The Cooling Front: Why Kyiv is Risking Its Strategic Alliance with Poland

The “cold war” between Ukraine and Poland is dragging on. Kyiv shows no intention of backing down from a historical policy that is actively antagonizing the Polish public and fueling anti-Ukrainian sentiment in a country that has served as a leading advocate of the “Ukrainian case” and its primary logistical hub since 2022.

Tensions flared further after Kyrylo Budanov, head of the Office of the Ukrainian President, strongly signaled no intentions to rename a Special Operations Forces unit, which was recently named after the “Heroes of UPA”, the Ukrainian insurgent organization that collaborated with Nazi Germany and slaughtered thousands of Polish civilians during World War II.

Budanov recently visited Poland to meet with ministers and intelligence coordinators, but the crisis remains unresolved. According to the Polish press, “the talks were cold, and the Polish side remained assertive. Warsaw expects the Ukrainians to resolve the problem they created themselves.”

Yet, Kyiv is doubling down. Ukraine has already approached German authorities for permission to exhume Stepan Bandera, the leader of the radical OUN-B faction responsible for the Volhynia massacres, as well as antisemitic pogroms. Bandera, assassinated by the KGB in Munich in 1959 and posthumously awarded the “Hero of Ukraine” title in 2010, is slated to be reburied with full honors in a newly planned Pantheon of Outstanding Ukrainians, which – according to an official statement – “should become a place of historical continuity, dignity, and value-based consolidation of the Ukrainian people”.

The Zelensky administration is currently designing this Pantheon to house 98 figures from 21 countries. The head of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance, Oleksandr Alfyorov, proudly stated that these individuals are “markers of Ukrainian identity.” Meanwhile, Ukraine continues its years-long obstruction of Polish exhumations of civilians murdered by Ukrainian nationalists, leaving thousands of victims without any burial.

In Poland, analysts increasingly suspect that this diplomatic friction is not accidental, but rather a calculated maneuver. Marek Budzisz, a prominent Polish geopolitical commentator, argues that it was no mistake and that “the Zelensky administration was perfectly aware of how Poland would react to the glorification of the OUN-UPA. This historical row was engineered to happen right now.”

According to Budzisz, Zelensky’s ultimate goal is to shape a favorable Western negotiating coalition ahead of inevitable talks with Russia to end the war.

To understand the geostrategic context, analysts point to a letter Zelensky recently sent to Vladimir Putin. On the one hand, Zelensky signals readiness to continue a war of attrition; on the other, amid escalating strikes inside Russian territory, he urges Moscow to act rationally and enter negotiations.

Zelensky’s vision relies on a Western negotiating team built on two pillars: an American one and a European one. Kyiv views the European pillar as consisting strictly of Germany, France, and the UK. Poland’s chances of joining this inner circle are illusory, as the current government in Warsaw lacks the ambition to play a leading role on the European stage. Surprisingly, no permanent framework for strategic cooperation has been built between Poland and Ukraine since 2022.

The new reality was laid bare on June 7, when the “European Trio”, Germany, France, and the UK, met with Zelensky in London. Poland was noticeably absent, a stark illustration of how low Warsaw ranks in Kyiv’s current calculus. While Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk protested the exclusion, declaring that any agreements made without Poland would not be binding, his words are largely seen as empty rhetoric.

From Kyiv’s perspective, bypassing Poland, Washington’s main ally in Europe, is crucial because Warsaw’s presence would strengthen the American voice at the expense of European autonomy. This aligns perfectly with the interests of Germany, which requires neither Poland as an intermediary nor a powerful pro-American voice in Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, German companies stand to benefit economically by eliminating Polish competition in future reconstruction efforts.

Though Gdańsk is set to host the Ukraine Recovery Conference later this June to discuss defense capabilities and economic aid, President Zelensky’s attendance remains highly uncertain.

Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, a former Member of the European Parliament and now adviser to the Polish President, associated with the previous right-wing, pro-US, and pro-Ukrainian PiS government, goes a step further. He suggests that Germany has actively encouraged Ukraine to distance itself from Poland, prompting Kyiv to wager its future on Berlin at the expense of its strategic partnership with Warsaw.

Recent events seem to validate this hypothesis. Just as Zelensky antagonizes Poland, Germany committed another €5 billion in military aid to Ukraine, promising a total of €11 billion by 2028 alongside joint ventures in defense manufacturing.

However, Polish analysts warn that Zelensky’s strategy carries immense geostrategic risks. Alienating Poland cannot yield long-term benefits for Ukraine, especially since Germany’s long-term backing is highly uncertain. Facing severe economic stagnation and the rapid political rise of the right-wing AfD, which openly advocates for resuming economic ties with Russia, Berlin may eventually prioritize its relationship with the Kremlin over its commitments to Kyiv, leaving Ukraine without reliable partners.

The end result could be catastrophic for Ukraine: Russia may refuse to negotiate, Germany may scale back aid to pursue a deal with Moscow, and an alienated Poland will no longer be interested in unconditionally backing an “ungrateful” neighbor that glorifies the UPA.

The current political landscape in Warsaw exacerbates this risk. Prime Minister Donald Tusk is widely viewed as a deeply pro-German politician who aligns his foreign policy with Berlin rather than Washington. While a political shift or economic crisis in Poland could theoretically bring the right-wing, pro-US PiS party back to power, Kyiv can no longer count on the enthusiasm of the Polish public or the conservative political elite.

The atmosphere has fundamentally changed. While the Polish right postured as “servants of the Ukrainian nation” in 2022, that same political camp recently blocked a minor donation of 15 used public buses to Ukraine. Their justification was simple: Ukraine’s historical policy has crossed a line that Poland can no longer accept.

Editor’s Note: Polish President Karol Nawrocki announced on 19 June 2026 the revocation of the Order of the White Eagle previously awarded to President Zelenskyy in 2023. The decision is directly tied to Kyiv’s move to name a special operations unit in honor of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), a formation associated in Polish historical memory with the mass killing of Polish civilians in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia during the Second World War, and the subject of a longstanding, deeply sensitive dispute over wartime remembrance.

By framing the revocation as a defense of historical truth and the dignity of Polish victims — rather than a rupture with the Ukrainian people, Nawrocki has effectively deployed a state honor as an instrument in a broader contest over narrative sovereignty. The move signals to both domestic audiences and Kyiv that Warsaw has hard limits on how far it will tolerate Ukrainian state commemoration of figures and formations regarded in Poland as perpetrators, even against the backdrop of an ongoing war and otherwise close strategic ties.