Missile Developments in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region remains one of the most strategically important regions as well as being a region of turmoil and conflicts.
Regional stability that is undercut by the snuggle for power among regional as well as global players.
Indulging in arms races has become a common phenomenon amid regional players and a considerable amount of defence budget is utilized by the states in the region to acquire or indigenously develop weapon systems for combat, deterrence and coercive diplomacy.
Ballistic and cruise missiles have become major constituents of deterrence and combat capability for many states in the MENA region.
States in these regions have graduated from Scud category missile systems to sophisticated missile capabilities that could prove its mettle even against enemy air and missile defence systems.
States focus on diverse missile systems in order to strengthen their deterrence in the region.
However, missile systems that were developed and inducted for purpose of strengthening deterrence has resulted in a failure of a deterrence mechanism resulting in the usage of such systems by not only state systems but also asymmetric organisations.
The introduction of long range strike capabilities and stand-off capabilities have further worsened security situations in the region.
This article looks at developments in the MENA region involving ballistic and cruise missiles i possessed by both state and non-state actors that play proxies for state actors.
Israel
Israel has focused on Jericho category missile systems that range from 500kms to reportedly intercontinental range. Israel has made technological advancements in its missile capabilities to make them evade air and missile defence systems through drag stabilization and smaller fins for greater maneuverability.[1]
The Jericho category missile systems are nuclear capable and can reach targets in the Middle East as well as in Pakistan too.
In addition, Israel also possesses air-launched ballistic missile capability which it has used in 2024 against Iran and provided Israel with a stand-off capability even with ballistic missiles. [2]
This stance from Israel was noteworthy as Tel Aviv used ALBMs instead of air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) for launching an attack. Israel possesses Popeye category air-to-surface cruise missiles, the Popeye 1, Popeye 2 and Popeye Turbo.[3] The Popeye Turbo also reportedly has a submarine version. [4]
Israel is known to have possessed the Long Range Artillery (LORA) and in 2024, they also developed air launched version of the LORA called the Air LORA.[5] The missile possesses supersonic speed, and can engage in precision strikes and could be integrated with any aircraft providing Israel greater flexibility to launch its attacks. [6]
Israel’s Delilah category air launched cruise missiles also add to its combat strength with a range of 300kms.[7] These missiles are also in the form of surface to surface category to provide greater combat flexibility.
Tel Aviv has also developed another air-launched cruise missile (air to surface cruise missile) named Wind Demon with a range of 200kms in 2024 to provide “accurate response to the changing nature of warfare” at an affordable cost. [8] There are anti-ship missile capabilities too to provide Israel with anti-access area denial capabilities like the Gabriel missiles which can be ground, sea and air launched with a range of 350-400kms.[9]
Iran
Iran has also progressed with ballistic and cruise missile capabilities that are nuclear capable despite United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions imposed upon it on grounds of its nuclear program which could have ‘possible military dimension.’ Despite the landmark deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA), sanctions were not eased, but did not deter Iran was progressing with advanced missile capabilities.
These advancements include a shift from liquid fueled propulsion systems for ballistic missiles to solid fueled propulsion systems and also hypergolic propulsion systems, a shift from Scud category missile capabilities to guided missile technology, with missiles ranging from short range to medium range ballistic missiles that are nuclear capable and counter-measures on these missile systems.
Iran views its ballistic missile arsenal as an asset that strengthens their conventional deterrence.
Hence, despite the global pressures on Iran to include ballistic missiles in the nuclear deal, Iran remained stern on its decision that missiles would not become part of the nuclear deal.
Iran’s Shahab category missiles (Scud variants), the variants of Shahab category missiles: Ghadr and Emad, the Sejjil missile, Fateh-313, Qiam and its advanced version Jihad with greater operational efficiency despite liquid fuelled propulsion given the multiple launch platforms[10], Zolfaghar, Khorramshahr, Tondar, Kheibar Shekhan, Martyr Haj Qassem form constituent of Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal. [11] Iran has used its ballistic missile arsenals for combat purpose since 2017. [12]
Iran’s cruise missile arsenal includes nuclear capable missile like the Soumar, the Hoveyzeh, Abu Mehdi, Paveh, Meshqat, Qader, Ya-Ali, Noor, Kowsar, CM-300, and Heidar.
