MACG-38: The Command-and-Control Enabler for Marine Corps Distributed Operations

The modern Marine Air Control Group 38 (MACG-38) represents a fundamental shift in how the Marine Corps conceptualizes aviation capabilities in the era of distributed operations.

Rather than viewing Marine aviation through the traditional lens of individual platform types, MACG-38 demonstrates how integrated command, control, communications, and air defense functions serve as the essential enabler for the entire aviation enterprise.

Colonel O’Connell IV, commanding officer of MACG-38, articulates a vision where the control group functions as the dial for force configuration, dynamically assembling tailored packages to create specific impacts across time and space.

The Control Group as Integration Hub

MACG-38’s organizational structure reveals its central role in Marine aviation operations. The control group encompasses all operational support for the air wing beyond the flight line itself.

This includes the Marine Wing Support Squadrons (MWSS) handling ground support, engineering, fuel, firefighting, and the physical infrastructure needed to generate sorties. The communications squadron provides the kill web design backbone or the sensor and communication networks that enable distributed operations.

At Camp Pendleton, the 3D Low Altitude Air Defense (LAAD) Battalion brings counter-UAS and integrated air defense capabilities, while the Marine Air Support Squadron (MASS-3) houses the tactical air controllers who provide real-time aircraft control and airspace deconfliction. Marine Air Control Squadron (MACS) 1 provides fixed site and expeditionary air traffic control services and also provides the expertise and infrastructure for the 3d MAW Tactical Air Command Center (TACC).

While the MACG has been in existence for decades, there is a newfound appreciation for the criticality of the unit, its Marines, and the capabilities they bring to bear in future warfare scenarios.

This integration represents a fundamental evolution in how Marine aviation capabilities are conceived and employed. Rather than discrete units operating independently, MACG-38 demonstrates platform-agnostic thinking where the focus shifts from specific aircraft to the effects and impacts that can be achieved through properly integrated force packages.

The control group serves as the nexus where sensors, shooters, and command elements connect to create what Colonel O’Connell describes as the kill web or a networked approach to operations that moves beyond linear kill chains.

From Crisis Management to Chaos Management

In my view, the operational concept driving MACG-38’s evolution reflects a broader shift in how military forces must operate in contemporary conflict environments whereby the notion of chaos management rather than traditional crisis management is central. This distinction is crucial: crisis management assumes a knowable problem set that can be resolved to restore stability, while chaos management recognizes that modern operational environments are characterized by persistent complexity and ambiguity.

In chaos management, forces must probe the environment through action to understand what they’re actually confronting. The Marine Corps, particularly through units like MACG-38, is uniquely positioned to serve this exploratory function. Unlike larger Air Force or Navy formations that signal major commitment through their very presence, Marine force packages can be calibrated to create specific impacts while maintaining proportionality. This measured approach allows commanders to test adversary responses, gather intelligence about intentions and capabilities, and shape the operational environment without necessarily triggering escalation.

The control group’s ability to task-organize enables this flexibility. When given a mission, MACG-38 doesn’t deploy as a fixed unit but rather assembles the precise slice of capabilities required. For a Marine Expeditionary Unit deployment, this might include an LAAD detachment for air defense, air controllers for aviation coordination, MWSS elements for engineering and sustainment, and communications squadron personnel for the digital backbone. For other missions, entirely different combinations might be required. This modularity transforms the control group from a static organization into a dynamic force generator.

The Air Defense Renaissance

One of the most significant developments Colonel O’Connell describes is the renaissance of Marine Corps air defense capabilities. For decades, LAAD battalions existed on the periphery of Marine Corps operations. After divesting the Hawk missile system in the late 1990s and transitioning to a Stinger-only low altitude air defense posture, these units became primarily focused on point security for maneuver forces. During Iraq and Afghanistan, LAAD battalions largely functioned as provisional infantry, as the air threat environment didn’t require dedicated air defense forces.

The proliferation of unmanned aerial systems has fundamentally changed this calculus. The drone threat, from small quadcopters to sophisticated autonomous systems, has elevated air defense from peripheral to central in Marine Corps planning. Force Design initiatives have recognized this shift, growing the LAAD battalion structure significantly. The recent standup of 1st LAAD Battalion in Hawaii, designated as an experimental unit, signals the service’s commitment to rapid innovation in counter-UAS capabilities.

