Re-Imaging German Defence: A Strategic Opportunity for the West
Germany stands at a pivotal moment in its defence evolution. After three decades of strategic drift following reunification, the nation now has an unprecedented opportunity to reshape European security architecture and lead the Europe’s response to authoritarian challenges.
This transformation is about more than hardware and force structure — it requires reimagining Germany’s strategic culture and embedding defence within the fabric of German society. The stakes are enormous: Germany’s choices will determine Europe’s ability to defend itself against Russian aggression, Chinese expansion, and America’s inevitable strategic rebalancing.
In my professional lifetime, I have seen several variants of German defence within the fabric of German society and culture, and I will review those variants prior to considering how the current one provides new opportunities for shaping a new way forward. The point is rather simple: defence policy is embedded within a society or it is little more than a diplomatic game to deal with the external environment and to support domestic goals that have little to do with a real ability to defend the nation.
The Cold War Foundation (1980s)
During the 1980s, West Germany maintained a credible defence posture built on three pillars: NATO integration, close U.S. partnership, and commitment to “peace through strength.” The Air-Land Battle doctrine developed in the 1980s exemplified this approach — using superior coordination, technology, and tactics to offset numerical disadvantages against Warsaw Pact forces.
This strategy emphasized deep battle concepts: engaging enemy front lines while simultaneously striking reserves, supply lines, and command centers. Ground and air forces operated in integrated fashion across multiple combat echelons. While never tested in Europe, this doctrine proved devastatingly effective against Iraqi forces in the 1991 Gulf War.
Crucially, Germans understood that reunification required credible defence capabilities, strong alliances, and persistent pressure on Soviet leadership. When the Berlin Wall fell, it happened because of military strength, not wishful thinking.
NATO at the time was led by an American administration committed to a two-track approach to nuclear modernization which would lead to the INF treaty with the Soviet leadership, I worked extensively on Euromissile issues during the period with the American, British, French and West German governments while working at the Institute for Defence Analysis in Alexandria, Virginia.
I worked extensively on the French and German relationships in defence and security as well as on German and Russian issues. In fact, I ran a seminar in 1985 at IDA where we brought in leading experts on Russia working in European governments to discuss the way ahead with the dynamic changes underway in Russia at the time.
As these changes unfolded, I set up a working group at IDA in 1986 which addressed the question of how we might craft an effective path towards German reunification. Let me assure readers that we had not competitors in what was viewed as a utopian waste of time.
But from work with the Kohl government, it was clear that the Chancellor was working towards this goal and that the Reagan and then Bush Administrations consider this a feasible goal.
Germans clearly wanted to end the division of Germany: this only happened because of credible defence capabilities, a strong alliance and serious changes unfolding in the Soviet Union.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union new possibilities opened up, and these changes would also see the erosion over the next two decades of the direct defence capabilities in Europe and German put any real defence thinking on the shelf as an unnecessary priority for the New Germany.[1]
The Strategic Holiday (1990s-2000s)
Victory in the Cold War paradoxically undermined European defence thinking. The Clinton Administration focused on expanding NATO and the European Union while integrating China into the global economy — decisions that planted seeds for today’s multipolar authoritarian challenge.
Germany embraced its role as Europe’s dominant economic power while treating defence spending as an externality cost. The assumption that “friends surrounded us” became conventional wisdom, encoded in Germany’s 2006 White Book. Defence capabilities atrophied as Germany pursued global influence through economic rather than military means.
Chancellor Angela Merkel epitomized this approach from 2005-2021. Her strategy centered on German leadership of EU economic decisions while maintaining minimal defence commitments. As a former East German who spoke Russian, she believed Germany could work with Putin as a rational actor within the globalization framework.
The policies of the 1990s were the harbingers of the world we live in 2025. The notion of the need to defend the European region against Russian military forces or a global ascendant China was not in policy maker’s minds.
Germany was focused on its new role in a new Europe and how to leverage the new global situation for its enhanced global political and economic position. There was little thought about a Russian Tsar showing up some day or the Chinese economic dragon swallowing German industrial goods and leveraging them to take away German markets. Defence was dramatically marginalized in the shaping of the geopolitical strategy of the new Germany in the new Europe.