Turkey
Turkey has also progressed with credible ballistic missile capabilities that include the J-600 Yildrim, the Bora missiles, Cenk and Tayfun, and Atmaca.
Turkey also possesses the Stand-off Cruise Missiles. Turkey has recently focused on indigenously built engines for its cruise missiles. For instance, the KTJ-3200 engine will be used in Stand-off missiles. [13]
Turkey has also focused on cruise missiles like the Cakir that could be launched from multiple platforms.
In fact, the missile was tested from an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in 2024.[14] Turkey is also utilising Artificial Intelligence(AI) in its missile technology and the KEMANKEŞ version of mini cruise missile uses AI enabling the missile to earn the reputation of being smart and intelligent.[15]
Syria
States like Syria had also possessed Scud category cruise missiles while there were unconfirmed reported of China providing its DF-11 and DF-15 ballistic missiles to Syria.[16]
In August 2017, there were reports that Russia provided SS-21 and SS-26 Iskander missiles to Syria.[17]
Syria is also in possession of anti-ship cruise missiles which include the Yakhont cruise missile that it acquired from Russia. [18] Syria also possessed Chinese made anti-ship missiles that have been used to target Israeli destroyer during the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah.[19]
According to reports, weapon components were also smuggled from Syria to Lebanon for Hezbollah and crossed the central point between the two states which was an underground strategic missile site of the Hezbollah.[20]
For Iran, Syria remains crucial not only for strategic gains, but also for transporting weapon systems to Hezbollah.
GCC
States like Qatar and United Arab Emirates have acquired Joint Attack Rocket and Missile System (JARM) from China and Black Shaheen from France and Britain respectively.
There were also reports that UAE was indigenously developing ALCM called the Saber 220 and was also in talks with Israel to purchase cruise missiles.[21]
On the other hand, Qatari military commanders have expressed interest to acquire hypersonic missile capabilities for Qatar Emiri Air Force and Qatar Emiri Navy.[22]
Prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Baghdad had also progressed with ballistic missile capabilities and has already paraded the Al Samoud ballistic missile and had also used cruise missiles against coalition forces during the 2003 invasion.[23]
North Africa
Along with Middle East, missile development programs in North Africa also become very crucial to study as these developments affect security in the entire MENA region.
Libya also made deliberate efforts to acquire advanced missile capabilities but its efforts remained futile owing to sanctions that restricted technological know-how transfers.
Despite the proliferation efforts, there were no credible developments in the field of missile technology from Libya’s side.
Nevertheless, in 2003, owing to U.S. invasion of Iraq, Libya decided to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program which included the elimination of ballistic missile capabilities.[24]
These actions of Libya resulted in the state being removed from list of state sponsors of terrorism.[25]
Though denied by Egypt, there were reports that Cairo had acquired the No Dong missile systems from North Korea in 2001.
Egypt also possesses anti-ship missiles like the Chinese HY-2, US Harpoon Block 2, Italian Ottoman and Chinese Scrub.[26] I
n 2024, there were reports that China could supply Cairo with long range ALCMs like the Guangdong Hongda HD-1A to be integrated with the Egyptian air force’s fleet.[27]
The Egyptian Air Force also possesses MBDA Scalp cruise missiles from France despite US pressure.[28]
North African states like Algeria already possessed Scud category missiles and Frog-7s acquired from the erstwhile Soviet Union owing to the threat perception from Libyan missile systems to its territory.
In 2024, Algeria also paraded the Russian Iskander-E short range ballistic missiles that were acquired in 2017. [29]
Algeria was reported to be possessing anti-ship cruise missiles like the Kh-35 from Russia and the CX-1 and YJ-12B from China. [30]
In 2022, there were reports that Algeria could acquire the Chinese SY-400 short range ballistic missiles to complement its Iskanders.[31]
Scuds have ruled the North African missile inventory for decades and Sudan also is no exception.
But Sudan was keener to acquire advanced air power capabilities given the threat environment.