This growth isn’t simply about fielding more systems. Colonel O’Connell emphasizes that the LAAD community is being asked to think creatively about the tools needed to address the drone challenge without bankrupting the force. The economics of air defense have become critical, using million-dollar missiles against thousand-dollar drones represents an unsustainable approach. Instead, the focus has shifted toward a weapons room concept: a suite of capabilities spanning electronic defeat, kinetic options at various ranges, and integrated systems that can be tailored to specific threat profiles.

The target-to-weapon matching problem exemplifies the broader challenge of distributed operations. Rather than one-size-fits-all solutions, commanders need the ability to dial appropriate weapons against specific threats. This requires not just technology but also the operational concepts and command structures to employ these capabilities effectively. MACG-38’s role in integrating ground-based air defense with airborne sensors and shooters makes it central to solving this problem.

The F-35 Integration Revolution

The F-35’s introduction represents a watershed moment for Marine aviation, though its full implications are still being absorbed. Colonel O’Connell describes the aircraft’s capabilities in terms of expansion, expanding the kill web, extending reach, and fundamentally changing what’s possible in distributed operations.

Beyond its kinetic capabilities, the F-35 functions as a sensor and information node within the broader kill web. Its ability to collect, process, and distribute information in real time transforms the operational picture for ground forces and other aircraft. The control group’s role in receiving and disseminating this information becomes crucial. While direct datalinks between F-35s and individual ground units represent one mode of operation, the more flexible approach involves F-35s feeding information to MACG-38’s C2 nodes, which can then distribute relevant information through various communications pathways to whoever needs it.

This information architecture reflects platform-agnostic thinking. The value isn’t in any single platform but in the network of capabilities that platforms enable when properly integrated. The F-35 can warn forces of threats, provide targeting information, or confirm that friendly forces should reposition, all without necessarily employing weapons itself. This multi-mission flexibility, combined with the control group’s ability to integrate and disseminate information, creates options that didn’t exist in previous generations of Marine aviation.

The Payload Revolution and Maritime Autonomous Systems

Colonel O’Connell’s discussion touches on what I have called the payload revolution or the recognition that capabilities increasingly reside in sensors, communications systems, and effectors that can be distributed across multiple platforms rather than being tied to specific airframes. This thinking has profound implications for how Marine aviation conceptualizes force structure and employment.

Maritime autonomous systems offer particularly promising opportunities. Unlike aerial systems that face significant challenges with autonomy levels and endurance, maritime platforms operating on the surface can carry useful payloads for extended periods. The Navy’s experimentation with unmanned surface vessels carrying various sensor and communications packages demonstrates the concept. For MACG-38, the question becomes: what payloads positioned where would enhance our ability to command, control, and employ aviation assets?

This could include communications relays to extend reach, sensors to provide early warning or targeting information, or even kinetic effects. The key insight is that these capabilities don’t need to be on manned platforms or traditional military systems. Commercial off-the-shelf solutions, rapidly prototyped systems, and experimental platforms can all contribute to the kill web if properly integrated. The control group’s role becomes less about controlling specific platforms and more about orchestrating a network of capabilities to achieve desired effects.

The challenge lies in acquisition and experimentation processes. Colonel O’Connell describes 1st LAAD Battalion’s designation as an experimental unit, working directly with the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab and industry to rapidly prototype and test capabilities outside traditional acquisition channels. This model needs to expand across the control group’s mission areas. The goal isn’t just to experiment but to create pathways for successful concepts to transition into programs of record that can be fielded at scale.

Integrating Air Defense into the Fires Paradigm

One of the most significant conceptual shifts Colonel O’Connell describes is the integration of air defense fires into the broader fires paradigm. Historically, air defense operated somewhat independently, providing point security or area defense but not integrated into schemes of maneuver and fires in the way artillery or close air support would be.

