The Risks for European Cohesion in the Russian-Ukrainian crisis

The conflict in Ukraine, triggered by the Russian invasion of 2022, marked the return on a continental scale of a dynamic that many thought had been consigned to the past: the logic of power.

This logic involves the use of military, economic, or technological power to exert influence over other actors. With the rearmament promoted by the United States—which has urged European countries to devote up to 5% of their GDP to defense—the current scenario is evolving from a regional crisis to a conflict that is testing the founding principles of European security, the strength of alliances, and the balance between national sovereignty and supranational cohesion.

In this context, the adoption of rearmament strategies by certain member states, if not supported by a common political vision and a shared strategy, risks producing effects contrary to those sought, generating internal fragmentation and amplifying the risks of escalation.

The military build-up announced by Germany – illustrated by the ReArm Plan and statements by Chancellor Friedrich Merz – marks a historic turning point. It signals the end of a long post-war period during which Berlin chose to project its influence through the economy and European integration rather than through military power.

Today, Germany aims to build the largest conventional army in Europe, lifting internal fiscal constraints to finance this project. However, if this process is not integrated into a coherent European framework, it risks becoming a factor of internal division and an accelerator of external geopolitical tensions.

Paradoxically, the rearmament of European states, designed to strengthen deterrence and consolidate the continent’s security, could have the opposite effect. In the absence of real coordination at the EU level, these unilateral initiatives may weaken mutual trust between member states by accentuating structural inequalities. Countries with sufficient budgetary margins will be able to invest heavily in defense, while others will be forced to reduce resources allocated to vital sectors such as health, education, and the ecological transition.

This imbalance not only undermines the principle of European solidarity, but also fuels the perception—both inside and outside the EU—of a new phase of escalation. Europe, once a guarantor of stability and a promoter of peace, could gradually transform into a player directly involved in the conflict, paving the way for unpredictable scenarios of instability.

Adding to this already worrying situation is another source of tension: the openly interventionist stance of the United Kingdom. Although it left the EU following Brexit, London continues to play a decisive role in providing military support to Ukraine and strengthening its own defense apparatus. The UK has not only significantly increased its military spending, but has also adopted a rhetoric of direct confrontation with Russia, strengthening its strategic presence in Eastern Europe.

This British military protagonism, now freed from intra-European coordination dynamics, is helping to fuel a logic of competitive power on the continent. This logic, if not tempered by a common political vision and a multilateral institutional balance, risks dragging the whole of Europe into a dynamic of progressive confrontation, where deterrence is confused with a willingness to clash.

Finally, the national arms race, if not brought back into a common political perspective, could further fragment the Union. Nationalist tendencies, already exacerbated by economic and cultural crises, would find new impetus in a security perceived as an exclusively sovereign matter. In the absence of a shared strategy, the European Union could become increasingly vulnerable to divergent agendas and asymmetrical alliances that could undermine its authority and unity.

In this context, it is also essential to reflect on the strategic position of the United States. Recent official statements have reaffirmed that the United States is not at war with Russia. It is therefore legitimate to assume that NATO itself would not automatically be involved in an armed conflict involving a member state acting unilaterally in Ukraine.

This strategic ambiguity exposes certain European countries to disproportionate risks, calling into question the very principle of collective security. In particular, the possibility of Russian military action against European targets—as mentioned by Duma officials in response to the hypothetical delivery of German missiles to Ukraine—cannot be ignored.

The construction of a genuine European defense cannot be based on erased memories or strategic automatisms. The recent deployment of a German brigade in Lithuania—the first to be stationed abroad since World War II—took place without any reference to the tragic events of 1941 that marked this region. Forgetting the past does not strengthen security: it weakens it. And rearmament without a common political direction is not deterrence: it is dispersion.

Europe certainly needs credible defense. But it must be consistent with the values and institutions that the Union embodies. We cannot allow the logic of power to prevail over the principle of cooperation. We cannot accept that the drive towards militarization should supplant the prospect of integration.

If our strength is not based on the political legitimacy of the European Union, it risks becoming an instrument of internal division and external destabilization. True European security will not come from imitating 20th-century models, but from our ability to combine strategic responsibility with political cohesion.

Pasquale Preziosa is Expert member of the Eurispes Scientific Committee and Professor of Geostrategy

This piece was originally published in French by The European Review and the English translation was generated by Defense.info.

The featured image is generated by an AI program.