Sudan’s efforts to acquire North Korean ballistic missiles were also thwarted by Sudan’s own government that restricted relations with North Korea owing to Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and missile program.[32]
Algeria’s military modernization process has resulted in Morocco pacing up with the former and Morocco made efforts to acquire the Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) and the Joint Stand-off Weapons (JSOW) from the United States.[33]
Morocco in 2024, has acquired a Turkish drone called the Bayraktar Akinci which can be used to launch stand-off cruise missiles and air-launched ballistic missiles too.[34] Such capabilities could allow Morocco to neutralise the counter-insurgency challenges more efficiently.
Non-state Actors
In the MENA region, missile development trends have not only remained confined to state-actors but non-state actors too have sought for such capabilities. These developments have enabled such non-state actors to become perfect proxies for their state actors and help the state actors to pursue their foreign policy objectives.
Reports confirm of Polisario, an extremist group in Morocco also used missiles to attack civil population in Morocco, though the group claimed the missile attack was aimed at Morocco’s military positions in Mahbes.[35]
Non-state actors like Hezbollah and Hamas have possessed critical missile technologies acquired from Iran and North Korea to pursue foreign policy objectives of Tehran. Hamas has indigenously developed the M-75 which is Iran’s Fajr-5 version. [36]
Other long range systems include the R-160 with 120kms range and the M-302 which is 200kms of range.[37]
Hezbollahs have also possessed long range ballistic missiles as well as cruise missiles including advanced missile capabilities that include anti-ship capabilities.
Ballistic missiles like Qadr and cruise missiles like Noor add to the combat strength of Hezbollah with deep strike capabilities. [38]
Houthis in Yemen with support from Iran possesses missile capabilities that extend up to 2000kms range.[39]
Houthis’ ballistic missile arsenals include Burkan, Hatem, Karar, Tankeel, and Toofan and anti-ship capabilities like the Asif and Mohit. Cruise missile arsenals include Al-Mandab, Quds-4 and anti ship capabilities like the Sayyad and Rubezh.[40]
In addition, Houthis also possess Scud variant missiles and North Korean Hwasong missiles that they have managed to acquire from the Hadi government’s arsenal and weaponry.[41]
In 2024, there were also reports that the Houthis possess hypersonic missile capability called the ‘Palestine-2’ and have used them against Israel.
The missile developments in Houthis are also due to the fact that the organisation considers them to be the Yemen’s official military.[42]
In 2014, there were also reports that ISIS paraded Scud missiles in Syrian town, though concerns remained whether the missile has operational value or was a dud missile.[43]
The possession of deep strike capabilities by non-state actors especially, anti-ship capabilities could jeopardize basic maritime trade leading to non-traditional security threats globally that could include rise in fuel prices, commodities prices, food prices and hence, rise in inflation.
Deep strike capabilities also allows non-state actors to target adversaries’ counter-value targets thereby, strengthening non-state actors and their state actors’ ability to indulge in coercive diplomacy and also display their hard power strength for pride and prestige. Hence, long range capabilities are enabling proxies to become strategic assets for their state actors.
Existential Complexities
These missile developments that do not only remain confined to state actors but also extend to non-state actors through indigenous developments and proliferation make it impossible to achieve missile free zone in the MENA region.
While African countries have signed the Pelindaba Treaty and vouch for a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ), the same kind of regional nuclear weapons free regional treaty is missing in Middle East. T
his is precisely the reason why Egypt has probably signed the Pelindaba Treaty but has not ratified the same. Missiles in MENA region are capable of being equipped with chemical and biological warheads also along with conventional warheads.
Counter-measures on these missile systems render air and missile defence systems incapable of intercepting such systems making missile deterrence and security equation more complex in the region.
Conclusion
States and non-state actors are focusing on missile capabilities of varied ranges to challenge adversaries both at tactical level as well as strategic level in order to gain both tactical and strategic advantages.
As missiles get more technologically advanced, they are being used both by state as well as non-state actors in the region as ‘weapons of terror’ and ‘coercive diplomacy.’
One way to attenuate the threats from these escalating proliferation of missiles would be to ensure each state is willing to open talks with adversaries in the region to discuss the nuances of missiles.
Such steps are not imposssible as in the recent past, Israel and Saudi Arabia have opened talks to resolve their security dilemma vis-à-vis each other.
In addition, there are modst efforts being taken from Saudi Arabia and Iran’s side to organize talks between high level officials.[44]
Iran and Morocco that have severed ties with each other in 2018, also have sought to renew their relations in 2024.[45]
Such talks would also require global players to participate as in regions like Libya and Syria, there are global players like the United States and Russia influencing the course of actions of the sections of their respective state systems.
Notes
[1] “Jericho-III,” Military Today, <http://www.military-today.com/missiles/jericho_3.htm>
[2] “Israel’s use of air-launched ballistic missiles against Iran sparks market interest,” The Times of Israel, November 4, 2024, <Israel’s use of air-launched ballistic missiles against Iran sparks market interest | The Times of Israel>
[3] “Popeye,” Missile Threat, April 23, 2024, <Popeye | Missile Threat>
[4] “Popeye,” Missile Threat, April 23, 2024, <Popeye | Missile Threat>
[5] “AIR LORA,” IAI, <Air LORA I Air Launched Ballistic Missile I Next-Level ALBM Strike>
[6] “AIR LORA,” IAI, <Air LORA I Air Launched Ballistic Missile I Next-Level ALBM Strike>
[7] “Jane’s Defence Weekly: Israel Develops Its First Cruise Missile,” Haaretz, October 4, 2024, <https://www.haaretz.com/1.4708637>
[8] Seth J. Frantzman, “Israel’s IAI announces new Wind Demon air-to-surface missile,” Breaking Defense, July 23, 2024, <Israel’s IAI announces new Wind Demon air-to-surface missile – Breaking Defense>
[9] “Popeye,” Missile Threat, April 23, 2024, <Popeye | Missile Threat>
[10] “Iran unveils ‘Jihad’ missile with enhanced capabilities,” Iran International, September 22, 2024, <Iran unveils ‘Jihad’ missile with enhanced capabilities | Iran International>
[11] “Country: Iran,” Missile Threat, <Missiles of Iran | Missile Threat>
[12] “Table of Iran’s Missile Arsenal,” Iran Watch, February 22, 2024, <Table of Iran’s Missile Arsenal | Iran Watch>
[13] “In-house built engines to power Türkiye’s cruise missiles,” Daily Sabah, October 30, 2022, <In-house built engines to power Türkiye’s cruise missiles | Daily Sabah>
[14] Gökhan Ergöçün, “Turkish UAV tests homegrown cruise missile Cakir successfully,” AA, March 1, 2024, <Turkish UAV tests homegrown cruise missile Cakir successfully>
[15] Harry Mc Neil, “Baykar next gen KEMANKEŞ 2 mini cruise missile development,” Air Force Technology, April 18, 2024, <Baykar next-gen KEMANKEŞ 2 mini cruise missile development – Airforce Technology>
[16] “Syria Missile Overview,” NTI, <https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/syria-missile/>
[17] Lucas Tomlinson, “Russia Sends Syria Its Largest Missile Delivery to Date, US Officials Say,” Fox News, February 8, 2017, <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/02/08/russia-sends-syria-its-largest-missile-delivery-to-date-us-officials-say-html>
[18] “P-800 Oniks/ Yakhont/ Bastion/ (SS-N-26 Strobile),” Missile Threat, April 23, 2024, <P-800 Oniks/Yakhont/Bastion (SS-N-26 Strobile) | Missile Threat>
[19] “Russia to sell Syria anti-ship cruise missiles,” BBC News, September 17, 2010, <Russia to sell Syria anti-ship cruise missiles – BBC News>
[20] “Israel said it destroyed Hezbollah strategic missile site near Syria,” Reuters, November 28, 2024, <Israel said it destroyed Hezbollah strategic missile site near Syria | Reuters>
[21] Cited in Debalina Ghoshal, “Historical and Contemporary Missile Development: Nuclear Weapon States, Regional Powers and Other Powers,” Role of Ballistic and Cruise Missiles in International Security (Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023), pp. 105
[22] “Qatar: On Lockheed Martin Mako hypersonic missile,” Tactical Report, July 12, 2024, <Qatar: On Lockheed Martin Mako hypersonic missile>
[23] “Iraq Missile Overview,” NTI, <www://nti.org/analysis/articles/Iraq-missile/>
[24] “Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Every CRS Report, April 22, 2024, <Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction – EveryCRSReport.com>
[25] “Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Every CRS Report, April 22, 2024, <Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction – EveryCRSReport.com>
[26] “Egypt,” NTI, January 2015 (https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/egypt/delivery-systems/).
