Divergent Paths: A Decade of South and North Korean Arms Exports

The two Korean states have become key players in the evolving global order and in this context their arms export policies play a key role.

South Korea has become a significant global exporter which has expanded its role in shaping a evolving capability working with other democratic states rivaling Europe and challenging classic American dominance of this trade.

For North Korea, their arms exports and foreign engagements have made them an anchor partner in the evolving multi-polar authoritarian world.

This article compares the two countries different approaches which shed light on the changing global order.

South Korea has undergone a remarkable transformation in its defense industry over the past few decades. Originally heavily dependent on the United States for weapons, South Korea has developed a robust domestic defense industry that now ranks as the world’s 8th largest weapons exporter.

This transition reflects both economic and strategic priorities for Seoul.

The country’s ascent in the global arms market has been particularly dramatic in recent years. While exports typically ranged from $2-3 billion annually until 2020, they surged dramatically to $7.3 billion in 2021, then to $17.3 billion in 2022, and $14 billion in 2023.

This represents a 70% increase in South Korean arms exports from 2018-2022 compared to the 2013-2017 period—a growth rate that has astounded military analysts.

“Since the late 2000s and early 2010s, the South Korean government began ambitious efforts to strengthen export-led characteristics in the country’s defense industry,” explains Kim Jae Yeop, Senior Researcher at the Sungkyun Institute for Global Strategy  These efforts were designed not only to boost economic value but also to enhance the industry’s long-term competitiveness in the global market.

South Korea’s success is no accident. It stems from deliberate government policy dating back to the Roh Moo-hyun administration, which established the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) in 2006 to centrally manage the arms industry and improve its global competitiveness. This organization has been instrumental in positioning South Korean defense exports as both an economic driver and a foreign policy tool.

The approach has been multifaceted. South Korean companies like Hanwha, Hyundai Rotem, LIG Nex1, and Korea Aerospace Industries maintain hot production lines primarily serving domestic demands, but these can be easily diverted to fulfill export orders. This production capacity, combined with the government’s willingness to sometimes postpone domestic deliveries to prioritize exports, creates a responsiveness that many competitors cannot match.

Another distinctive feature of South Korea’s export strategy is its flexibility in customizing equipment to client needs, offering technology transfer, and setting up local production facilities This approach has been particularly appealing to countries seeking to develop their own defense industrial capabilities while still acquiring advanced systems.

South Korea has significantly expanded its customer base over the past decade. In 2023, the country exported arms to 12 countries, up from just 4 previously, with the types of weapons systems exported doubling from 6 to 12. Its market now spans multiple regions including Europe, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America.

Major South Korean defense exports include aircraft, artillery, and ships. Specific notable sales include:

• T-50 advanced trainers to Indonesia ($4 billion) and Thailand ($110 million).
• Military vehicles to the Philippines ($345 million).
• K-9 Thunder self-propelled howitzers to India, Turkey, Finland, Norway, Poland, Egypt, and Australia.
• Cheongung II surface-to-air missiles to the UAE ($3.5 billion).

In Latin America, South Korea has employed a unique strategy that includes donations of military equipment. Over the past decade, Seoul has donated corvettes and patrol vessels to Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay, helping to establish relationships that could lead to future sales.

“By maintaining the current strategy that aligns with the unique needs of Latin American countries, the South Korean defense industry could diversify its market and better prepare for an unpredictable future,” notes a 2024 analysis.

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol has set an ambitious target for the country’s defense industry, announcing that South Korea aims to become the world’s fourth-largest arms exporter by 2027. To support this goal, Seoul unveiled a funding package of $770 million to support investment and research.

This growth is supported by further diversification into emerging technologies. As part of its defense industry policy, South Korea has launched the Defense Innovation 4.0 initiative, with a special emphasis on game-changing technologies such as AI and quantum physics.

North Korea has a long history in the international arms market, albeit with a very different character from its southern neighbor. In the 1980s, North Korea emerged as a significant arms exporter of inexpensive, technically unsophisticated, but reliable weapons primarily targeting Third World countries that lacked the resources to develop their own systems. The Middle East was the major market for North Korean arms, with Iran and Libya making most purchases

According to a 1991 Defense Intelligence Agency report, arms sales grossed approximately $4 billion from 1981 to 1989 and comprised over one-third of North Korea’s total export volume in 1982. In the following decade, North Korea expanded into missile and nuclear technology exports.

