Beyond Battleships: Building a Maritime Force for 21st Century Conflict

The Wall Street Journal’s recent editorial on President Trump’s naval expansion plans reveals a fundamental disconnect between traditional thinking about naval power and the realities of 21st-century maritime conflict. While the editors correctly identify China’s naval expansion as a critical threat and acknowledge the inadequacy of today’s 296-ship Navy, their analysis remains trapped in 20th-century paradigms of fleet composition and warfighting. The editorial’s fixation on manned platforms, battleships, frigates, cutters, and submarines, completely ignores the transformative potential of maritime autonomous systems that are reshaping naval warfare even as legacy platforms struggle through acquisition dysfunction.

The Real Problem: Platform-Centric Thinking in a Network-Centric Era

The WSJ editorial embodies what might be called “tonnage thinking” or the belief that naval power is primarily measured in displacement tons and hull counts of manned warships. This approach made sense in an era when individual platforms were discrete fighting units, when the battleship Iowa or carrier Enterprise operated as largely independent centers of combat power. But that era ended with the networked warfare revolution that began in the 1990s and has accelerated dramatically in the past decade.

The editorial asks whether Trump’s battleship is “right for that threat” and worries about “roughly 30% or 40% more missile capacity than the latest destroyer” coming at “eye-watering cost.” This cost-per-hull analysis misses the fundamental question: In an era of ubiquitous sensors, AI-enabled targeting, and hypersonic weapons, how survivable will any large, manned surface combatant be in high-intensity conflict? The editors don’t address this uncomfortable reality because doing so would undermine their entire framework for evaluating naval power.

China certainly isn’t ignoring this question. While building a massive fleet of traditional combatants, the People’s Liberation Army Navy is simultaneously developing extensive autonomous and unmanned capabilities from underwater vehicles to surface craft to aerial systems. They understand that future maritime dominance will come not from simply outbuilding America’s Arleigh Burke destroyers, but from creating networked systems that can operate in environments where traditional platforms cannot survive or cannot afford to risk exposure.

The Autonomous Revolution: Force Multiplication Through Distribution

Maritime autonomous systems represent the most significant evolution in naval warfare since the aircraft carrier displaced the battleship as the capital ship. Yet the WSJ editorial doesn’t mention autonomous systems even once. This omission is particularly striking given that the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard have all identified unmanned systems as critical to future operations.

Consider what autonomous systems bring to the fight: First, they enable radical distribution of combat power. Rather than concentrating expensive capabilities on a small number of high-value units that present lucrative targets, autonomous systems allow navies to distribute sensors, weapons, and electronic warfare across hundreds or thousands of platforms. This creates multiple dilemmas for adversaries who must now track, target, and engage a vastly expanded battlespace.

Second, autonomous systems fundamentally change the cost-exchange ratio. When a $2 billion guided missile destroyer must expose itself to launch $2 million missiles at targets, the mathematics of attrition warfare favor the side that can produce cheaper missiles faster. But when autonomous platforms costing $10-50 million can carry similar weapons loads without risking crew, the exchange ratio shifts dramatically. More importantly, these platforms can operate in high-threat environments where commanders would hesitate to send manned ships, expanding the operational envelope of the fleet.

Third, autonomous systems enable persistent presence in ways traditional platforms cannot match. An unmanned surface vessel can maintain station in contested waters for weeks or months, providing continuous sensor coverage and strike capability without crew rotation, provisioning, or the human factors that limit endurance. This transforms concepts like blockade, sea control, and maritime domain awareness.

Mesh Fleets: The Network Warfare Solution

The concept of “mesh fleets” or networks of manned and unmanned platforms operating in coordinated fashion represents the synthesis of traditional naval power and autonomous systems. Rather than replacing crewed combatants, autonomous systems augment them, creating a layered force structure that combines the decision-making capability and versatility of human crews with the persistence, affordability, and risk tolerance of unmanned platforms.

A mesh fleet approach to the Taiwan scenario that obsesses the WSJ editorial might look radically different from the traditional carrier strike group model. Imagine a networked force of:

• Crewed combatants (destroyers, submarines, amphibious ships) providing command and control, high-end air defense, and critical decision nodes
• Large unmanned surface vessels serving as missile magazines and sensor platforms
• Medium autonomous vessels conducting anti-submarine warfare, mine countermeasures, and distributed lethality missions
• Small autonomous surface and underwater vehicles providing persistent surveillance and targeting
• Aerial autonomous systems extending sensor and strike range
• All operating within a resilient, redundant network that can continue functioning even as individual nodes are attrited

This architecture addresses the fundamental problem that the WSJ editors identify, insufficient capacity, but does so through distribution and multiplication rather than simply building more expensive manned platforms. When Admiral Caudle says the fleet has “only a third of the small combatants it needs,” the answer isn’t necessarily tripling production of crewed vessels that take years to build and cost billions each. The answer may be developing autonomous small combatants that can be produced in large numbers, rapidly.

The Acquisition Dysfunction: Symptoms vs. Disease

The WSJ editorial correctly identifies the U.S. Navy’s acquisition dysfunction, citing the Constellation-class frigate debacle where a proven European design was modified so extensively from 85% similar to 15% similar that it became an essentially new ship with all the delays and cost overruns that implies. The editors suggest abolishing Naval Sea Systems Command as a potential solution.

But this recommendation treats symptoms rather than disease. The fundamental problem isn’t one organization or process: it’s a defense acquisition system optimized for perfection rather than adequacy, for exquisite platforms rather than sufficient quantities, for risk avoidance rather than rapid learning. This system worked (albeit expensively) during the Cold War when production runs lasted decades and America’s industrial base could support lengthy development timelines. It fails catastrophically in an era when commercial technology cycles measure in months and adversaries can observe our programs and adapt faster than we can field systems.

Autonomous systems offer a potential escape from this dysfunction precisely because many draw on commercial technologies and development approaches. The software, sensors, and artificial intelligence that enable autonomous operations often have dual-use applications that benefit from rapid commercial innovation cycles. This doesn’t eliminate acquisition challenges, but it does create opportunities to leverage different procurement pathways and industrial base segments.

Moreover, the relatively lower cost and faster production timelines of many autonomous systems enable an iterative approach: Build, test, learn, improve, repeat. Rather than spending a decade perfecting a design before cutting steel, the Navy can field systems, learn from their operational performance, and rapidly evolve capabilities. This is how technology companies operate, and increasingly how China’s defense industry functions. America’s traditional acquisition model looks increasingly anachronistic by comparison.

Budget Realities and Strategic Choices

The WSJ editorial notes that “the Trump defense budget is flat” and worries this means insufficient resources for naval expansion. This is a legitimate concern, but it also presents an opportunity to rethink how America generates naval power. The question isn’t simply “how do we build more ships with the same budget?” but “how do we generate more combat capability per dollar invested?”

Autonomous systems offer compelling answers. A large unmanned surface vessel might cost $250-400 million compared to $2 billion for a guided missile destroyer, yet carry similar or greater weapons loads and sensor suites. If that LUSV requires a tenth the crew (or none), its lifecycle costs drop proportionally. The ability to produce four to eight autonomous platforms for the cost of one crewed destroyer fundamentally changes the capacity question.

This isn’t to suggest eliminating crewed combatants, the submarines, carriers, and amphibious ships that provide capabilities autonomous systems cannot yet match. Rather, it argues for a balanced fleet architecture that uses autonomous systems to multiply the effectiveness of crewed platforms while expanding overall capacity.

Consider the nuclear weapons argument in the WSJ editorial. The editors applaud reviving the sea-launched cruise missile as a tactical nuclear option but note “the best delivery vessel for that weapon is a submarine.” Correct: for nuclear missions. But submarines are expensive, limited in number, and have many critical missions competing for their time. For conventional strike, sea control, and presence missions, do we really need submarines, or would a mix of crewed surface combatants and autonomous systems be more cost-effective?

The China Timeline: 2027 and Operational Reality

The editorial concludes with the Pentagon’s assessment that “China expects to be able to fight and win a war on Taiwan by the end of 2027” or just 24 months away. The editors correctly note this is “day trading for building a naval fleet” of traditional combatants. A new destroyer takes roughly seven years from contract to commissioning. The Trump battleship won’t arrive until the 2030s. Even the adapted Coast Guard cutter, promised for 2028, may not make this timeline.

But autonomous systems can be developed and fielded much faster. Large unmanned surface vessels are already undergoing testing. Smaller autonomous systems are operational today. If the 2027 timeline is real and the strategic window that narrow then autonomous systems aren’t an interesting future technology but an urgent operational necessity.

This doesn’t mean sacrificing quality for speed. Rather, it means accepting that in a rapidly evolving threat environment, the capability you have next year is more valuable than the perfect capability you might have in a decade. It means building learning organizations that can rapidly adapt and improve rather than acquisition bureaucracies that optimize single programs for decades.

Chaos Management and Maritime Adaptation

The fundamental challenge facing U.S. naval power isn’t simply building more ships: it’s adapting to an operational environment characterized by persistent complexity and rapid change. Traditional crisis management approaches assume the goal is restoring stability and normalcy. But the contemporary maritime environment offers no such comfort. China’s gray zone operations, hybrid warfare, autonomous systems proliferation, and the blurring of commercial and military domains create permanent conditions of ambiguity and adaptation pressure.

This is what I’ve termed “chaos management” or the recognition that modern military forces must operate effectively within persistent complexity rather than seeking to restore stable conditions. For naval forces, this means developing architectures that are inherently adaptable, that can rapidly integrate new technologies and operational concepts, and that distribute rather than concentrate capabilities.

Autonomous systems are ideal for such environments precisely because they can be rapidly reprogrammed, their mission sets can evolve through software updates, and they can operate in coordinated swarms that adapt to local conditions. A mesh fleet of manned and unmanned platforms represents an organizational architecture matched to operational chaos rather than fighting against it.

The Real Comparison: Reagan’s Maritime Strategy

The WSJ editorial invokes Ronald Reagan’s 600-ship Navy as a model, noting it was “rooted in America as a global power with a chief adversary” and backed by “sustained presidential leadership and budget increases.” This comparison is instructive but not in the way the editors intend.

Reagan’s maritime strategy succeeded not simply because it built more ships, but because it presented the Soviet Union with multiple operational dilemmas they couldn’t solve within their economic and technological constraints. The forward deployments, aggressive exercises, and demonstrated willingness to operate in contested waters forced Soviet defensive investments that stressed their system. The strategy worked because it exploited specific Soviet vulnerabilities while leveraging American advantages in technology, alliance networks, and strategic geography.

Indeed, I worked at the Center for Naval Analysis at that time and our research group focused on how to exploit Soviet maritime weaknesses rather than becoming cheerleaders for the 600-ship navy.

The defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 demonstrates how tactical innovation and environmental understanding can overcome numerical and material superiority. The Spanish fleet was larger, better armed, and sailing what were considered the most formidable warships of their era. Yet the English exploited their advantages ruthlessly: lighter, more maneuverable vessels that could sail closer to the wind; longer-range culverins that allowed them to engage while staying outside the range of Spanish heavy guns; and intimate knowledge of their own coastal waters. When the Spanish anchored off Calais, the English sent in fireships that broke their defensive formation, then harried the scattered fleet into the North Sea where Atlantic gales completed what English guns had begun. The English didn’t try to match Spanish strengths. They identified and exploited Spanish vulnerabilities, turning the enemy’s massive fleet into a liability rather than an asset in the confined waters of the Channel.

Lord Cochrane’s exploits offer an even more audacious example of asymmetric naval warfare. Commanding the tiny 14-gun HMS Speedy, Cochrane captured the Spanish frigate El Gamo in 1801, a vessel with seven times his firepower and five times his crew. He achieved this through deception, surprise, and intimate understanding of his opponent’s decision-making cycle. Cochrane flew false colors, maneuvered into the frigate’s blind spots where her superior guns couldn’t bear, and used the enemy’s size against them by positioning Speedy so close alongside that Spanish gunners couldn’t depress their weapons enough to hit her. When he boarded with his small crew, he created chaos that prevented the Spanish from bringing their numerical advantage to bear in any coordinated fashion. Cochrane’s genius lay not in frontal assault but in creating conditions where his adversary’s strengths became irrelevant and their weaknesses, confusion, rigid command structures, predictable tactics, became decisive vulnerabilities.

