Beyond Fight Tonight: Building Resilience and Capacity Across Defence and Industry

The ghost of inadequate preparation haunts modern military planning. Mrs. Marion Chapman’s 1949 letter to the Department of Air, lamenting her son’s death in the Pacific War, carries a haunting accusation that resonates today: “he, with others, was so poorly equipped, directed and eventually abandoned.”

This stark reminder opened the panel discussion on building resilience capacity across defence industry, setting the tone for a sobering examination of Australia’s preparedness for sustained conflict.

The panel, moderated by Chris McInnis of the Air Power Institute, brought together three distinct perspectives: Colonel Dave Beaumont from Defence’s National Support Division, Mike Prior from Boeing Defence Australia, and Group Captain Travis Hallen, whose PhD research examines Swedish air power development during the Cold War.

Their discussion revealed uncomfortable truths about Australia’s current readiness posture and the complex challenges of building genuine resilience across the defence-industrial base.

The Fight Tonight Fallacy

The panel’s central thesis challenged one of defence planning’s most enduring concepts: the “fight tonight” mentality. McInnis opened with a quote from Phillips O’Brien’s recent work “War and Power”: “Wars go off the rails because they are extremely complex and difficult interactions that end up taxing militaries, economies, governments and societies from the beginnings of the productive process all the way to the battlefields. They are not decided on the battlefield. Rather, the battlefield reveals the states with the powers involved.”

This perspective fundamentally reframes how military planners should approach readiness. The traditional focus on immediate tactical capability, while important, can obscure the more critical challenge of sustained operations. McInnis emphasized that an over-focus on fighting tonight tends toward “an overemphasis on the pursuit of decisive battle that’s a seductive mix doesn’t exist.” History, he noted, is littered with forces that won initial battles but lost wars due to inability to sustain operations.

The German military machine of both world wars exemplifies this pattern, achieving spectacular early successes before collapsing under the strain of extended operations. Japan’s Pacific War experience mirrors this trajectory: brilliant tactical victories followed by inexorable decline as industrial and logistical limitations proved decisive. The lesson is stark: battles don’t decide wars; they reveal the underlying strength and stamina of the societies waging them.

This historical pattern carries profound implications for contemporary defence planning.

As McInnis observed, “states win wars, not militaries.” Military capability exists within and depends upon broader societal structures. The stamina of the state and society, rather than particular capabilities at any given moment, typically proves decisive. This reality demands a fundamental shift from tactical readiness to strategic endurance, from immediate capability to sustained resilience.

The National Support Imperative

Colonel Dave Beaumont’s presentation outlined the scope of this challenge through Defence’s emerging National Support concept. Drawing on historical precedent, he referenced historian Sean Nolan’s observation that modern military success requires winning “the campaign, then the year, then the decade.” Military organizations excel at tactical focus but struggle with longer-term perspectives, particularly the post-conflict stabilization and economic transformation that ensures lasting peace.

Beaumont identified four pillars of Australia’s national support base: industry, workforce, social cohesion, and institutional decision-making capacity.

Each pillar faces distinct challenges, but the industry component presents perhaps the greatest concern. While defence industry professionals understand their sector’s challenges and collaborate on solutions, the vast majority of Australia’s economy operates without daily consideration of defence requirements. Yet these civilian industries would prove critical during extended conflict.

The challenge extends beyond traditional defence contractors to encompass telecommunications providers, transportation networks, energy suppliers, and basic manufacturing.

As Beaumont noted, “it will matter that we’re communicating what the best potential needs of conflict may be, to Qantas, to Telstra and beyond.” This represents a fundamental shift from viewing defence industry as a specialized sector to recognizing the entire national economy as a potential defence resource.

Current global events already demonstrate how civilian industries become military assets. Supply chains have been “securitized” and wielded as weapons in the current geopolitical environment. Nations must make strategic choices about suppliers and trading partners based on security considerations rather than purely economic factors.

This reality demands national readiness that extends far beyond military forces to encompass infrastructure, workforce, and material requirements across society.

The institutional component proves equally critical but often overlooked. Democratic societies require decision-making apparatus capable of rapidly prioritizing resources for war while maintaining democratic governance and social cohesion. This balancing act – preserving democratic values while mobilizing for sustained conflict – represents one of the most complex challenges facing liberal democracies in an era of great power competition.

Industry’s Uncomfortable Truths

Mike Prior’s presentation provided a candid assessment of industry realities. His perspective, shaped by 15 years in the Air Force followed by legal practice and defence industry experience, offered unvarnished insights into the gap between defence expectations and industry capabilities.

Prior highlighted a fundamental misalignment in expectations between defence and industry. Military personnel often assume industry capabilities based on peacetime interactions and theoretical scenarios rather than understanding actual capacity and limitations. As Prior observed, “more often than not, those expectations are founded in presumption and certainly false assumptions.” This disconnect creates dangerous gaps in planning and unrealistic assumptions about industry responsiveness during crisis.

The reservist dilemma exemplifies this challenge. Boeing Defence Australia employs approximately 900 active reservists, representing over 30% of their workforce. These personnel concentrate in critical areas: maintenance, modifications, and training. The company trains virtually all Australian E-7 Wedgetail operators through reservist instructors. If these individuals were activated for military service during a crisis, Australia’s Wedgetail training system would “cease overnight.”

This creates an impossible choice: maintain critical civilian defence support capabilities or activate military reserves. Prior noted that defence cannot “spend the same $10 twice” – personnel cannot simultaneously serve in uniform and maintain their civilian industry roles. The challenge extends across Australia’s defence industry, with many veterans in critical positions also serving as active reservists.

The workforce composition presents additional vulnerabilities. Rapid growth to meet expanding defence programs has created an experience gap. Currently, 30-35% of most defence industry workers have less than 18 months of experience. By next year, over 50% of sustainment program personnel will have been in defence industry for less than three years. This inexperience creates dangerous knowledge gaps during normal operations and could prove catastrophic during crisis mobilization.

Prior also addressed industry’s commercial reality. While companies support defence missions passionately, they ultimately exist to generate profit. This creates tension between commercial interests and national security requirements, particularly regarding speculative investments in crisis preparedness without guaranteed contracts. Companies cannot indefinitely prepare for hypothetical scenarios without financial sustainability.

The innovation challenge represents another critical concern. Industry personnel interpreted recent defence strategic reviews as declaring “innovation was dead” unless capabilities appeared in formal planning documents. This perception led to serious consideration of defunding advanced research capabilities, including Boeing’s Phantom Works division that developed the MQ-28 Ghost Bat unmanned aircraft. Such misunderstandings can inadvertently stifle the very innovation defence requires for future conflicts.

Lessons from Swedish Resilience

Group Captain Travis Hallen’s research into Swedish air power development during the Cold War provided compelling insights into how a small nation built world-class military capabilities through sustained commitment and strategic clarity. Sweden’s achievement appears remarkable: maintaining the world’s fifth-largest air force in 1991 with 425 domestically designed and built combat aircraft, despite having only 8.5 million people compared to Germany’s 61 million or Britain’s 57 million.

Swedish success stemmed from necessity rather than choice. Geographic isolation and Cold War neutrality demanded self-reliance in defence capabilities. This necessity drove deliberate decisions about industry policy, force structure, and operational concepts over decades. Sweden didn’t achieve its capabilities through one or two decisions but through 50 years of consistent development.

Hallen identified three key factors applicable to Australia’s situation.

• First, the Swedish Air Force maintained clarity about the military problem they were designed to solve – enabling national mobilization by fighting for 72 hours against Soviet invasion forces. This clarity shaped all other decisions about capability development and resource allocation.

• Second, Sweden developed deep understanding of how geography, history, culture, and population created unique requirements for Swedish air power. They didn’t attempt to replicate other nations’ solutions but developed approaches suited to their specific circumstances. This included designing systems operable by conscripts with minimal training, enabling rapid mobilization while maintaining high operational standards.

• Third, Swedish planners studied their own history extensively, learning from both successes and failures to inform future planning. This institutional memory provided continuity across political changes and ensured lessons weren’t lost during leadership transitions.

The Swedish export strategy proved crucial for sustaining their defence industrial base. Recognizing that domestic demand alone couldn’t support advanced manufacturing, they designed systems for NATO interoperability to access export markets. They also pursued deliberate differentiation, creating capabilities dissimilar from standard NATO equipment to complicate adversary planning while offering export customers alternatives to mainstream options.

Perhaps most importantly, Swedish success required societal commitment sustained across decades. The relationship between government, industry, and population enabled this long-term approach but isn’t easily transferable to other political systems. However, the methodology, systematic assessment of unique requirements and sustained commitment to addressing them, offers valuable insights for Australian planners.

The Resilience Challenge

The panel discussion revealed several interconnected challenges threatening Australia’s defence resilience. The workforce issue extends beyond reservist activation to include civilian workers who might simply leave during sustained conflict. Prior noted that Boeing already experiences weekly protests, and escalation to physical violence would likely prompt employee departures based on personal safety concerns.

This vulnerability reflects broader societal questions about commitment during prolonged conflict. Unlike Sweden’s Cold War experience with clear existential threats and conscription-based societal involvement, Australia faces the challenge of maintaining civilian commitment during extended operations that may seem geographically distant from the homeland.

The geographical concentration of defence industry in major cities presents additional vulnerabilities. As Prior observed, defence industry’s “ivory tower” locations in Brisbane, Newcastle, Adelaide, and other major centers are precisely the areas that would be difficult to defend during conflict. This concentration creates attractive targets while limiting defensive options.

Cyber vulnerabilities compound these challenges. Basic cyber protection, data protection and monitoring systems, approaches unaffordable levels even before considering advanced threat mitigation. Industry has moved from “okay to not okay very, very quickly” in cyber preparedness, requiring massive investment just to reach baseline security standards.

The supply chain weaponization already underway in current geopolitical tensions provides a preview of wartime challenges. Nations must increasingly choose suppliers and trading partners based on security rather than economic considerations. These pressures will intensify during actual conflict, requiring robust domestic capabilities or reliable allied alternatives.

The Mobilization Paradox

Perhaps the most sobering insight from the panel discussion concerned mobilization expectations. Traditional planning assumes the ability to “switch on” industrial capacity during crisis, but this assumption proves increasingly problematic. Modern industrial systems require sustained investment, skilled workforces, and complex supply chains that cannot be rapidly created or restored.

Prior emphasized that mobilization requires planning in advance rather than crisis response. The “necessity is the mother of invention” approach cannot address complex industrial challenges with uncertain warning times and rapid escalation scenarios. This reality demands fundamental changes in how defence and industry approach preparedness planning.

The Swedish example provides valuable perspective on this challenge. Swedish forces were designed to fight for 72 hours to enable mobilization, not to absorb mobilization output. They created space for societal transformation rather than expecting immediate industrial surge. This approach recognizes mobilization as a time-intensive process requiring protection and preparation rather than instant activation.

Australia faces particular challenges in this regard due to geographical isolation and limited domestic industrial base. Unlike European nations with nearby allies and established industrial cooperation, Australia must plan for potentially extended periods of relative self-reliance. This reality demands greater emphasis on domestic capabilities and stockpiling rather than relying on just-in-time global supply chains.

Toward Genuine Resilience

The panel discussion pointed toward several principles for building genuine resilience across Australia’s defence-industrial base.

• First, honest assessment of current capabilities and limitations must replace optimistic assumptions about crisis responsiveness. This requires uncomfortable conversations about actual versus theoretical capacity.

• Second, expectation alignment between defence and industry needs systematic attention. Regular dialogue must replace episodic engagement, with industry proactively developing scenario assessments rather than waiting for defence direction. Prior suggested that industry should begin answering questions “that we know defence won’t ask us, or otherwise can’t ask us” about realistic support requirements during extended operations.

• Third, whole-of-nation planning must extend beyond traditional defence industry to encompass civilian sectors critical during sustained operations. This requires educating non-defence industries about potential wartime requirements and developing frameworks for rapid transition from civilian to defence production.

• Fourth, workforce development needs strategic attention, including addressing the reservist dilemma, retention during crisis scenarios, and knowledge transfer from experienced personnel to newer workers. The current experience gap threatens operational continuity during normal times and could prove catastrophic during crisis mobilization.

• Fifth, long-term commitment and political sustainability require broader societal understanding of defence requirements. The Swedish model demonstrated how conscription created societal buy-in for defence investments, but Australia must find alternative approaches to maintain public support for sustained defence preparedness.

The Path Forward

The panel’s insights point toward a comprehensive approach to building defence resilience that acknowledges the complexity of modern conflict while addressing Australia’s unique circumstances. This approach must balance immediate readiness with sustained capability, tactical effectiveness with strategic endurance, and military requirements with civilian resilience.

Success requires moving beyond the “fight tonight” mentality toward “stay in the fight” planning that considers the full spectrum of national resources required for extended operations. This shift demands uncomfortable conversations about current limitations, realistic assessments of mobilization timelines, and honest evaluation of societal commitment to sustained defence efforts.

The Swedish experience demonstrates that small nations can develop impressive defence capabilities through clarity of purpose, sustained commitment, and systematic approach to unique challenges. However, their success required decades of consistent effort and societal agreement about defence priorities. Australia must find its own path, suited to democratic governance, geographical isolation, and contemporary threat environments.

The alternative, continuing with current assumptions about crisis responsiveness and industrial surge capacity, risks repeating historical patterns where tactical success gives way to strategic failure due to inadequate preparation for sustained operations. Mrs. Chapman’s 1949 accusation about sending soldiers “poorly equipped, directed and eventually abandoned” serves as a stark reminder of the consequences of inadequate preparation.

Building genuine resilience requires acknowledging these uncomfortable truths while working systematically to address them. The panel discussion provided valuable insights into these challenges, but implementation demands sustained political will, industry commitment, and societal understanding of the stakes involved. The question remains whether Australia can learn from history and allied examples to build the resilience required for an uncertain strategic future, or whether it will discover these lessons through the harsh teacher of inadequate preparation during actual conflict.

The choice between preparation and improvisation remains stark, and the consequences of choosing poorly could prove as tragic as those Mrs. Chapman witnessed in 1949. The panel’s insights provide a roadmap for building genuine resilience, but only sustained commitment across government, industry, and society can transform these insights into the capabilities Australia needs for an uncertain future.

Featured image: The resilience paenl from left to right: Chris McInnes, Colonel Beaumont, Mike Prior and Group Captain Travis Hallen.