Xi Jinping’s Post-Pandemic Playbook: How China’s Leader Is Reshaping Global Order
In the wake of a global pandemic that reshaped international relations and economic structures, Chinese President Xi Jinping has systematically advanced a bold vision for China’s place in the world.
Through a series of ambitious foreign policy initiatives and domestic economic reforms, Xi has sought to position China as an alternative center of global governance while navigating significant economic headwinds at home.
Since 2021, Xi has unveiled three major initiatives that together form the intellectual and strategic foundation of China’s foreign policy:
The Global Development Initiative (GDI)
Launched in September 2021 during Xi’s address to the UN General Assembly, the Global Development Initiative represents China’s effort to reshape international development frameworks. The GDI directly positions itself as supporting the UN’s 2030 Sustainable Development Goals while offering a distinctly Chinese approach to development assistance.
“The GDI aims to support the timely achievement of all 17 SDGs of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development by revitalizing global development partnership, and promoting stronger, greener and healthier global development,” according to official Chinese government statements on the initiative.
Priority areas for the GDI include poverty alleviation, food security, COVID-19 response, financing for development, climate action, and digital economy advancement. By June 2022, China had established a Group of Friends of the GDI at the United Nations and claims support from over 100 countries.
The initiative has faced criticism, however. According to analysis from the Lowy Institute, “despite all the GDI’s references to the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, it’s unclear how the GDI actually advances the existing SDGs. There’s also the risk that the GDI will cherry pick which aspects of the SDGs it advances in line with Beijing’s interests.”
The Global Security Initiative (GSI)
In April 2022, Xi introduced the Global Security Initiative at the Boao Forum, presenting China’s vision for international security governance. The GSI is framed as an alternative to Western security alliances and proposes six core commitments:
- Common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security
- Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries
- Abiding by the UN Charter principles
- Taking all countries’ security concerns seriously
- Peacefully resolving disputes through dialogue
- Maintaining security in both traditional and non-traditional fields.
While Beijing has actively promoted the GSI, particularly to Global South nations, Western analysts note that “Chinese officials have yet to clearly define how the GSI would actually advance the vague security goals it espouses. The initiative appears designed to challenge U.S.-led security arrangements and offer an alternative framework centered on China.
The Global Civilization Initiative (GCI)
Completing Xi’s trilogy of global initiatives, the Global Civilization Initiative was unveiled in May 2023. The GCI advances a relativistic approach to governance systems and human rights, arguing that different civilizations naturally produce different political models.
As reported in Foreign Affairs, the GCI “asserts that states determine rights and that no one country or model has a mandate to control the discourse of human rights.” In this framework, China’s authoritarian governance model is presented as equally valid to Western liberal democracy, with each nation free to choose its own path based on its cultural and historical context.
Xi’s economic policy since the pandemic has been characterized by three major phases: the zero-COVID period, the abrupt reopening, and the current push for technological self-reliance amid economic headwinds.
Throughout the pandemic, Xi personally championed China’s strict zero-COVID approach, describing it as “the most economic and effective policy” for China during a symbolic visit to Wuhan in 2022. The policy became interwoven with Xi’s personal leadership and presented as evidence of the superiority of China’s governing system.
However, the economic consequences were severe. According to analysis from the Al Habtoor Research Centre, “frequent lockdowns, notably in eastern and south-eastern China — the core of Chinese industry and trade — resulted in instability for factories and businesses, challenges for employers, decreased production, factory closures, and less long-term investments.”
By late 2022, economic indicators suggested growth was headed for its worst performance in nearly half a century. This mounting economic pressure, combined with unprecedented public protests, ultimately forced an abrupt policy reversal in December 2022.
In the post-COVID period, Xi has doubled down on technological self-sufficiency. Industrial policies like Made in China 2025 involve state-supported development of strategic high-tech industries to reduce foreign dependence.
According to the Brookings Institution, these policies suggest “that China’s economy will become less economically interdependent with the United States and the global economy” as China moves up the value chain.
Xi has apparently calculated that “doubling down on high technology while eschewing a bailout for the real estate sector will ultimately put China’s economy on a stronger footing over the long term,” despite the short-term economic pain this approach entails.
As of mid-2025, Xi faces a daunting array of economic challenges, including:
- A troubled property sector with major developers facing insolvency.
- High youth unemployment.
- Demographic pressures from an aging population.
- Substantial local government debt.
- Declining foreign investment.
Foreign Policy magazine reported in early 2025 that “economic growth cratered as unemployment, bankruptcies, and capital outflows soared” during 2024, creating significant pressure on Xi’s leadership.
Despite these challenges, Xi has continued to prioritize the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), his signature foreign policy program since 2013. The pandemic prompted a strategic evolution of the BRI rather than a retreat.
“China’s ‘going out’ strategy of encouraging outward investment by Chinese firms was repackaged into the sweeping Belt and Road Initiative, which is now part of the Party constitution and is seen as Xi’s signature foreign policy initiative,” notes the Brookings Institution.
Post-pandemic, the BRI has developed new dimensions including the “Health Silk Road” and increased focus on digital infrastructure. According to Foreign Affairs, “Beijing first announced a version of the Health Silk Road in 2015, but it garnered little attention. In 2020, however, China used the COVID-19 pandemic to breathe new life into the project, with Xi delivering a major address before the World Health Assembly promoting China as a hub for medical resources.”
A defining characteristic of Xi’s approach is the integration of economic and security objectives. The Lowry Institute has noted that his “linking of the GDI with China’s new Global Security Initiative is concerning, inextricably tying development efforts with Beijing’s security interests.”
This integration reflects Xi’s broader vision for China’s international positioning. Prior to his leadership, China avoided suggesting it offered a “model” for other countries. Xi, however, has “explicitly made the case for China as a model,” positioning the country as “qualified to be a leader in shaping a new international order.”
Together, these initiatives reveal Xi’s vision for a post-pandemic world order that challenges Western dominance of global institutions and norms. As Foreign Affairs underscored in March 2025, in Xi’s vision “global institutions and norms will be underpinned by Chinese notions of common security and economic development, Chinese values of state-determined political rights, and Chinese technology.”
Rather than seeking to overthrow existing global institutions, Xi has pursued a two-track approach: working within organizations like the United Nations while simultaneously building parallel structures and initiatives that reflect Chinese priorities.
The success of this strategy remains uncertain. The Council on Foreign Relations notes that “formal support from other states, as reflected in including the GSI in joint documents, is limited” and “the GSI’s implementation has been uneven, especially in Asia, with few regional organizations offering unqualified support.”
As Xi navigates his unprecedented third term as leader, he faces the challenge of balancing grand international ambitions with pressing domestic economic problems. His vision for China’s global leadership is being tested by slowing growth, demographic decline, and international skepticism.
Yet Xi appears determined to press forward with his strategy of positioning China as an alternative pole in global governance. Through the Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, and Global Civilization Initiative, he has articulated a comprehensive vision for a world order with Chinese characteristics—one that offers developing nations an alternative to Western-led institutions and norms.
Whether this vision succeeds will depend not only on China’s economic resilience and diplomatic skill but also on how the existing international order adapts to accommodate or resist Beijing’s ambitions.
What is clear is that Xi Jinping has embarked on his most ambitious chapter yet in reshaping China’s relationship with the world.
Credit featured image: Xi Jinping smiling portrait. Budapest, Hungary – 8th November 2024: wax figurine Xi Jinping in Madame Tussauds in Budapest. General secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since 2012 and as the president of the People s Republic of China since 2013. Previously he served as China s vice president (2008–13).