Putin’s Shadow Boxing with NATO: How Russia Created the Very Threats It Claims to Combat
In February 2022, as Russian forces massed on Ukraine’s borders, Vladimir Putin delivered a rambling televised address that would serve as his primary justification for the largest European war since 1945. Central to his argument was the existential threat posed by NATO expansion, particularly the prospect of Ukraine joining the Western alliance. Putin painted a picture of Russia encircled by hostile forces, with NATO pressing ever closer to Russia’s borders in an aggressive campaign of containment.
Yet this narrative contained a fundamental irony that reveals the self-defeating nature of Putin’s strategic thinking. At the moment Putin launched his “special military operation,” NATO posed perhaps the least credible military threat to Russia since the alliance’s founding in 1949. European defense capabilities had atrophied, alliance attention was scattered across global commitments, and the very idea of large-scale territorial conflict in Europe seemed antiquated to most Western leaders.
Putin’s actions since 2014, and particularly his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, have accomplished something that decades of NATO expansion and Western military modernization could not: they have created a genuinely militarized, unified, and existentially motivated alliance directly on Russia’s borders. Putin has been shadow boxing with a NATO that existed more in his imagination than in reality and in the process, he has brought that imagined threat into being.
The Myth of Pre-2022 NATO Aggression
To understand the depth of Putin’s strategic miscalculation, it is essential to examine the actual state of NATO in the years leading up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The alliance that Putin portrayed as an aggressive, expanding military juggernaut was, in reality, an organization struggling with internal divisions, declining military capabilities, and a fundamental uncertainty about its post-Cold War purpose.
Following the September 11 attacks, NATO underwent a dramatic reorientation away from its original mission of collective defense in Europe. The alliance’s invocation of Article 5 for the first and only time in its history was not in response to a Russian threat, but to support the United States in Afghanistan. For two decades, European NATO members focused their military attention and resources on counterinsurgency operations in distant theaters rather than on the defense of European territory.
This shift had profound implications for European military capabilities. Nations optimized their forces for expeditionary operations, peacekeeping, and counterterrorism rather than high-intensity conventional warfare. The heavy armor, air defense systems, and logistical infrastructure necessary for territorial defense were allowed to deteriorate or were eliminated entirely.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of European security policy in the 2000s and early 2010s was the continued pursuit of the “peace dividend” or the reduction in military spending made possible by the end of the Cold War. Even as Putin’s authoritarian consolidation became increasingly apparent, European nations continued to reduce their defense capabilities.
Germany provides the most dramatic example of this trend. Once the backbone of NATO’s European defense, Germany’s military readiness declined precipitously in the decades following reunification. By 2014, the German military could field fewer than 40 operational tanks, and its air force struggled to maintain basic readiness levels. The nation that had once maintained hundreds of thousands of troops as a bulwark against Soviet expansion had effectively disarmed itself.
This pattern was repeated across Western Europe. The United Kingdom, despite maintaining global ambitions, saw its military shrink to its smallest size since the Napoleonic Wars. France, while retaining significant expeditionary capabilities, allowed its heavy armor and air defense capabilities to atrophy. Even Eastern European nations, theoretically more sensitive to Russian threats, prioritized NATO interoperability over territorial defense capabilities.
The Obama administration’s approach to European security reflected broader American strategic priorities that had moved decisively away from traditional great power competition. President Obama’s famous “pivot to Asia” explicitly acknowledged that America’s strategic focus was shifting toward China and the Pacific, not Russia and Europe.
Obama’s approach to Russia was characterized by the “reset” policy, an attempt to improve relations with Moscow through pragmatic cooperation on shared interests. Even after Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, the administration continued to pursue engagement, reflecting a broader Western belief that Russia could be integrated into the European security architecture as a responsible stakeholder.
European allies during this period were largely supportive of this approach. The prevailing view among Western European leaders was that economic integration and diplomatic engagement would gradually transform Russia into a more conventional European power. The idea that Russia might resort to large-scale territorial aggression seemed anachronistic to policymakers who had internalized Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis.
Even the Trump administration, despite its later reputation for confronting Russia, initially showed little interest in strengthening European defenses. President Trump’s criticism of NATO focused not on the Russian threat, but on burden-sharing and what he viewed as European free-riding on American security guarantees.
Trump’s public questioning of Article 5 commitments and his apparent skepticism toward alliance solidarity further weakened NATO’s credibility as a deterrent force. European allies, uncertain about American commitment and facing domestic pressure to reduce defense spending, were ill-positioned to strengthen their own capabilities.
The 2014 Watershed: Crimea Changes Everything
Putin’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 marked the beginning of the end for the post-Cold War European security order. Yet even this dramatic act of territorial aggression initially produced only a limited Western response, reflecting the degree to which European leaders remained committed to the belief that such conflicts belonged to the past.
The Western response to Crimea’s annexation was calibrated to express disapproval without fundamentally altering the European security landscape. Economic sanctions were imposed, but they were carefully designed to avoid disrupting major energy relationships between Russia and Europe. Military assistance to Ukraine remained minimal, and there was no significant reinforcement of NATO’s eastern flank.
Most tellingly, European defense spending actually continued to decline in the immediate aftermath of the Crimean crisis. The 2014 NATO Wales Summit established the famous “2 percent” defense spending target, but this was presented as a long-term goal rather than an immediate response to Russian aggression. The prevailing hope remained that diplomatic engagement could resolve the crisis without requiring a fundamental militarization of European security policy.
It was only as the conflict in eastern Ukraine persisted and expanded that European leaders began to acknowledge that their assumptions about post-Cold War European security had been fundamentally wrong. The downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 in July 2014, killed by a Russian surface-to-air missile, finally began to shift European public opinion toward a recognition that Russia represented a genuine security threat.
Even so, the European response remained measured and incremental. Defense spending began to increase, but slowly. Military exercises were expanded, but remained limited in scope. The deployment of NATO forces to the Baltic states was more symbolic than substantive, involving battalion-sized “tripwire” forces rather than the heavy brigade-level formations that would be necessary for effective territorial defense.
The 2022 Invasion: Putin’s Strategic Catastrophe
Putin’s decision to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 represented the culmination of his growing frustration with what he viewed as Western encirclement. Yet this decision, rather than resolving Russia’s security dilemma, has created exactly the militarized and hostile NATO that Putin claimed to fear.
Within days of the Russian invasion, NATO underwent a transformation that previous decades of gradual expansion and modernization efforts had failed to achieve. The alliance displayed a unity and sense of common purpose that had been absent since the height of the Cold War, with even previously reluctant members embracing significant increases in defense spending and military modernization.
Germany’s response was perhaps the most dramatic. Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a “Zeitenwende” (turning point) that would see German defense spending increase to over 2 percent of GDP, with a special €100 billion fund for military modernization. The nation that had effectively disarmed itself over the previous three decades committed to building one of Europe’s largest and most capable militaries.
Similar transformations occurred across the alliance. Poland announced plans to double the size of its military and become home to the largest land force in Europe outside of Russia. The United Kingdom reversed years of defense cuts with significant increases in military spending. Even traditionally neutral nations like Switzerland began reconsidering their defense policies in light of the changed security environment.
Perhaps no development better illustrates the self-defeating nature of Putin’s strategy than the decision of Finland and Sweden to abandon their long-standing neutrality and join NATO. These nations had maintained their non-aligned status throughout the Cold War, even as the Soviet Union posed a far more credible military threat than the Russia of 2022.
Finland’s decision was particularly significant given its 830-mile border with Russia and its historical experience of Soviet aggression. Finnish leaders had carefully calibrated their security policy for decades to avoid provoking Russian retaliation while maintaining their independence. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine convinced Finnish leaders that this careful balance was no longer sustainable.
Sweden’s decision was equally remarkable. Swedish neutrality had been a cornerstone of European security architecture since the early 19th century. The nation had avoided military alliances even during the existential threat posed by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Yet Putin’s aggression accomplished what centuries of great power competition had not—convincing Swedish leaders that neutrality was no longer a viable security strategy.
Military Modernization and Forward Deployment
The alliance response to the Ukraine invasion has gone far beyond increased defense spending and new membership. NATO has fundamentally restructured its force posture to address the Russian threat in ways that were unimaginable before 2022.
The alliance has established new forward-deployed battle groups in Eastern Europe, moving from the symbolic “tripwire” forces deployed after 2014 to brigade-sized formations capable of meaningful territorial defense. Pre-positioned equipment stockpiles have been established across the region, and major exercises now routinely involve tens of thousands of troops practicing scenarios that would have been considered provocative just three years ago.
Air defense systems, largely neglected during the post-Cold War focus on counterinsurgency operations, have become a priority across the alliance. Nations are rushing to acquire modern surface-to-air missile systems and to restore the integrated air defense networks that had been allowed to atrophy during the 1990s and 2000s.
The Self-Fulfilling Security Dilemma
Putin’s approach to NATO expansion reveals a classic example of a self-created security dilemma”, a situation in which actions taken to enhance one’s own security inadvertently threaten others, leading them to take countermeasures that ultimately reduce the security of all parties involved.
At every stage of this process, Putin’s actions have created precisely the security challenges he claimed to be addressing. His 2014 seizure of Crimea ended the post-Cold War European security consensus and began the process of NATO’s reorientation toward territorial defense. His 2022 invasion of Ukraine completed this transformation, creating a militarized and united alliance that poses a far greater threat to Russian security than the scattered and underfunded NATO of previous decades.
This pattern extends beyond military capabilities to alliance solidarity. Before 2022, NATO was plagued by internal divisions over burden-sharing, strategic priorities, and the credibility of Article 5 commitments. Putin’s aggression has resolved these divisions by providing a clear and present threat that unifies alliance members around a common purpose.
