Develop Sovereign Strategic Strike While Deepening Alliance Interoperability While the U.S. alliance remains the cornerstone of Australian security, recent global events have highlighted the risks of over-reliance. Australia must develop “high-leverage capabilities,” such as uncrewed and autonomous systems, that allow it to act independently to defend its interests if required. This pursuit of strategic independence should be managed within the alliance through a framework of “deliberate incrementalism,” deepening cooperation in practical ways while preserving sovereign decision-making autonomy.
• Operationalize a Forward Defence Posture Through Distributed Operations Australia’s geography is both a strategic asset and a logistical challenge. It necessitates a posture of forward defence that can engage threats far from its shores. This requires a force structured for distributed operations across the Indo-Pacific, built on resilient and dispersed infrastructure, supported by integrated “embedded logistics,” and postured through a regular and persistent program of forward-deployed exercises with regional partners.

In this era of perpetual competition, the capacity to learn and adapt faster than any adversary is no longer just an advantage. It is the ultimate determinant of victory.

Note: All of these issues are covered more fully in my new book on Australian defence.

Fight Tonight: Combat Readiness at the Speed of Relevance