The Complex Nexus: Narco-Trafficking Networks Between Latin America and Africa and China’s Growing Regional Influence

This article examines the evolving relationship between transnational narcotics trafficking networks connecting Latin America and Africa and China’s expanding economic and infrastructure presence in these regions.

Drawing on current research and recent developments, it analyzes how drug trafficking organizations have established new routes across the Atlantic, the role of Chinese-operated ports and businesses in both regions, and the implications of China’s Belt and Road Initiative for regional security and drug control efforts.

The analysis reveals a complex interplay where China’s legitimate economic activities create infrastructure that can be exploited by criminal networks, while Chinese entities are simultaneously implicated in supplying precursor chemicals and facilitating money laundering operations linked to the drug trade.

Introduction

The global narcotics trade continues to evolve in response to changing market demands, law enforcement pressures, and geopolitical shifts.

One of the most significant developments in recent decades has been the establishment of robust trafficking corridors between Latin America and Africa, primarily to serve European drug markets.

Simultaneously, China has dramatically increased its economic presence in both regions through infrastructure investments, port operations, and financial engagement—creating what some analysts have termed the “new Silk Road” connecting these continents.

This article explores the intersection of these two phenomena, examining how narco-trafficking networks operate across these regions and how China’s growing influence intersects with these illicit activities.

It addresses a critical question: What is the relationship between drug trafficking cooperation linking Latin America and Africa and China’s expanding economic and strategic presence in these regions?

The Evolution of Narco-Trafficking Between Latin America and Africa

The trafficking of narcotics from Latin America to Africa represents a significant evolution in global drug distribution networks.

According to research from Origins at Ohio State University, Colombian drug trafficking organizations have increasingly identified European markets for cocaine and established transit nodes through unstable West African states.¹ This strategic shift has been driven by both market factors and enforcement pressures.

As demand for cocaine in Europe has grown, and with penalties for trafficking generally less severe than in the United States, Latin American drug trafficking organizations have sought new routes to these lucrative markets. The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses reports that cocaine consumption in Europe more than doubled between 1998 and 2009, with particularly sharp increases in the United Kingdom, Spain, and Italy, which together account for approximately 60 percent of all cocaine users in Europe.

West Africa has emerged as a crucial transit point in this trans-Atlantic drug trade. The International Crisis Group notes that trafficking organizations have adapted their methods continually, switching from large-scale marine transport to using second-hand commercial aircraft to transport cocaine from Latin America to West Africa. Once the drugs reach African soil, they are typically moved through elaborate networks of land-based convoys for eventual smuggling into Europe.

The impact on West African states has been profound. Guinea-Bissau, for instance, has been described as the “world’s first narco-state” due to the extent to which drug trafficking has penetrated its governance structures. Similar patterns of corruption and infiltration of state institutions by drug trafficking organizations have been observed in other countries across the region.

The narcotics trafficking between Latin America and Africa operates through sophisticated networks with elements of both hierarchical organization and decentralized cooperation. According to Grey Dynamics, South American transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) have established a decentralized smuggling and trafficking network across Africa, with couriers or delegates in African countries, while African crime groups like Nigerian organized crime have established a presence in key South American ports and cities.

Criminal organizations employ various methods to transport drugs across the Atlantic. Diálogo Américas reports that cocaine is shipped from Latin America to Africa through multiple channels including shipping containers, fishing boats, and other maritime vessels. Major receiving ports include locations in South Africa, Mozambique, Kenya, Tanzania, and several other coastal African nations. Nigerian narcotraffickers in particular have established significant operations from São Paulo, Brazil, coordinating up to 30 percent of cocaine exports by boat or shipping container from the Port of Santos as early as 2013.

China’s Expanding Influence in Latin America and Africa

China’s economic engagement with both Africa and Latin America has increased dramatically in the 21st century, with infrastructure development serving as a cornerstone of this expansion. CNN reports that China has poured billions into African infrastructure through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), building railways, highways, and ports that connect major cities across the continent. These investments have tangible impacts, with residents in cities like Lagos, Nairobi, and Addis Ababa now using transportation infrastructure built with Chinese loans and often by Chinese construction firms.

In September 2024, President Xi Jinping pledged approximately $51 billion in financial assistance to Africa over three years, with commitments to infrastructure connectivity projects and other investments. This includes plans for 30 infrastructure connectivity projects and 30 clean energy projects across Africa. Similar patterns of investment can be observed in Latin America, where China has become a major economic player. The Council on Foreign Relations notes that China has developed close economic and security ties with many Latin American countries over the past two decades, becoming the largest supplier of infrastructural finance to the region.

Of particular relevance to narcotics trafficking is China’s growing control over ports in both regions. According to Diálogo Américas, China owns or controls several ports in Latin America and the Caribbean, including Lázaro Cárdenas and Manzanillo in Mexico, Balboa and Colón in Panama, as well as terminals in Argentina and Peru. COSCO Shipping Ports Ltd., a subsidiary of Chinese state-owned conglomerate COSCO, controls 60 percent of the Port of Chancay in Peru.

These ports serve as critical nodes in global shipping networks and handle significant volumes of containerized cargo. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) reports that the port of Paranaguá, owned and operated by the China Merchants Port Holding Company, is strategically located to facilitate the export of agricultural products from Brazil to China via the Far East South America Service shipping route.