A contemporary maritime strategy focused on China must likewise identify specific vulnerabilities to exploit and advantages to leverage. China’s vulnerabilities include dependence on sea lines of communication for resources, relatively limited overseas basing, and emerging challenges in integrating complex systems. America’s advantages include alliance networks, technological innovation capacity, and operational experience.

Autonomous systems exploit these asymmetries. They leverage America’s technological edge while presenting China with swarm dilemmas their current systems struggle to address. They enable distributed operations across the vast Pacific while reducing the vulnerability of concentrated high-value units. They allow allied navies to contribute more effectively through technology sharing and interoperability. And they adapt faster than traditional platforms to emerging threats and operational lessons.

Building the Relevant Fleet

So what does a relevant 21st-century fleet look like? It combines traditional capabilities with autonomous systems in a layered, networked architecture:

High-End Capabilities: Nuclear submarines for deterrence and sea denial, carriers for power projection and air superiority, large surface combatants for air defense and command and control. These remain essential but are complemented rather than duplicated.

Distributed Strike: Large and medium unmanned surface vessels serving as missile magazines, sensor platforms, and electronic warfare nodes. These platforms multiply the strike capacity of the fleet without multiplying the vulnerability of crewed ships.

Persistent Presence: Small autonomous surface and underwater vehicles providing continuous surveillance, targeting, and mine warfare capability. These systems enable sea control through persistence rather than concentration.

Adaptive Integration: Network architectures that allow rapid reconfiguration of force packages, integration of new systems, and resilient command and control even under attack.

Industrial Base: Shipyards and defense contractors that can produce both traditional platforms and autonomous systems, with procurement approaches matched to each. This includes leveraging commercial technologies and partners for autonomous systems while maintaining traditional shipbuilding for specialized platforms.

This isn’t a choice between crewed ships and autonomous systemsL it’s recognition that future naval power requires both, integrated thoughtfully. The WSJ editorial’s fixation on tonnage and hull counts reflects thinking from an era when platforms were largely independent. The future belongs to fleets that network diverse capabilities into resilient, adaptive systems.

Conclusion: Beyond Battleships

President Trump’s announcement of new battleships represents welcome attention to a fleet that has atrophied relative to the threats it faces. The WSJ editorial board is right to demand serious thinking about naval power and China’s maritime ambitions. But their analysis remains trapped in paradigms that are rapidly becoming obsolete.

The question isn’t whether America should build a 600-ship navy, or a 400-ship navy, or whether Trump’s battleship makes sense. The question is how to generate maritime power sufficient to deter China’s ambitions while operating within budget realities and industrial constraints. The answer lies not in simply building more traditional platforms though some are certainly needed but in fundamentally rethinking fleet architecture to leverage autonomous systems.

Maritime autonomous systems and mesh fleets aren’t interesting future concepts. They are operational necessities if America intends to maintain maritime superiority against a pacing threat that understands networking, distribution, and cost-exchange ratios. The editors who worry about 2027 being “day trading for building a naval fleet” should recognize that autonomous systems offer the only realistic path to relevant capability within that timeline.

The choice isn’t between Trump’s battleships and Biden’s neglect. The choice is between naval power rooted in platform-centric thinking and naval power built around networked, distributed, adaptive architectures. China is making that choice. The question is whether America will recognize the revolution happening at sea before it’s too late to respond effectively.

Building a relevant fleet requires moving beyond battleships, not because traditional platforms have no role, but because they cannot, alone, meet the challenges of 21st-century maritime conflict. The sooner America’s defense establishment recognizes this reality, the sooner we can begin building the maritime force that can actually deter the threats we face.

A Paradigm Shift in Maritime Operations: Autonomous Systems and Their Impact