The contemporary operating environment demands different thinking. When ground forces maneuver, they must consider the air threat, not just from traditional aircraft but from a spectrum of unmanned systems. When planning fires, commanders must account for how air defense contributes to protecting shooters, enabling maneuver, and creating windows of opportunity. The merger of the Direct Air Support Center (DASC) and Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC) functions into a common controller reflects this integration.

The Common Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S) provides the technical backbone for this integration, while the G/ATOR radar adds sensor capability that feeds the kill web. MASS-3’s tactical air controllers provide the human element, real-time control and deconfliction that allows complex air operations in contested environments. Together, these elements enable what Colonel O’Connell describes as an integrated air and missile defense system where Marine Corps capabilities mesh with longer-range Army and Navy systems to provide defense in depth.

The weapons-to-target matching problem becomes central in this integrated approach. Against peer adversaries with sophisticated air forces and diverse unmanned systems, Marine forces need layered defenses spanning counter-UAS systems at close range, medium-range systems for various threat profiles, and integration with higher-echelon systems for extended-range threats. The weapons room concept, selecting appropriate tools for specific threats, requires both the physical capabilities and the command structure to employ them effectively. MACG-38 provides that command structure.

Force Packaging for Distributed Maritime Operations

Distributed Maritime Operations represent the operational concept driving much contemporary naval thinking, and Marine aviation must adapt to enable this approach. The control group’s ability to task-organize becomes essential in the maritime environment where geography, distances, and the nature of sea control create unique challenges.

Consider Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) focused on fires or sensing missions. The control group provides tailored support, LAAD elements for air defense, air controllers for aviation coordination, MWSS engineers and support personnel to sustain operations, and communications packages to maintain connectivity with the broader force. The specific mix depends on the mission: a sensing-focused AEB might emphasize communications and air control, while a fires-focused location might prioritize air defense and sustainment for expeditionary operations.

The challenge lies in balancing survivability with lethality across time. Every force package exists on a survivability-lethality curve. At some point, the force becomes more vulnerable than effective. A particular capability package might create significant effects for 72 hours but becomes increasingly vulnerable beyond that window. Planning must acknowledge these limitations and build in either rotation, reinforcement, or extraction accordingly.

This realism about temporal constraints distinguishes serious operational planning from briefing chart fantasies. Commanders need forces they will actually employ, not concepts that look good on PowerPoint but create impossible dilemmas in execution. The control group’s value lies partly in providing realistic assessment of what force packages can accomplish within what timeframes, enabling commanders to match capabilities to requirements with appropriate confidence.

The Communication Squadron Innovation Engine

The communications squadron within MACG-38 represents a hub of innovation for kill web development. Co-located with a battle lab and working closely with the Marine Corps Test Support Activity at Camp Pendleton on Project DYNAMIS, the squadron experiments with emerging communications and networking capabilities. This isn’t just about technical specifications: it’s about understanding how different communications pathways enable or constrain operations.

In distributed operations, communications architecture becomes as important as any weapons system. How do dispersed elements maintain connectivity? What redundancy is required? How can commercial solutions supplement military networks? What protocols enable rapid formation of ad hoc networks as force packages assemble and disperse? These questions drive experimentation that feeds directly into operational concepts.

The squadron’s role extends beyond providing communications services to actively designing the digital backbone that enables kill web operations. When planning an operation, communications aren’t an afterthought but central to concept development. This requires communications personnel to think operationally about effects rather than technically about systems, a cultural shift that MACG-38 is actively fostering.

Platform Agnostic Thinking for the Autonomous Era

Perhaps the most significant theme in Colonel O’Connell’s discussion is the shift toward platform-agnostic thinking. Rather than asking what platforms the Marine Corps needs, the question becomes what capabilities are required and how can they be most effectively delivered. This inverts traditional acquisition and force development logic.

Sensors provide a clear example. Rather than integrating specific sensors onto specific platforms through lengthy acquisition programs, platform-agnostic thinking asks: what sensing capability is needed, where does it need to be positioned, and what platforms (manned, unmanned, or simply emplaced) can carry it most effectively? The answer might be multiple platforms carrying the same sensor, or different sensors optimized for specific platforms, or even expendable sensor packages that can be rapidly emplaced and replaced.

This thinking requires comfort with expendability. Not every capability needs to be on an expensive, survivable platform. Some sensors, communications nodes, or even effectors might be deliberately expendable if they provide the capability needed at acceptable cost. The key becomes the network architecture that allows individual nodes to be lost without degrading overall capability, resilience through redundancy rather than hardening of individual platforms.

For MACG-38, platform-agnostic thinking means focusing on integration rather than platforms. The control group doesn’t care whether a sensor is on an F-35, an unmanned aerial vehicle, a maritime autonomous system, or an emplaced ground sensor. It cares that the sensor data flows into the kill web where it can be exploited. Similarly, communications pathways matter more than specific communications platforms. This abstraction of capability from platform enables flexibility impossible when thinking in terms of specific systems.

Steel Knight and Operational Experimentation

The Steel Knight exercise series exemplifies how MACG-38 approaches operational experimentation. Rather than single-focus force-on-force exercises, Steel Knight incorporates multiple vignettes testing different aspects of distributed operations simultaneously. This reflects the reality that future conflicts won’t resemble clean force-on-force engagements but rather complex environments where multiple challenges exist simultaneously.

Steel Knight allows testing of force packaging concepts: what combinations of capabilities can achieve what effects? It provides opportunity to stress communications networks and command relationships under realistic conditions. Air defense integration, aviation coordination, sustainment concepts, and command and control architectures all get exercised together rather than in isolation. This systems-level approach reveals dependencies and friction points that single-system tests would miss.

The exercise also serves as venue for introducing experimental capabilities and concepts. This creates a feedback loop between innovation and operational employment: experiments inform operational concepts, which drive requirements for new experiments.

Rethinking the Marine Aviation Narrative

Colonel O’Connell’s insights point toward a fundamental rethinking of how Marine Corps aviation capabilities are presented and understood. The traditional narrative focuses on type-model-series aircraft, F-35s, MV-22 Ospreys, AH-1Z attack helicopters, and so forth. While these platforms matter, they don’t capture what makes Marine aviation distinctive.

The alternative narrative positions MACG-38 and the control group at the center, with type-model-series aircraft as tools that can be orchestrated to achieve effects. This reorientation makes clear that Marine aviation isn’t about individual platforms but about integrated capabilities. The value proposition becomes: “We can assemble force packages tailored to specific requirements, sustain them for defined periods, and create impacts across multiple domains through integrated command, control, sensors, and fires.”

This narrative better explains why Marine aviation differs from Air Force or Navy aviation. It’s not primarily about the hardware, other services operate some of the same platforms. The distinction lies in the integration approach, the flexibility of force packaging, and the focus on enabling maneuver forces operating in contested environments. MACG-38 embodies this integration, making it central to the Marine aviation story rather than a supporting element.

Conclusion: The C2 Enabler for Distributed Operations

MACG-38’s evolution illustrates how the Marine Corps is adapting to the demands of distributed operations in an era of great power competition and persistent chaos. Rather than preparing primarily for major conventional war, the focus shifts to building capabilities that create impacts across the spectrum of competition from presence operations through high-intensity combat.

The control group serves as the essential enabler for this flexibility. Its ability to task-organize force packages, integrate diverse capabilities into kill webs, provide resilient command and control, and sustain expeditionary operations makes it indispensable for distributed maritime operations. The growth of air defense capabilities, integration of emerging technologies, and platform-agnostic thinking position MACG-38 at the forefront of Marine Corps transformation.

Colonel O’Connell’s vision emphasizes realism about capabilities and constraints, honest assessment of temporal limitations, and creative thinking about how to leverage emerging technologies. This pragmatic approach, combined with aggressive experimentation through exercises like Steel Knight and experimental units , positions Marine aviation to remain relevant in rapidly evolving operational environments.

The challenge ahead lies in translating these operational concepts into acquisition decisions, training programs, and force structure. The transformation isn’t primarily about buying new platforms, rather it’s about building the networks, developing the doctrine, and creating the organizational culture that enables truly distributed operations. MACG-38 demonstrates that this transformation is already underway, providing a model for how command and control capabilities enable rather than constrain operational flexibility in the autonomous era.