China’s engagement extends beyond physical infrastructure to include financial relationships. Chinese banks and financial institutions have become major lenders to both Latin American and African nations. While much of this financing serves legitimate development purposes, concerns have been raised about debt sustainability and the potential for economic leverage.

The expansion of Chinese-operated ports in regions with significant drug trafficking activity has raised concerns about potential exploitation by criminal organizations. CSIS highlights that some Chinese-operated ports in Latin America have become points of concern for organized crime activities. For example, the ports of Lázaro Cárdenas, Manzanillo, and Ensenada in Mexico have been identified as trafficking points where millions of doses of fentanyl were seized between 2015 and 2023.

The Peru-based Institute of Criminology and Violence Studies has warned that the Port of Chancay in Peru, where COSCO controls 60 percent of operations, could become a hub for cocaine and fentanyl trafficking between South America and Asia. The report notes that Chinese investment in infrastructure in Latin America often creates an environment of opacity that limits transparency and accountability, potentially facilitating corruption and bribery by criminal organizations.

A more direct connection between Chinese entities and drug trafficking involves the supply of chemical precursors used in drug production. The Brookings Institution reports that Chinese brokers are dominant suppliers of precursor chemicals needed for methamphetamine and fentanyl production, which are then used by Mexican cartels to produce drugs for North America. Additionally, Chinese actors have been involved in money laundering operations for Mexican drug trafficking cartels.

This relationship evolved after China outlawed the entire class of fentanyl-type drugs in 2019. Prior to this, China was the principal source of finished fentanyl for the U.S. illegal market. Following the ban, Chinese chemical suppliers adapted by selling precursor chemicals to Mexican criminal groups, who then manufacture the drugs themselves.

Financial connections between Chinese entities and drug trafficking organizations have been documented through various money laundering investigations. According to reporting from the South China Morning Post, Chinese financial institutions have become significant launderers of illicit proceeds from drug trafficking. Court documents have revealed operations laundering billions of dollars through banks in Hong Kong and mainland China on behalf of drug trafficking organizations from Mexico and Colombia.

One case described by U.S. prosecutors involved a Guangzhou enterprise that laundered at least $5 billion through bank accounts in Hong Kong and mainland China for drug trafficking organizations. The scheme involved purchasing counterfeit goods in China, which were then shipped to Colombia and elsewhere for resale, effectively converting drug proceeds into seemingly legitimate commercial transactions.

China’s approach to international counternarcotics cooperation has been inconsistent and often subordinated to broader strategic objectives. The Brookings Institution notes that China has at times suspended counternarcotics cooperation with Western countries, as it tends to subordinate international law enforcement assistance to its geostrategic relationships and leverage it for other purposes.

When cooperation does occur, it is often selective and limited in scope. For example, under intense international pressure, the Chinese government has occasionally taken enforcement actions against wildlife trafficking, such as raids against retailers selling protected totoaba bladders in 2018. However, these efforts have tended to push the illegal activity underground rather than eliminating it entirely.

Conclusion

The expansion of transportation infrastructure, particularly ports and shipping networks, serves legitimate economic purposes but can simultaneously facilitate illicit activities. This “dual-use” nature of infrastructure development presents a significant challenge for law enforcement and policy makers. While improved transportation networks can boost economic development and integration, they can also be exploited by criminal organizations to move illicit goods more efficiently across borders.

The presence of large-scale drug trafficking operations undermines governance in both Latin America and Africa, with corruption of officials being a key strategy of trafficking organizations. The International Journal of Drug Policy has noted that drug trafficking can hinder economic growth because illegal drug profits rarely flow into long-term and sustainable capital investments, while corruption undermines the state’s capacity to develop robust institutions.

In West Africa, the narcotics trade has had particularly corrosive effects on governance structures. The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses reports that the subversion by corruption of law enforcement and military personnel has already taken place in many countries, with Guinea-Bissau and Guinea-Conakry being examples where international narco-trafficking groups have formed strong relationships with ruling elites.

Many countries in both regions lack the resources and capabilities to effectively combat sophisticated transnational trafficking networks. The Wilson Center reports that many West African countries face significant resource constraints in their counter-narcotics efforts. The combined annual budgets of roughly a dozen West African countries would not even amount to the estimated $200 million needed to equip their coastlines with adequate marine fleets for interdiction operations.

Without multinational interagency efforts supported by adequate political will and economic resources, the capacity to monitor and interdict drug shipments across vast maritime spaces will remain limited. This resource gap is often exploited by trafficking organizations, who can invest considerable sums in evading detection and interdiction.

China’s growing influence in both Latin America and Africa gives it considerable leverage in regional affairs, which sometimes conflicts with international narcotics control efforts. As noted earlier, China has demonstrated selectivity in its cooperation on counternarcotics operations, often subordinating these efforts to broader strategic objectives.

The relationship between narco-trafficking networks connecting Latin America and Africa and China’s influence in these regions is multifaceted and complex. While there is no direct evidence that Chinese government policy actively encourages or facilitates drug trafficking, the extensive Chinese economic presence, particularly in shipping and ports, creates infrastructure that can be exploited by criminal networks. Simultaneously, Chinese entities are implicated in supplying precursor chemicals and laundering proceeds from drug trafficking operations.

This complex situation reflects the challenging reality of globalization, where legitimate economic development and trade can inadvertently create opportunities for transnational criminal networks to expand their operations. It underscores the need for a comprehensive approach to addressing drug trafficking that considers not only law enforcement and interdiction but also governance, development, and international cooperation dimensions.