[27] Boyko Nikolov, “Egypt could arm Rafale jets with Chinese long-range HD-1A missiles,” Bulgarian Military, November 21, 2024, <Egypt could arm Rafale jets with Chinese long-range HD-1A missiles>
[28] Guy Martin, “Egyptian Air Force confirmed to be operating SCALP cruise missiles,” Defence Web, February 10, 2021, <Egyptian Air Force confirmed to be operating SCALP cruise missiles – defenceWeb>
[29] “Algeria reveals acquisition of Russian Iskander-E ballistic missile system,” Army Recognition, October 29, 2024, <Algeria reveals acquisition of Russian Iskander-E ballistic missile system>
[30] Darek Liam, “Algeria inducts Chinese-made YJ-12B anti-ship cruise missiles,” Military Africa, August 20, 2024, <Algeria inducts Chinese-made YJ-12B anti-ship cruise missiles>
[31] Ekene Lionel, “Algeria Continues Military Build-Up with New Chinese SY-400 Ballistic Missile Acquisition,” Military Africa, November 30, 2022, <Algeria Continues Military Buildup with New Chinese SY-400 Ballistic Missile Acquisition-Military Africa>
[32] “Sudan Says It Has Cut All Defence Ties with North Korea,” Reuters, June 6, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-north-korea/sudan-says-it-has-cut-all-defence-ties-with-north-korea-idUSKCN1J22BU>
[33] Agnes Helou, “Why Morocco Is Investing Heavily in Long-Range Fires,” Breaking Defense, April 13, 2023, <Why Morocco Is Investing Heavily in Long-Range Fires- Breaking Defense>
[34] Óscar Ruiz, “Morocco strengthens its air power with Bayraktar Akinci,” The Diplomat in Spain. November 20, 2024, <Morocco strengthens its air power with Bayraktar Akinci>
[35] “Mehbes: Polisario militia launch missile attack on civilians, eliminated by FAR,” HESPRESS ENGLISH, November 10, 2024, <Mehbes: Polisario militia launch missile attack on civilians, eliminated by FAR>
[36] Eric Tegler, “The IDF Is Displaying Captured Hamas Long Range Rockets,” Forbes, December 7, 2023, <The IDF Is Displaying Captured Hamas Long Range Rockets>
[37] Jonathan Marcus, “Israel-Gaza violence: The strength and limitations of Hamas’ arsenal,” BBC News, May 12, 2021, <Israel-Gaza violence: The strength and limitations of Hamas’ arsenal>
[38] Agnes Helou, “Experts see Hezbollah ‘escalation’ in use of new missiles, as group weathers Israeli bombardment,” Breaking Defence, October 8, 2024, <Experts see Hezbollah ‘escalation’ in use of new missiles, as group weathers Israeli bombardment – Breaking Defense>
[39] “Houthi Explainer: Military Arsenal,” The Iran Primer, July 22, 2024, <Houthi Explainer: Military Arsenal | The Iran Primer>
[40] “Houthi Explainer: Military Arsenal,” The Iran Primer, July 22, 2024, <Houthi Explainer: Military Arsenal | The Iran Primer>
[41] “Houthis,” Missile Defence Advocacy Alliance, February 2024, <Houthis – Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance>
[42] “Yemen’s Houthis claim hypersonic missile attack against Israel,” Al Jazeera, December 16, 2024, <Yemen’s Houthis claim hypersonic missile attack against Israel | Houthis News | Al Jazeera>
[43] “ISIS parades ballistic Scud missile in Syrian town.” Al Arabiya, July 2, 2024, <ISIS parades ballistic Scud missile in Syrian town>
[44] “Saudi Arabia’s Army chief to visit Iran to bolster defence relations,” The Hindu, November 11, 2024, <Saudi Arabia’s Army chief to visit Iran to bolster defence relations – The Hindu>
[45] Safaa Kasraoui, “Iran Responds to Reports on Potential Talks to Mend Ties with Morocco,” Morocco World News, November 20, 2024, <Iran Responds to Reports on Potential Talks to Mend Ties with Morocco>
Featured image: From DIA report on Houthis’ use of Iranian missiles.