Putin’s strategic failures appear to stem from fundamental misperceptions about Western intentions and capabilities. His rhetoric consistently portrays NATO expansion as part of a deliberate Western campaign to weaken and encircle Russia, yet the actual behavior of NATO members in the decades before 2022 suggests a far more benign interpretation of Western intentions.
The West’s response to previous Russian aggression from Chechnya to Georgia to the initial Ukraine intervention was consistently measured and limited. Rather than seizing opportunities to weaken Russia, Western leaders repeatedly attempted to maintain working relationships with Moscow even after clear violations of international law.
Putin appears to have interpreted Western restraint and accommodation as evidence of weakness rather than genuine preference for stability and cooperation. This misperception led him to escalate conflicts in ways that ultimately produced the Western military response he claimed to fear.
Putin’s actions have also transformed the economics of European security in ways that make sustained Western military superiority more likely. Before 2022, the primary constraint on European defense capabilities was political will rather than economic capacity. European nations possessed the industrial base and financial resources necessary to field formidable militaries; they simply chose not to do so.
By creating an existential security threat, Putin has removed the political constraints that limited European defense spending. The result is a massive shift in the military balance that will persist long after the current crisis in Ukraine is resolved. European defense industries, moribund for decades, are experiencing unprecedented growth and investment. Military technologies that had been neglected are receiving renewed attention and funding.
Implications for Russian Strategy
The transformation of NATO since 2022 has profound implications for Russian strategic thinking and future policy options. Putin’s actions have created a security environment that is far more constraining for Russia than anything that existed in the post-Cold War period.
Perhaps most significantly, Putin’s aggression has ended Russia’s integration into European security structures and eliminated any prospect for the kind of cooperative security arrangements that might have addressed legitimate Russian concerns about NATO expansion. Before 2014, there were ongoing discussions about creating a broader European security architecture that might have included Russia as a stakeholder rather than an adversary.
Putin’s actions have made such arrangements politically impossible for the foreseeable future. European publics, previously skeptical about the need for large-scale military preparations, now view Russia as an existential threat. This shift in public opinion provides a sustainable political foundation for the kind of long-term military buildup that will be necessary to contain Russian power.
Putin’s increased reliance on nuclear threats as a tool of coercion reflects the degree to which his conventional options have been constrained by his own strategic choices. The NATO that Russia faces today is far better equipped to respond to conventional aggression than the alliance that existed before 2022. This has increased Russia’s dependence on nuclear weapons as the primary means of preventing Western military intervention.
Yet this increased reliance on nuclear threats has its own limitations. Repeated nuclear saber-rattling has gradually reduced the credibility of such threats while hardening Western resolve. Moreover, the strengthened NATO of today is far better positioned to manage escalation dynamics than the unprepared alliance of previous decades.
The economic dimensions of Putin’s strategic failure are equally significant. The sanctions imposed in response to the Ukraine invasion, while not immediately decisive, have begun the process of decoupling Russia from Western economic systems that provided much of the foundation for Russian prosperity in the post-Cold War period.
More importantly, Putin’s actions have accelerated Western efforts to reduce dependence on Russian energy exports, eliminating one of Russia’s primary sources of leverage over European policy. The European Union’s rapid pivot away from Russian gas and oil represents a fundamental shift in the economic foundations of European-Russian relations.
Conclusion: The Price of Miscalculation
Vladimir Putin’s shadow boxing with NATO reveals the dangers of strategic thinking based on threat inflation and misperception of adversary intentions. By treating a largely benign and distracted alliance as an existential threat, Putin has undertaken actions that created precisely the kind of militarized and unified NATO that he claimed to fear.
The irony is particularly acute because Putin’s stated goal of preventing NATO expansion and maintaining Russian influence over its neighbors could have been achieved more effectively through different means. A Russia that had continued its post-Cold War integration with Europe while respecting the sovereignty of its neighbors would have been far more successful in limiting NATO’s military capabilities and maintaining influence over European security policy.
Instead, Putin’s aggressive actions have united NATO around a common threat, ended European security complacency, and created a military balance that heavily favors the West. Finland and Sweden, neutral throughout the Cold War, have joined the alliance. Germany has begun the most significant military buildup in its post-war history. European defense spending has increased dramatically across the continent.
The NATO that Putin faces today is larger, more unified, better funded, and more directly focused on the Russian threat than at any time since the 1980s. This transformation represents one of the most significant strategic failures in modern history—a case study in how threat inflation and misperception can lead to policies that create the very security challenges they were designed to prevent.
Putin’s shadow boxing with NATO has ended with the Russian leader facing a real opponent of his own creation, one that is far more formidable than the imaginary threat he originally claimed to combat. The consequences of this miscalculation will shape European security for decades to come, serving as a reminder that in international politics, the greatest threats often come not from our enemies’ strength, but from our own strategic failures.
For a podcast discussing this subject, see the following:
Russia’s Self-Created Security Dilemma: How Putin’s Choices Shaped the Path to War
For a video discussing this subject, see the following:
The Missing Half: How Russian Choices Shaped the Path to War in Ukraine