Is There a Military Pivot to China Underway by President Lula’s Brazil?
President Lula’s recent decision to station Brazilian general officers permanently in Beijing marks a historic shift in Brazil’s defense partnerships.
While proponents frame this as a move toward “strategic autonomy,” a closer examination reveals troubling parallels to colonial-era relationships that could further subordinate Brazil to Chinese interests rather than liberate it from foreign dependence.
The Illusion of Diversification
The narrative surrounding Brazil’s military rapprochement with China emphasizes diversification and reduced dependence on the United States. After decades of limited technology transfer and restrictive export controls under American partnership agreements, The promise of Chinese VT-4 tanks, J-10 fighter jets, and advanced artillery systems appears to offer both strategic options and technological advancement.
However, this framing obscures a fundamental reality: Brazil is not achieving independence by diversifying suppliers. It is potentially replacing one master with another, more demanding one.
From Economic Colony to Military Dependent
Brazil’s relationship with China already exhibits the classic characteristics of center-periphery dependence. China purchases Brazilian soybeans, iron ore, crude oil, and other raw materials while exporting manufactured goods, technology, and increasingly, capital investments. This “primarization” of Brazil’s economy has concerned economists for years, as it locks the country into a lower value-added role in global supply chains.
Now, military cooperation threatens to extend this subordinate relationship into the security realm. Unlike economic partnerships that can be more easily diversified or terminated, military dependencies create lasting vulnerabilities through:
- Technology dependence: Chinese military equipment requires ongoing maintenance, spare parts, training, and upgrades, creating long-term reliance
- Operational integration: Military systems must work together, making it difficult to mix suppliers or change partners
- Intelligence sharing: Defense cooperation inevitably involves sharing sensitive information that can be leveraged for broader influence
- Financial obligations: Major defense purchases typically involve extended financing arrangements that create additional pressure points
The Democratic Deficit
Perhaps most concerning is the governance dimension of this shift. Brazil’s partnership with the United States, whatever its limitations, occurred between democratic allies with shared values around transparency, legislative oversight, and public accountability. Military cooperation with China introduces a fundamentally different dynamic.
China’s authoritarian system operates without meaningful public scrutiny, independent media oversight, or legislative accountability. Military partnerships with such regimes risk normalizing less transparent decision-making processes within Brazilian institutions. The decision to station generals permanently in Beijing, for instance, appears to have been made with minimal public debate or legislative input, precisely the kind of executive autonomy that democratic governance seeks to constrain.
When Brazilian generals spend extended periods embedded in Chinese military structures, they may gradually absorb different assumptions about civil-military relations, strategic priorities, and acceptable levels of public accountability. This institutional influence can prove far more durable than formal agreements.
Strategic Autonomy or Strategic Subordination?
True strategic autonomy would require Brazil to develop indigenous defense capabilities, maintain balanced relationships with multiple partners, and preserve decision-making independence. Instead, the current trajectory suggests a shift from one form of dependence to another, potentially more comprehensive, subordination.
China’s approach to international partnerships increasingly resembles what scholars have called “debt trap diplomacy” in other sectors. Countries find themselves drawn into Chinese-financed infrastructure projects or resource extraction agreements that initially appear beneficial but gradually create leverage for Chinese political influence. Military cooperation could follow similar patterns, especially given Brazil’s existing economic vulnerabilities to Chinese pressure.
Moreover, China’s global behavior suggests it views partnerships instrumentally rather than as relationships between equals. Countries that accept significant Chinese investment or cooperation often find their foreign policy options gradually constrained as they become reluctant to take positions that might jeopardize crucial economic relationships.
The Path Forward
One need not argue for maintaining uncritical dependence on the United States or any single partner. Brazil’s frustrations with limited technology transfer and restrictive export controls from American partners are legitimate grievances that require attention.
However, genuine strategic autonomy demands a more sophisticated approach than simply switching primary dependencies. Brazil should:
- Invest in domestic capabilities: Rather than seeking foreign suppliers for critical defense technologies, Brazil should prioritize developing indigenous military industries and research capabilities.
- Maintain balanced partnerships: True diversification means working with multiple partners, European allies, other Latin American countries, India, and others, rather than replacing American dependence with Chinese subordination. And build on their key partnerships with European countries in particular (which I discuss in a later article).
- Strengthen democratic oversight: Any major shift in defense partnerships should involve robust legislative debate, public scrutiny, and transparent decision-making processes that maintain civilian control over military policy.
- Preserve policy independence: Military partnerships should enhance Brazil’s strategic options, not constrain them through financial dependencies or implicit political obligations.
Conclusion
Brazil’s size, resources, and democratic institutions position it to be a truly independent actor on the global stage. Achieving that independence requires building genuine strategic autonomy, not simply changing which foreign power calls the shots. The permanent stationing of Brazilian generals in Beijing may mark a historic moment, but history will judge whether it represents a step toward genuine sovereignty or deeper subordination to a new hegemon.
The choice facing Brazil is not between American and Chinese dependence, but between dependence and true strategic autonomy. That path remains open, but only if Brazilian leaders recognize the difference between changing partners and achieving genuine independence.
Note: The Brazilian decision is highlighted here: