Russian Geopolitical Challenges: Kazakhstan’s Strategic Pivot
Putin’s leadership of Russia has gone through four phases (so far).
The first phase was when he became President of Russia in 2000. He did so after the “wild west days” of the decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union. He consolidated Russia’s position and leveraged oil revenuse to rebuild Russia.
During this phase, he was actively engaged within the Western world shaping a role for Russia as a quasi-part of the Western world.
The second phase was defined by his shift from being part of the Western order — even if limited in how it would participate –to focusing on restoring Russia’s lost glory by reasserting Russia’s claims to control the near abroad and parts of the Russian empire. His position was clearly stated in his Munich speech in 2007.While at the Munich Agreement in 1938 where Hitler promised hope to avoid war, Putin used Munich as a setting to announce clearly that he was not satisfied with having created only realities like Londongrad. He wanted more.
Putin’s 2007 Munich Security Conference Address marked a pivotal moment in post-Cold War relations when the Russian president spoke at the annual gathering on February 10, 2007. Invited by conference chairman Horst Teltschik, Putin became the first Russian leader to address the Munich Conference, using the platform to challenge what he saw as Western dominance in global affairs.
The speech centered on Putin’s rejection of a unipolar world order dominated by a single superpower, along with sharp criticism of NATO’s expansion eastward into former Soviet territories. He also addressed concerns about the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), disarmament issues, and Iran’s nuclear program, framing these topics within his broader critique of Western policy.
International observers widely interpreted the address as Russia’s declaration that it would no longer accept a secondary position in world affairs. The speech represented a turning point in Russian foreign policy, signaling Moscow’s intention to pursue a more assertive and independent path in international relations. Putin emphasized Russia’s readiness to actively defend its national interests and play a larger role in determining global governance structures.
His statement of intention was embodied in action, notably with the seizure of Crimea in 2014.
The third phase was from 2014 through February of 2022 during which Putin’s statements and actions indicated that he was at war with the West. His speeches, language, and actions in this period clearly underscored his policy orientation.
Then during 2021 his preparation for an invasion of Ukraine became increasingly evident. I detailed events that year which made it clear the direction in which Putin was headed in a chapter in my edited boo published this year entitled, The Biden Administration Confronts Global Change.
The fourth phase is the phase we are currently in. Putin saw his invasion of Ukraine as recapturing legitimate Russian territory and claimed that Ukraine’s move West was simply unacceptable to his role as the Russian Tsar of what was the “real” Russia.
What was justified as a “special action” to ensure that Ukraine did not enter NATO has led to a worse case scenario for Russia for which Putin is directly responsible: Sweden and Finland joined NATO, and NATO has been re-energized by enhanced European defense efforts.
And now the most militarized state in Europe is Ukraine. A country which is reinventing warfare with a strong mix of modern Western weapons with Ukraine’s innovations in warfare, such as the Spider Web operaton.
But just as significant is the crumbling of the Russian empire in less noticed directions.
Rather than expanding the Russian empire like some new version of Catherine the Great, Putin increasingly looks more like Nicholas II.
It is about these developments which I am going to focus in this article and in following articles dealing with Russian geopolitical challenges.
Let me start with developments involving Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan, long considered one of Russia’s most reliable partners in Central Asia, is executing a dramatic strategic realignment that threatens to undermine Moscow’s war effort in Ukraine.
The oil-rich nation is systematically cutting economic and military ties with Russia while pivoting toward Western partnerships and it is a shift that extends far beyond diplomatic posturing to include the severing of supply chains critical to Russian ammunition production.
At the heart of this strategic shift lies an obscure but vital commodity: cotton pulp. For decades, Kazakhstan and neighboring Uzbekistan have supplied over 98% of Russia’s imported cotton pulp, a seemingly innocent agricultural byproduct that serves as the foundation of Moscow’s military-industrial complex. This cotton pulp is processed into nitrocellulose. This is the key component in virtually every Russian missile, drone, and artillery shell being fired at Ukrainian targets.
The numbers tell a stark story of wartime dependency. In 2021, before Russia’s invasion, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan shipped just $4 million worth of cotton pulp to Russia. By 2022, as the war intensified Russia’s ammunition needs, this figure exploded by 150% to $10 million. Kazakhstan alone ramped up its shipments by nearly 60% that year.
This agricultural lifeline has directly fueled Russia’s relentless artillery campaigns.
Russia’s imports of nitrocellulose and cotton pulp have been sufficient to produce the equivalent of 700,000 artillery shells annually.
As one Ukrainian intelligence officer bluntly stated: “All those missiles that are currently being launched at Ukraine and all the drones that hit the regions and Kyiv today, all of this is made with nitrocellulose”.
But this critical supply chain is now under threat.
Recent indicators suggest Kazakhstan is deliberately cutting back these shipments as part of a broader realignment away from Moscow⁶.
The shift became apparent in summer 2023 when Khlopkoprom-Cellulosa, Kazakhstan’s main cotton pulp producer, abruptly halted operations.
This economic severance extends well beyond cotton. Kazakhstan has been systematically reducing its energy dependence on Russia, expanding use of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline to export oil via Turkey to European markets. This is a direct bypass of Russian territory that undermines Moscow’s regional leverage.
Kazakhstan’s pivot encompasses a complete restructuring of its security relationships.
The country recently dismissed pro-Russian Defense Minister Ruslan Zhaksylykov and is now participating in NATO-standard ammunition production projects. This represents a remarkable transformation for a nation that was once firmly within Russia’s military sphere of influence.
Kazakhstan’s strategic shift is being driven by both opportunity and necessity. As the largest economy in Central Asia, with over $370 billion in foreign investment since independence, Kazakhstan has the economic foundation to pursue an independent foreign policy. The country possesses vast oil reserves, minerals, and agricultural potential that make it an attractive partner for Western nations seeking to diversify their supply chains away from authoritarian regimes.
President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has signaled that this realignment is permanent, stating that Kazakhstan is prepared to face ongoing global economic challenges while maintaining its development agenda.
The country’s commitment to this new direction is evidenced by major infrastructure projects, including plans by UAE-based Al Khaleej Sugar to establish a sugar plant in Kazakhstan’s Almaty Region, with emphasis on renewable energy and environmental sustainability.
Kazakhstan’s pivot represents more than a bilateral shift—it signals a fundamental realignment of Central Asian geopolitics. For Russia, the loss of Kazakhstan as a reliable partner in both the cotton supply chain and broader regional security arrangements represents a strategic catastrophe. The country has been not just a supplier of critical war materials, but also a key transit route and economic partner.
For the West, Kazakhstan’s realignment offers opportunities to further isolate Russia economically while gaining access to vast natural resources and strategic geography. The severing of the cotton supply chain, in particular, strikes at the heart of Russia’s ability to sustain its artillery-heavy military doctrine in Ukraine.
Nonetheless, Russia still maintains considerable influence in Kazakhstan through economic ties, ethnic Russian populations, and established political networks.
Moreover, the transition away from Russian partnerships requires Kazakhstan to quickly develop alternative relationships and supply chains.
But Kazakhstan’ssevering of critical supply chains to Russia’s war machine while simultaneously embracing Western partnerships, Kazakhstan is charting a new course that could reshape the entire Central Asian region.
The implications extend far beyond bilateral relations.
As Ukraine continues to resist Russian aggression, Kazakhstan’s decision to cut off supplies of cotton pulp or the “white gold” that powers Russian ammunition may prove to be one of the most consequential acts of economic warfare in the conflict.
The Biden Administration Confronts Global Change: Déjà vu All Over Again
On the phases of Putinism, see the following: