Steel Knight 2025: Turning Distributed Operations into Warfighting Practice
At the recent Steel Knight 2025 exercise conducted by 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing at MCAS Miramar, Lieutenant General (Retired) Hedelund served as a senior mentor, bringing decades of operational experience to observe and guide one of the Marine Corps’ most significant training evolutions. His observations reveal both the promise and challenges facing the Corps as it transforms from Force Design 2030 concepts into practical operational capability.
The MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP): Preserving Institutional Knowledge
Hedelund’s role at Steel Knight exemplifies the Marine Corps’ commitment to leveraging retired general officer expertise through the MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP) (MSTP). This program, which has existed for decades, provides a stable of experienced flag officers who assist Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) commanders and staffs with training and certification exercises.
“It’s not about making money,” Hedelund explained. “For those of us that stick with it, it’s more about what we can contribute. It’s about staying connected to the service that we love, and more importantly, the people that we serve with inside the Marine Corps.” This emphasis on genuine institutional commitment ensures that the mentor corps consists of officers who “care about what the future of the Marine Corps holds.”
The program operates under strict guidelines following reforms that addressed earlier concerns about senior mentor activities. Today’s program maintains a focused cadre of highly qualified experts who work within clearly defined parameters, ensuring both accountability and mission effectiveness.
Continuity Amid Transformation
One of Hedelund’s most striking observations challenges the narrative that Force Design 2030 represents a complete break from Marine Corps history. While acknowledging the impact of new technology and capabilities, he emphasized fundamental continuity in Marine Corps operations.
“If you peel back the words and the semantics, there’s a lot that I did in 1985 on my first deployment that I saw in Steel Knight,” Hedelund noted. “Different tools, different capabilities, eye-watering technology that enables quicker decision making and more rapid deployment over longer distances. But the Combined Arms Force is still the secret sauce.”
Whether organized as a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), Marine Littoral Unit (MLU), or another formation, the essential components remain: a command element, capable aviation, ground combat forces, and critically, logistics. “It’s still essentially an air-ground team,” Hedelund observed, though he expressed concern about potentially inadequate logistics capacity to support distributed operations.
This continuity matters because it provides templates for commanders grappling with new operational concepts. Marines aren’t inventing distributed operations from scratch. They’re adapting proven combined arms approaches with dramatically enhanced technological capabilities including the F-35, MV-22 Osprey, and the incoming CH-53K King Stallion.
The Command-and-Control Challenge
Steel Knight 2025 revealed both impressive progress and persistent challenges in command and control for distributed operations. Hedelund observed 3rd MAW attempting to function as both force provider and operational headquarters from Miramar is a demanding dual role that exposed important questions about command relationships.
“The acknowledgement that nodes, communication nodes, command and control nodes, logistics nodes, all have some vulnerability no matter where they are in this world today,” Hedelund explained. “How do we fight with the nodes that we have at the moment that we have them?”
The exercise highlighted complex questions about who actually commands air operations in a distributed Pacific scenario. When a Marine division becomes the lead forward element and eventually transitions to Joint Task Force status, who provides air component expertise and resources?
“What’s the relationship between the JFACC and the 3rd MAW commander, or the third MAW commander’s representative in theater if you put, say, a MAW forward out into the Philippines?” Hedelund asked. This question gets at the heart of joint operations in distributed environments, ensuring clear command relationships while enabling the rapid decision-making that modern combat demands.
Tactical Excellence, Strategic Questions
While command and control challenges persist, Hedelund expressed strong confidence in tactical execution. “The mission execution was really well done,” he observed. “I was really impressed with the packages put together to address some of the threats. They did impressive work against a realistic threat. Nobody is worried about the actual tactical execution. Marines will be Marines.”
The exercise demonstrated effective use of assault support packages and combined arms operations against realistic threats. Marines at the tactical level showed they could employ distributed forces effectively, integrating aviation and ground elements to accomplish specific missions.
However, Hedelund’s concern centered on ensuring these tactical capabilities serve coherent strategic purposes. The exercise tested various force projection scenarios and different combinations of capabilities within a kill web framework, but questions remained about how these tactical operations would integrate into broader campaign plans.
Hub, Spoke, and Node Operations
3rd MAW worked hard on developing hub, spoke, and node concepts for distributed operations, but Hedelund identified areas requiring further maturation. “You have to make sure that everybody out there understands what a hub is and what it can provide, and likely what it cannot provide, and how static it is, or how permanent or semi-permanent it is. Same thing with the spoke. And then down to the node.”
Current nodes remain “a little bit too heavy” in Hedelund’s assessment, partially because the Corps hasn’t fully exploited F-35 capabilities. The challenge involves determining precisely what each node should accomplish and for how long, then designing appropriate support structures.
Hedelund proposed an important operational concept: putting timestamps on nodes. “You almost have to tell whoever’s in charge of that node you need to assume that you’re coming out at time X on date X, unless you’re told otherwise and not the other way around where you’re asking ‘We’re about to get pummeled. Can I come home?'”
This approach treats nodes as having inherent shelf lives which are measured in hours or days depending on their assigned tasks. “They’ve got a shelf life, and that shelf life may be hours or maybe a couple of days, depending on what task it’s been told to accomplish,” Hedelund explained. Elements should constantly move, with forces that inserted a node already en route to establish the next one while the current node completes its mission.
This concept addresses signature management or the reality that forces firing missiles from a location for extended periods will be detected and targeted. Constant movement becomes essential to survival and effectiveness in contested environments.
The Logistics Imperative
Throughout our conversation, both Hedelund and I returned repeatedly to logistics as the critical enabler and potential Achilles’ heel of distributed operations. “I’m keeping my eye on the logistics piece of this, because that is the real key or cornerstone of any success,” Hedelund emphasized. “The distances we are talking about require a capable logistics system and organization.”
Contested logistics presents challenges without perfect solutions, rather only paths to attenuating problems. The CH-53K King Stallion “couldn’t come fast enough” in this context, and maritime autonomous systems offer promise for sustaining distributed nodes. Yet fundamental questions remain about what shipping the Navy will provide for Marine Corps operations.
The Air Force’s 130 aircraft proved crucial to Steel Knight’s success. “If we didn’t have Air Force 130s in this exercise, things would have looked a lot different,” Hedelund observed. This dependency highlights capability gaps facing the Marine Corps. In my view, the USMC doesn’t have enough KC-130Js, MV-22 Ospreys, CH-53Ks, or F-35s to fully execute its distributed operations concept without joint support.
The CH-53K could potentially assume many KC-130J missions, but only if acquired in sufficient numbers. “You cannot do this operation with magic,” Hedelund concluded. “You might want to, but it’s not going to happen. No voodoo here.”
Delegation and Decision Authority
Both Hedelund and I agreed that distributed operations demand unprecedented delegation of decision authority. The technology and lethality available to smaller units has increased exponentially, but organizational structures haven’t fully adapted to enable these capabilities.
In my view, if you’re projecting force and distributing that force, you’re going to have to delegate decision making in ways we’ve never done historically. The challenge facing INDOPACOM involves more than Marine Corps force structure. It requires rethinking how area commanders task subordinate units and what authorities those units need to exploit fleeting opportunities.
Modern C5ISR and networking capabilities mean that relatively small Marine units possess situational awareness and strike capabilities that once required much larger formations. An F-35, an Osprey, and a CH-53K fundamentally change what a Marine unit can accomplish independently. Add maritime autonomous systems and eventually Collaborative Combat Aircraft, and small distributed nodes possess firepower equivalent to much larger forces a decade ago.
But capability without clear tasking and appropriate authority becomes wasted potential. As Hedelund noted, “You’re going to be hoping that your commander is giving you clear guidance, and you’re going to be executing that guidance, yet may not be able to get feedback right away on whether or not what you did was a good thing or a bad thing.”
Mission Command in Practice
The Air Force struggles with similar challenges, Hedelund observed from his work at the LeMay Center. “They have embraced mission command. They understand the ’what’ but are still figuring out the ‘how.’ It’s like the dog that caught the tailpipe of the car. Now what?” They understand distributed operations will be necessary in the Pacific, “but yet they struggle to let go of the centralized control piece of it.”
This tension between centralized control and distributed execution isn’t unique to any service. Operating in contested electromagnetic environments where a 32-second radio transmission could bring retribution within two minutes requires fundamentally different approaches to command and control.
Steel Knight 25 experimented with low-signature communications and rapid decision cycles, but questions remain about how much authority to delegate and how to maintain unity of effort across distributed nodes operating with limited communications.
The Path Forward
Despite challenges, Hedelund came away impressed with the exercise’s professionalism and the participants’ commitment to learning. “In every tent or building that we ended up in during the exercise, everybody was engaged. They were eager and hungry to learn more and to practice these things that people have been talking about. There’s nothing more exciting than people who are hungry to learn.”
Major General Wellons willingness to embrace outside perspectives exemplified the mature command climate Hedelund praised. “There are some commanders out there that aren’t comfortable with people from outside coming in and trying to assist,” Hedelund noted. “That willingness shows a real maturity level in our commanders.”
Steel Knight 2025 demonstrated that the Marine Corps is translating distributed operations concepts into practical capability. Tactical execution remains strong, and Marines at all levels show commitment to mastering new operational approaches. The exercise tested multiple force distribution scenarios and integrated kill web operations, providing valuable insights for continued development.
However, significant work remains in three critical areas.
- First, command and control structures must evolve to match distributed operations’ tempo and decision-making requirements.
- Second, logistics capabilities need substantial enhancement through additional platforms like the CH-53K and integration of maritime autonomous systems.
- Third, and perhaps most importantly, the Corps needs clearer strategic guidance on how distributed forces will be employed: what specific tasks nodes will accomplish, for how long, and in support of what larger campaign objectives.
As Hedelund concluded, “You cannot do this operation with magic.” Success requires continued hard work translating concepts into capabilities, honest assessment of gaps and shortfalls, and sustained commitment to the difficult organizational and cultural changes that distributed operations demand.
The Marine Corps that deployed Hedelund in 1985 and the Marine Corps conducting Steel Knight 2025 share fundamental DNA: both are combined arms forces built around aviation-ground integration. But the tools available today enable operations at scales and speeds previously impossible. The challenge now is ensuring institutional structures, command relationships, and logistical capabilities match the revolutionary potential of these new operational concepts.
Note: The MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP) is the Marine Corps’ senior-level training organization that trains Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commanders and their staffs in planning and executing operations across the range of military operations, usually in a joint or combined environment.
MSTP’s mission is to improve the warfighting skills of senior commanders and their staffs by providing realistic, operational-level training focused on MAGTF employment (MEF, MEB, and major subordinate commands). It develops a shared understanding of MAGTF doctrine, enhances commanders’ ability to employ a MEF/MEB as part of a joint or combined task force, and promotes team building within the headquarters.
MSTP designs and conducts staff training exercises and events (often command-post exercises) that use the Marine Corps Planning Process, contemporary threats, and joint/coalition contexts to stress command and control, planning, and decision-making.
These events are typically tailored to specific MEF/MEB or major subordinate commands, allowing the commander and staff to practice campaign design, operational planning, and battle staff procedures in a consequence-free environment.
MSTP is located at Quantico, Virginia, under Training and Education Command (TECOM), which is responsible for much of the Marine Corps’ formal training and education enterprise.
From this position, it supports deploying and readiness-critical headquarters, often in preparation for major exercises or real-world contingencies that require integrated MAGTF and joint operations