North Korea’s arms export activities have been severely constrained by international sanctions imposed in response to its nuclear weapons program. The country has been under UN arms embargo since its first nuclear test in 2006. UN Security Council Resolution 1718 imposed bans on the trade of heavy conventional weapons with North Korea. This was expanded in 2009 with UNSCR 1874, which sanctioned all arms and related materiel except for the export of small arms and light weapons (SALW) to North Korea. UNSCR 2270 later prohibited exports of SALW to North Korea in 2016.

The impact of these sanctions has been significant. Analysis of trade data shows that the total amount of SALW exports to North Korea has dramatically decreased since 2016, with no official SALW export records from 2019 through 2021. Regarding North Korea’s exports, the total volume of imports by UN member states decreased from approximately 3.5 million USD to 75,000 USD between 2009 and 2011, though it has shown signs of rebounding since 2015.

While official arms exports have declined, North Korea has maintained illicit arms transfers, with a significant new development being its growing military cooperation with Russia. A turning point occurred on January 4, 2024, when the White House National Security Council spokesman informed reporters that North Korea had provided Russian forces with ballistic missiles, which were used in strikes on Ukrainian targets. The missiles matched the capability of the North Korean KN-23B, the most capable short-range ballistic missile in its arsenal.

As the Russia-Ukraine conflict has continued, evidence of North Korean weapons being used in Ukraine has mounted. According to an analysis by the UK-based Conflict Armament Research, 90 percent of the electronic components recovered from the debris of North Korean missiles used by Russia originated from 26 companies in eight countries, with the United States accounting for the largest share at 75.5 percent.

By early 2024, the scale of this cooperation had increased dramatically. North Korea’s munitions factories are reportedly “operating at full capacity” to produce weapons and shells for Russia, according to South Korea’s defense minister. In contrast, North Korean arms factories for non-Russian exports operate at only 30% capacity due to shortages of raw materials and electricity.

In September 2024, South Korea’s Foreign Minister formally stated that Russia is engaging in illegal arms trade with North Korea, reiterating statements by the United States, Ukraine, and independent analysts that Pyongyang is supplying rockets and missiles in return for economic and other military assistance from Moscow.

This weapons supply relationship was further condemned by NATO leaders in July 2024, who expressed “great concern” over the deepening ties between North Korea and Russia, noting that both North Korea and Iran were “fueling Russia’s war of aggression” against Ukraine by providing direct military support.

Despite the international sanctions regime, North Korea has proven remarkably adept at discovering new ways to circumvent restrictions. According to a 2019 UN report, North Korea has developed a sophisticated criminal network to continue selling arms through a diverse cast of proxies, front companies, and foreign middlemen.

In recent years, North Korea has become a leading arms supplier to the Houthi movement in Yemen and militant groups in Uganda and Sudan, mainly by funneling its merchandise through complex networks. North Korea also heads a robust maritime smuggling ring, as evidenced by the UN’s largest seizure of ammunition in the history of sanctions against North Korea—30,000 rocket-propelled grenades aboard a North Korean vessel en route to Egypt.

“While North Korea’s arms exports to the Middle East continue, [they] are likely waning, but it is difficult to track North Korean arms sales due to how opaque those arms deals have to be,” noted Scott Kardas of Risk Assistance Network Exchange.

The divergent paths of the two Koreas in the global arms market highlight several fundamental characteristics and comparisons.

First, South Korea exports increasingly advanced systems including fighter jets and sophisticated artillery, while North Korea primarily exports legacy Soviet-era technology, artillery, and ballistic missiles.

Second, but the North Korean relationship with Russia has opened the venue for North Korea to more rapidly raise the sophistication of their arms and their participation in the war in Ukraine has given them valuable information about Western weapons systems.

Third, ror South Korea, arms exports represent a strategic economic sector supporting high-skilled jobs, while for North Korea, arms sales are a critical source of hard currency for a heavily sanctioned economy.Conclusion

As South Korea aims for the ambitious goal of becoming the world’s fourth-largest arms exporter by 2027, North Korea appears set to deepen its military cooperation with Russia and other sanctioned states, further cementing its position within the multi-polar authoritarian world.

These divergent paths not only highlight the dramatically different trajectories of the two Korean states but also underscore the complex interplay between arms exports, economic development, and geopolitical standing in today’s world.

Credit featured graphic: ID 35226795 © Steve Allen | Dreamstime.com