The Fall of Bashar al-Assad’s Regime in Syria: The Impact on Putin’s Russia

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria is undoubtedly bad news for Russia, which in recent years has invested considerable effort and resources to save the Damascus government and establish its influence in the region.

However, it is too early to definitively conclude that Russian troops will withdraw entirely from Syria.

It is highly likely that the Kremlin will make every effort to maintain at least some of its facilities there.

The rapid pace and effectiveness of the offensive by various insurgent groups, including Jihadi fighters, against Assad’s forces have been surprising. While it was known that the governmental forces were weak and demoralized, few expected them to surrender the entire territory without a fight, forcing President Assad to flee the country within days, ending his 24-year rule.

The fall of Assad’s regime carries numerous implications, including for Russia, which has been directly involved in Syria since September 2015, when it launched an air campaign to support Iranian ground forces. Russia succeeded in saving Assad’s government and achieving a ceasefire, all with a relatively small contingent (now it has roughly 7,000 to 8,000 troops in Syria).

In exchange for its assistance, Russia gained access to two key military facilities: the Khmeimim Air Base near Latakia, vital for its African operations, and the Tartus Naval Base. The Russian task force in the Mediterranean Sea included a Grigorovich-class frigate, the corvette Mercury, two Gorshkov-class frigates, Kaliningradneft-class oiler and the diesel-electric submarine of the Kilo-class. These bases have been essential for Russia’s regional and global power projection.

While it was clear that Russian forces would not help Assad reclaim the entire country, few anticipated they would be unable to protect him during a crisis.

However, this failure is more reflective of Assad’s forces’ passivity, as they showed no will to fight.

Lt. Col. (Res.) Maciej Korowaj, a Polish analyst specializing in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine, suggests that “there is a high probability that the HTS and other insurgent groups aimed to neutralize Russian forces in Syria and take them ‘hostage,’ cutting off Assad’s military from meaningful Russian support.”

He also noted that “this was executed systematically and with operational precision, likely with assistance from foreign special operations and intelligence services, potentially involving Turkey, Israel, and the U.S. in a coordinated special operation.”

Media sources have also revealed that Ukrainian military intelligence has been training Syrian Sunni rebels in drone operations and supplying them with equipment.

Russian forces in Syria have shown limited activity, focusing on isolated attacks and retreating to evacuation zones (e.g., reports of withdrawal from Sarrin Airbase near Turkey’s border). Before the fall of Damascus, reports indicated that Russia had withdrawn warships from the Tartus Naval Base.

The collapse of Assad’s regime not only damages Russia’s reputation but also significantly weakens its geopolitical position in the region, undermining its ability to project power in the Mediterranean and Africa.

For instance, the Khmeimim Air Base has been central to Russia’s efforts in Africa where operations in the Sahel have expanded its influence while pressuring Europe (e.g., through strategic manipulation of migrant flows). Russia has successfully diminished France’s influence in the region, leading to its withdrawal from the Sahel. Furthermore, Africa is economically vital for Russia, particularly for the Wagner Group, due to mining contracts in several countries.

Losing access to the Khmeimim Air Base would disrupt Russia’s logistical network linking its territory to African outposts, complicating supply routes and resource exports.

Similarly, losing the Tartus Naval Base would leave Russia without a permanent foothold in the Mediterranean, forcing reliance on more distant facilities in Crimea. The Tartus base is Russia’s only replenishment and repair station in the Mediterranean Sea.

Additionally, the loss of these facilities would weaken Russia’s leverage in negotiations with the West and diminish its strategic partnerships with Iran and, previously, Israel. The Kremlin may also face a resurgence of jihadist threats within its borders, particularly in the Caucasus, undermining one of the original goals of its intervention in Syria: neutralizing Islamist threats.

However, it is premature to conclude that Russia has lost its foothold in Syria or that its forces will be completely withdrawn. The Kremlin is likely to take significant steps to retain its presence. Unconfirmed reports suggest negotiations are already underway with Syrian fighters to maintain access to these bases.

Some speculate that Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) could agree to a deal if Russia hands over Assad, though it is also possible that the Kremlin could negotiate favorable terms, such as economic aid in exchange for continued access.

Russia may also show interest in acquiring former Syrian military equipment now under HTS and other groups’ control, potentially repurposing it for use in Ukraine.

Ensuring the complete removal of Russian bases from Syria should remain a priority for the West.

Featured graphic: Bashar al-Assad against the backdrop of the Syrian flag, the Russian flag and the Kremlin.

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