The New Scramble for Africa: How Russia and China Are Reshaping the Continent
In the shadow of Western disengagement, a new geopolitical contest is unfolding across Africa. Russia and China, with markedly different approaches but complementary ambitions, are steadily expanding their influence across the continent.
This analysis examines how these two powers are competing for resources, influence, and partnerships in what some observers have termed a “new scramble for Africa.”
Divergent Strategies, Shared Ambitions
Russia and China have fundamentally different objectives on the African continent. While China has pursued stability to ensure their considerable investments can succeed, Russia’s involvement appears to thrive in environments of insecurity and instability. These contrasting approaches reflect deeper differences in each nation’s global strategy and economic capacity.
China’s Economic Empire
China’s engagement with Africa is primarily economic, focused on long-term infrastructure development and resource acquisition. Trade between China and Africa reached $295 billion in 2024, making China the continent’s largest trading partner by a significant margin. This dwarfs Russia’s $24.5 billion in African trade during the same period.
At the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit in September 2024, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced more than $50 billion in financing for Africa over the following three years. Chinese companies have reportedly signed contracts worth more than $700 billion in Africa between 2013 and 2023.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) serves as the cornerstone of China’s African strategy, with all but two African countries now participating. The scale of this initiative is demonstrated by Chinese involvement in at least 46 African ports, which have been built, financed, or are operated by Chinese state-owned shipping companies.
Dr. Chris Alden, a professor of international relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science, explains that China’s approach prioritizes “subtle influence and maintaining stability in areas of investment to ensure that it gets good returns”.
Russia’s Security Footprint
In contrast, Russia has focused on security partnerships and political alliances, often in countries experiencing internal conflict or instability. Russia’s reconnection with Africa has been accelerated by geopolitical shifts in the Sahel region, where a security vacuum was created as traditional Western powers lost influence (ISS Africa, 2024).
Moscow has provided defense assistance to countries where armed groups are widespread, often helping struggling leaders remain in power. It’s no coincidence that Mali, Central African Republic, and Sudan, all experiencing widespread insecurity, are major hot spots of Russian influence.
The Russian strategy frequently involves the deployment of private military contractors. First deployed to the Central African Republic in 2018, the Wagner Group (now restructured as Africa Corps) has established a presence in several African countries, including Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, Sudan, and Libya. Anton Yelizarov, leader of the Africa Corps, stated in early 2024 that the unit will “defend the interests of the Russian Federation, and we will do this anywhere in the world”.
After Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death in 2023, Russia stepped up its involvement in Africa, with the Kremlin now “squarely in competition with the West” across deployments in places like Libya, Sudan, and Burkina Faso. Russia is now directly confronting Western interests rather than working through the plausibly deniable Wagner Group (Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2024).
Winning Hearts and Minds
Both powers have made significant inroads in terms of public perception among African populations, often at the expense of Western influence.
According to the African Youth Survey 2024, China and Russia appear to be winning the battle for influence among Africa’s youth. The survey indicates that 76 percent of African youth see China as the most influential global power, with 82 percent describing Chinese influence as positive. The United States ranks second at 70 percent influential and 79 percent positive.
Russia’s influence has risen significantly since 2020, with 41 percent of survey respondents identifying Russia as a leading foreign influencer on the continent, and 68 percent viewing that influence as positive. This shift is particularly notable in countries like Malawi and South Africa.
A Gallup World Poll report found that the United States has lost its position as the most influential power in Africa, with Russia now the dominant power in terms of approval ratings across several sub-Saharan countries.
This shift in perception is partly due to growing anti-Western sentiment. According to CNBC Africa, “As the Russia-Ukraine war moves toward its third anniversary with no end in sight, and as Israel and Iran square off, African concerns all too often appear as a mere afterthought in Western strategic planning.”
Two-thirds of respondents to the African Youth Survey believe the Ukraine conflict could have been avoided, and nearly a third blame NATO, the United States, and the European Union.
Areas of Competition and Potential Conflict
Despite their different approaches, China and Russia are now the two largest arms suppliers to sub-Saharan Africa. Russia provides 21 percent of arms imports, slightly ahead of China at 18 percent. Western sanctions against Russia have created opportunities for China to expand in this market.
Competition for access to crucial minerals could become problematic. China controls approximately 30 percent of African copper and 50 percent of cobalt production, giving it significant control over global supply chains that it will want to protect.
In countries where Chinese and Russian presence overlaps, such as the Central African Republic and increasingly in Equatorial Guinea, their different approaches may create challenges. The analysis by William Matthews, a senior research fellow at Chatham House suggests China is generally happy to use Russia’s behavior opportunistically if it counters U.S. influence. They are typically not working together but keeping out of each other’s way.
The stability question poses a particular challenge to Sino-Russian cooperation in Africa. China’s economic model depends on stable governments and environments for its investments to flourish, while Russia’s security model often thrives in unstable conditions where its services are needed.
Western Response
As Russian and Chinese influence continues to expand globally, Western nations have intensified their strategic counter-efforts. The development of the Lobito Corridor, an 800-mile railway linking Congo’s mining regions to Zambia and Angola’s port of Lobito, represents a direct counter to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The project, funded by the United States and European Union through the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, has moved beyond feasibility studies to active implementation, with the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation approving a $553 million loan to the Lobito Atlantic Railway in November 2024 and construction scheduled to begin in 2026.
The Belt and Road Initiative maintains significant momentum, with 52 African countries having signed agreements as of August 2022, despite recent high-profile departures including Italy in 2023 and Panama in February 2025 Since 2013, Chinese BRI engagement has reached $1.308 trillion globally, including $775 billion in construction contracts and $533 billion in investments.
The Trump administration’s approach to Africa emphasizes transactional partnerships focused on immediate benefits, with the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) set to expire in September 2025 creating uncertainty about future trade relationships. At the June 2025 U.S.-Africa Business Summit in Luanda, African leaders called for shifting from aid-based relationships to investment-driven partnerships, with Angolan President João Lourenço stating it is “time to replace the logic of aid with the logic of investment and trade”
Current tensions exemplify broader challenges in U.S.-Africa relations, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio withdrawing from G20 ministerial meetings and accusing South Africa of being anti-American, while implementing a special refugee program for South African farmers and halting aid to the country. African countries are increasingly leveraging great power competition to their advantage, as seen through the DRC’s minerals-for-security deals and Rwanda’s offer to host deported migrants.
U.S. officials have argued that the United States is the “best” choice for African partnerships, though they acknowledge criticism that African nations dislike “lectures” from the U.S. and European allies about democracy and human rights, with many preferring to deal with China or Russia that don’t make similar demands.
The key changes reflect that the Lobito Corridor has progressed from feasibility studies to active development with concrete funding commitments, the BRI remains active despite some departures, and U.S.-Africa relations have evolved under the new administration toward more transactional approaches while facing new diplomatic tensions.
Implications for the Future
The growing influence of Russia and China in Africa has significant implications for international relations and African development.
For Africa itself, the competition offers both opportunities and risks. Multiple partners provide African nations with leverage and alternatives to Western-dominated institutions. However, there are concerns about debt sustainability (particularly with Chinese loans) and the potential for exploitation of resources without adequate benefits for local populations.
In November 2024, two countries that had increasingly showed signs of becoming closer to Russia, Chad and Senegal, asked France to withdraw its troops and bases, followed quickly by Cote d’Ivoire in December 2024, bringing to six the number of countries in West Africa that had made such requests in the past five years.
Conclusion
The competition between Russia and China in Africa is reshaping the geopolitical landscape of the continent. While both powers are increasing their presence, they employ distinctly different strategies: China focusing on economic development and long-term investment, while Russia leverages security cooperation and political alliances, often in less stable regions.
This dynamic creates both opportunities and challenges for African nations, which can now diversify their international partnerships beyond traditional Western allies. However, the long-term implications of this shift remain uncertain, particularly regarding sustainability, sovereignty, and development outcomes.
As this new scramble for Africa intensifies, the continent’s 54 nations find themselves at the center of a global strategic competition with far-reaching implications. How they navigate these complex relationships will significantly impact both African development and the broader international order in the decades to come.
But simply moving away from Western states does not bring enhanced sovereignty. If the point is that you did not like a past of European engagement in Africa, the Chinese-Russian tandem is not a path to enhanced sovereignty for Africa.
Africa faces several major challenges due to the growing influence of Russia and China, which include risks related to debt sustainability, the exploitation of resources, and shifting security dynamics and alliances.
Chinese loans have funded many infrastructure projects in Africa, but concerns over long-term debt sustainability have increased as some countries struggle to repay, risking loss of assets or political leverage. Excessive debt can constrain government budgets, limit spending on social services, and lead to dependency.
Large-scale investment from Russia and China often focuses on resource extraction (minerals, oil, agriculture) with minimal value addition and benefits for local economies. Weak regulatory environments and opaque contracts can undermine environmental protection and labor standards, exacerbating inequality.
As African countries distance themselves from Western military partners such as France, Russia and China offer alternative security arrangements, arms deals, and political support. This can increase instability, as foreign-backed rivalries, especially Russian involvement in coup-prone states, further fragment regional stability and governance.
While competition between major powers offers African nations leverage, it may also fragment policy coherence, undermine collective regional strategies, and make it harder to pursue sustainable development priorities. The shift complicates relations with traditional Western partners and risks entangling African states in broader geopolitical rivalries.
Embracing Russia and China while crafting a multi-polar authoritarian world may not be the best idea for securing the future for an Africa which seeks sovereignty and improvement for its people.