This was not unusual at the time. During the decade of the 2010s, the West was working with Putin on various deals on the assumption that Russia was willing to work with the West and be part of a broader globalization strategy. The most amazing one was when Nicolas Sarkozy announced the deal for two ships for the Russian Navy on December 24, 2010, and it was signed on January 25, 2011. The 1.2 billion euro ($1.3 billion) contract was negotiated in 2008 and signed in 2011 under the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy. After two years of negotiations, Russia and France signed a treaty of military cooperation on June 17, 2011 under which two Mistral-class amphibious assault ships, together with their full technological complement, would be sold to Russia.
But Sarko and Merkel missed the point that Putin was actually a new Tsar and not a cog in the globalization machine.
At the same time, the United States and Europe continued to expand NATO. Seven countries joined NATO in the largest single expansion in the alliance’s history on March 29, 2004: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Then on April 1, 2009, two countries joined: Albania and Croatia.
With this expansion you might have thought there was a well thought direct defence of Europe strategy being crafted by Washington and Brussels. Well, you would be wrong. Washington was preoccupied by the Middle East land wars and encouraging NATO members to contribute to “out of area” missions, because the European ones were no longer central.
Illustrative of what the Obama Administration was all about was its decision to rid of the fleet serving North Atlantic missions. It was dissolved in 2011. This fleet was restored in 2018 under President Trump along with the creation of the only operational NATO command on U.S. soil.
It is not surprising then that defence was never a key priority for Chancellor Merkel nor part of her global leadership DNA, not of the New Germany as well.
The Tsar Returns: Crimea and the Return of Direct Defence
But we live in the world we have not necessarily the world we want. Putin seized Crimea and followed the example of Tsar Catherine the Great by becoming the new Tsar. Unfortunately, Tsars are not good citizens in the age of globalization and the unravelling of the Merkel approach to global leadership was underway.
During my visit to Germany in 2019, I conducted a number of interviews which captured the transition dynamics underway in this period after 2014.
For example, in my interview with Brigadier General (ret.) Rainer Meyer zum Felde[2], he characterized the challenge for Germany in these terms: “After unification, the basic belief was that friends surrounded us. We wrote in the 2006 White Book, that we did not face a direct threat from Russian anymore and that only the most likely missions, i.e. crisis prevention, crisis response and peace enforcement mission such as in the Balkans and Afghanistan should guide the German defence posture.
“But the Russian aggression against Ukraine, which hit Germany and many other Europeans as a strategic surprise, made clear that this was a wrong assessment. Russia is back as a threat to Europe in the short and midterm.
“And what we have to be concerned about in the long run is an emerging axis between Russia and China, ganging up on a global scale against the West or what then may be left from the “West.”
“Now we face the challenge to rebuild and reconstitute our armed forces at the high end.
“But different from our Eastern European neighbors, who very clearly see themselves threatened by Russian behavior and power, we need to do so in a social context where many Germans do not share the assessment of the NATO governments that Russia poses a direct threat to Europe.”[3]
I published a book in 2020 with my colleague Murielle Delaporte in 2020 on the return of direct defence in Europe and focused on the threat of the multi-polar authoritarian world on Europe not just Russia. And the focus is upon shaping a relevant force structure within Europe, largely built around European capacity, with a strong need to shape a more robust and secure infrastructure for European defence as well.
Notably, the NATO summit concluded in June 2025 when focusing on enhanced direct defence capabilities in Europe is indeed embracing both force structure and infrastructure modernization.
But bluntly put, none of these fits into the world of German policy and leadership of Chancellor Merkel or I would add that of President Obama either. We were entering a new phase after the 2014 Crimea seizure BEFORE the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
The NATO-Russian War in Ukraine: Germany and European Defence
The 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine forced Germany into uncharted territory, requiring strategic imagination not seen since the Cold War’s end.
This is the kind of experience I had at the beginning of my professional career with Herman Kahn and Zbigniew Brzezinski. I can only hope that those of us who have been around in the world of strategy for a few years can help the new generation of strategists find ways to defend our values and our way of life against the authoritarian powers who fear those values.
Germany now has two concrete drivers in rethinking its defence role within Europe.
Fifth-Generation Air Power Revolution
Germany’s 2022 decision to acquire 35 F-35 fighters represents more than aircraft procurement — it’s entry into a F-35 global enterprise. The F-35 is fundamentally different from previous fighters, serving as a flying sensor network that enables entire force structures.
The F-35 is not just a fighter jet: it is a whole engagement in a American-led global coalition of airpower which enables significant coalition capability fighting as a force. I have been witnessing this process since 2004 and have written extensively about how different fifth generation enabled airpower is and the Israeli operations with their F-35s have proven this beyond any doubt.[4]
But the key for Germany is twofold. First, transitioning the German Air Force and enabling the entire German defence force in how to leverage this new capability for defence not just of Germany but becoming a plank holder in an entirely new European coalition capability. I have recently published a book on Italy and the F-35 which highlights their path with the F-35 to shaping Europe’s best air force, with an ability to build more combat aircraft than any other European country, to having built the leading air training center in Europe in Sardinia.[5]
Germany is now part of this global enterprise, and this will enable its own Eurofighters to become more lethal and survivable as both Britain and Italy have discovered flying both aircraft.
The Drone Revolution Partnership
Germany’s collaboration with Ukraine on drone warfare represents the most significant wartime defence cooperation in modern history. German companies have delivered over 900 advanced drones while establishing complete manufacturing facilities on Ukrainian soil.[6]
Key German contributions include:
- Quantum-Systems: Nearly 500 Vector reconnaissance drones with AI-powered target detection and electronic warfare resistance. Their Ukrainian facility now employs 120 people producing 1,000 units annually with fully localized production.[7]
- Helsing: Committed to delivering 10,000 AI-enabled strike drones, including innovative plywood-constructed systems with 100-kilometer range and swarm coordination capabilities.[8]
- Rheinmetall: Multiple SurveilSPIRE reconnaissance systems and Skynex air defence platforms specifically designed to counter drone threats.[9]
- HENSOLDT: 10 TRML-4D radars capable of tracking 1,500 targets simultaneously up to 250 kilometers range.[10]
This partnership has fundamentally altered German military thinking. Defence officials now recognize that drones account for 60-70% of equipment destruction in modern warfare, validating the shift toward “precision mass” — large quantities of AI-enabled systems rather than small numbers of exquisite platforms.[11]
Combat data is striking: German-supported systems maintain 67% survival rates in intensive electronic warfare environments while achieving mission objectives. Ukrainian forces using German drones have conducted strikes reaching over 4,000 kilometers into Russian territory.
Germany has pioneered joint production models through its Ukrainian partnerships, including €5 billion in defence cooperation agreements and €400 million investment in Ukrainian long-range drone production. These represent more than commercial relationships — they’re strategic industrial partnerships that enhance both nations’ capabilities.
Export policy has evolved from restrictive to enabling approaches for drone technologies. Germany now supports the “Danish Model” of direct procurement from Ukrainian defence industry while integrating Ukrainian suppliers into German defence supply chains.
Technology transfer acceleration characterizes the new German approach. Helsing’s distributed manufacturing across Europe, MBDA Deutschland’s counter-UAS cooperation, and numerous joint ventures between German and Ukrainian companies demonstrate rapid adaptation compared to traditional defence procurement.
The transformation extends to dual-use technology integration. German companies are incorporating civilian AI advances, commercial manufacturing techniques, and startup innovation models into defence applications — a significant departure from traditional segregation between commercial and military sectors.
Germany’s Ukrainian drone partnership has positioned both nations at the forefront of next-generation warfare technology. The established production networks provide foundations for potential expansion across NATO allies, while the technological advances have broader applications for European defence requirements.
German defence spending is projected to increase to 3.5% of GDP (€140 billion annually) based on strategic reassessment following Ukrainian lessons. This includes requirements for 2,000+ long-range loitering munitions annually and expansion from 40,000 to 100,000+ additional troops.
Strategic autonomy considerations emphasize reducing dependence on U.S. and Chinese components through European production capacity. Germany’s distributed manufacturing model provides both sovereignty and resilience against supply chain disruption while creating sustainable industrial capacity.
Germany’s support for Ukraine’s drone revolution represents a paradigm shift in defence industrial cooperation, demonstrating how rapid battlefield innovation combined with scalable production models can transform military capabilities in real-time. This partnership has not only enhanced Ukraine’s defensive capabilities but has fundamentally reshaped German defence thinking, industrial policy, and military doctrine.
The Ukrainian experience validates that technological innovation, operational adaptability, and strategic resilience have become defining characteristics of military effectiveness in modern warfare.
Germany’s potential transformation from traditional procurement approaches to agile, innovation-focused models positions it as a leader in European defence modernization while providing crucial lessons for NATO allies facing similar strategic challenges.
The distributed production networks, AI-enabled autonomous systems, and rapid innovation cycles pioneered through this partnership will likely define the future of European defence capabilities.
Germany’s Defence Initiatives: Building Europe’s New Security Architecture
In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and escalating security threats across Europe, Germany has emerged as a leading force in reshaping the continent’s defence landscape through two ambitious initiatives: the European Sky Shield Initiative and the NATO “Drone Wall.” These complementary programs represent a fundamental shift in European defence thinking, moving toward greater strategic autonomy while strengthening collective security.
The European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) stands as one of the most significant multilateral defence projects in recent European history. Originally proposed by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in August 2022, the initiative emerged during the height of Russian strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure, highlighting Europe’s vulnerability to modern missile threats.
The ESSI is designed as a ground-based integrated European air defence system with anti-ballistic missile capabilities. Under Germany’s leadership, the initiative aims to bolster European air and missile defence through joint acquisition of air defence equipment and missiles by European nations. As of 2025, 24 European states participate in the initiative, making it one of NATO’s most comprehensive collective defence projects.
The system’s technical architecture relies on a multi-layered approach. For long-range interception, the initiative incorporates Israel Aerospace Industries’ Arrow-3 system, while medium-range threats are addressed by U.S. Raytheon Patriot missiles. Short-range targets fall under the purview of the German-made Diehl Iris-T system. This configuration reflects both the urgent need for immediate capabilities and the current limitations of purely European defence technologies.
NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană emphasized the initiative’s significance, stating that it “shows the value of Allies stepping up to meet NATO’s requirements, while ensuring interoperability and integration.” He added that the initiative “helps translate Allied commitments on defence spending into tangible capabilities available for our collective defence”.[12]
Parallel to the ESSI, Germany is spearheading another groundbreaking initiative: the construction of NATO’s “Drone Wall” along the alliance’s eastern border. This project envisions a continuous network of unmanned aerial systems stretching from Norway to Poland, covering approximately 1,850 miles of NATO’s most vulnerable frontier.
Announced in 2024, the Drone Wall represents a response to Russia’s use of unconventional warfare tactics, including drone incursions, GPS jamming, and cross-border provocations. Lithuania’s Interior Minister Agnė Bilotaitė described it as “a completely new thing—a drone wall stretching from Norway to Poland, and the goal is to use drones and other technologies to protect our borders”.[13]
The technical specifications of the Drone Wall are impressive in scope and sophistication. Built around a layered system of AI-powered reconnaissance drones, ground-based sensors, mobile counter-drone platforms, and satellite surveillance, the system aims to detect and disrupt threats in real-time while providing NATO with faster, more accurate intelligence across its most exposed borders.
Germany leads the project with backing from six NATO countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Poland, and Norway. Estonia has already committed €12 million over three years, while other participating nations are developing their contributions through local defence industry clusters.
These initiatives reflect a broader transformation in German defence thinking. The shift toward strategic autonomy has accelerated under renewed pressure from the United States, particularly following President Donald Trump’s return to office and his continued emphasis on burden-sharing within NATO.
Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz has prioritized defence modernization, introducing sweeping reforms that lift spending caps on military programs. His government has passed historic legislation exempting defence projects costing more than one percent of GDP from Germany’s constitutional “debt brake,” marking a significant departure from post-war fiscal restraint.
Martin Karkour, chief sales officer at German drone manufacturer Quantum Systems, emphasized the importance of European-produced systems: “European-made systems ensure strategic autonomy and keep sensitive data under European control.” He noted that with proper political coordination, “a first operational layer — using existing, proven technology—could be deployed within a year”.[14]
The strategic rationale behind these initiatives extends beyond mere technological capability. An air defence shield would aim to prevent Russian missiles and drones from striking NATO territory, potentially triggering Article 5’s mutual defence clause. In this sense, the shield serves a de-escalatory function by averting possible Article 5-level crises that could spiral out of control.
The Drone Wall specifically addresses the challenge of gray-zone warfare, where traditional deterrence mechanisms prove insufficient. Gundbert Scherf, CEO of German AI defence firm Helsing, explained the deterrent effect: “If we deploy there in large numbers, rely on asymmetric capabilities and concentrate tens of thousands of combat drones there, then it will be a very credible conventional deterrent”.[15]
Work on both initiatives is already underway. Poland has begun construction under its Shield-East program, planning 700 kilometers of surveillance infrastructure. The final configuration will depend on top-level political direction within NATO.
Germany’s defence renaissance represents Europe’s best opportunity to achieve genuine strategic autonomy while maintaining Atlantic partnership. The combination of fifth-generation air power and AI-enabled drone capabilities provides the technological foundation for credible deterrence.
Success requires overcoming Germany’s traditional reluctance to lead militarily. The country must embed defence thinking within its broader strategic culture, not treat it as a diplomatic afterthought. This means sustained investment, public education, and political commitment across multiple election cycles.
The authoritarian powers are watching. Russia’s imperial ambitions and China’s global expansion will test European resolve repeatedly. Germany’s choices—whether to lead decisively or drift diplomatically—will determine whether democratic values survive the multipolar challenge.
The opportunity exists. The question is whether Germany will seize it with the same strategic imagination that built the Atlantic Alliance and secured German reunification. Europe’s security hangs in the balance.
[1]My books published in the 1980s and in 1991 have been reissued by Routledge: Europeanization of the Alliance, The Soviets, Germany and the New Europe, and France, The Soviet Union and the Nuclear Weapons Issue. There are more that is enough for now.
[2] Meyer zum Felde we a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Security Policy Kiel University (ISPK) when I interviewed him.From July 2013 to September 2017, he was the Senior Defence Advisor at the Permanent Delegation of Germany to NATO in Brussels and the German Representative in NATO’s Defence Policy and Planning Committee.Prior to this, he served for two years as Vice President of the Federal Academy for Security Studies in Berlin. He worked in various national assignments related to security policy in the Ministry of Defence, including twice on the Minister’s Policy Planning and Advisory Staff (1996–98; 2006–09) and in the Politico-Military Department (1989–1991). He has gathered extensive experience at NATO through integrated assignments at both Strategic Command Headquarters in Mons and Norfolk VA, as well as through national assignments at NATO HQ in Brussels, at military as well as political level. Brigadier General Meyer zum Felde studied educational science at the University of the Bundeswehr in Munich (1974–1977) and holds an MA equivalent (1996) in Security Policy and International Relations from the University of Geneva and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP).
[3] https://sldinfo.com/2019/03/the-strategic-shift-and-german-defence-the-perspective-of-brigadier-general-retired-rainer-meyer-zum-felde/
[4] Robbin Laird, My Fifth Generation Journey, Second Edition. (2025).
[5] Robbin Laird, Italy and the F-35: Shaping 21st Century Coalition-Enabled Airpower (2025).
[6] https://www.armyrecognition.com/focus-analysis-conflicts/army/conflicts-in-the-world/ukraine-russia-conflict/germany-delivers-new-types-of-drones-and-anti-drone-systems-to-enhance-ukraines-battlefield-awareness
[7] https://quantum-systems.com/us/2023/01/27/second-vector-delivery-to-ukraine/
[8] https://thedefencepost.com/2025/02/13/german-firm-drones-ukraine/
[9] https://armyrecognition.com/focus-analysis-conflicts/army/conflicts-in-the-world/russia-ukraine-war-2022/ukrainian-soldiers-confirm-rheinmetall-skynex-air-defence-systems-high-efficiency-in-intercepting-russian-drones
[10] https://www.armyrecognition.com/focus-analysis-conflicts/army/conflicts-in-the-world/ukraine-russia-conflict/germany-delivers-new-types-of-drones-and-anti-drone-systems-to-enhance-ukraines-battlefield-awareness
[11] https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/DRONES/dwpkeyjwkpm/
[12] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_219119.htm
[13] https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/2281492/baltics-poland-finland-norway-agree-on-drone-wall-to-protect-borders?srsltid=AfmBOorGNesknWwk_YYz6CyWsteAn2WItYNe5gzxuMYbTAkSvybkNmlO
[14] https://www.newsweek.com/drone-wall-coming-natos-eastern-border-2063177
[15] Ibid.