The Contested Maritime Domain: Challenges for an Integrated Force?
It is fine to have long-range force structure planning, but what happens when the operational environment is rapidly changing for your operational force? How to adapt the ready force effectively and adeptly in a timely manner? And what consequences does that have for one’s long-range force structure design?
The presentation by Jennifer Parker, Expert Associate National Security College of the Australian National University, focused on a key challenge which raises such questions. Her presentation was entitled: “The Contested Maritime Domain: Challenges for an Integrated Force?”
What she focused on was the changing nature of littoral maritime operations, the emergence of new technologies and concepts of operations by various actors notably in the Black and Red Seas, and how those shifts in approach affected maritime operations.
The bottom line of her analysis was that the new technologies and approaches had a clear impact on capital naval vessels, and with relevant defence measures, technologies and relevant training, capital ships could still operate effectively in the littorals. But the point can be put bluntly: you need to adapt your ready force to deal with new technologies, new con-ops and technologies.
And a point outside of her presentation was inherent within it: what is the future of capital ships integrating maritime autonomous systems? For defence? For offense?
Or as I would put it, it is not a question of crewed versus uncrewed vessels. It is about how crewed vessels could leverage offboard assets like maritime autonomous systems or air systems for the projection of effect or defence in depth.
Her first case study was of the Black Sea and contested littoral operations there.
She argued that: The range of the littoral is increasing. Ukraine has effectively used uncrewed surface vessels, cruise missiles and UAVs to target ships at greater ranges.
Now we don’t know the exact ranges of some of the uncrewed surface vessels that Ukraine has operated, but certainly they managed to hit the Kursk bridge at about 300 nautical miles from Ukrainian controlled territory.
That is a dramatic change in terms of the range of the littoral. Ukraine has managed to destroy about 30% of Russia’s Black Sea fleet, and certainly pushed them back from Ukraine and territorial seas and from Crimea, and that’s no mean feat when you look at the USV engagements,
But what must considered is how the Russian ships have defended themselves. They have no countermeasures whatsoever. They’re barely maneuvering or defending themselves…As offensive capability evolves, we need to be working hard on what the defensive capability is and integrating it into our platforms.
She noted as well that USVs can certainly attack ports and port infrastructure. This means that there need to be countermeasures for this new threat as well.
The key takeaways from her analysis were the following:
- Range of the littoral is increasing
- Sea denial strategy in enclosed seas
- Ship preparedness / posture is key
- Balance between development of offensive / defensive balance (capability / counter capability)
- Maritime trade does not stop during conflict
- Importance of port infrastructure protection
Her second case study was of the Red Sea and the approach of the Houthis to disruption in the littorals.
She argued that: The Houthis have been successful in changing the direction of maritime trade. There have been over 100 attacks now on merchant shipping, and 30 of these attacks have managed to sink a couple of ships. This shows the vulnerability of choke points using the kind of systems and technology available to the Houthis. They have attacked but not damaged surface combatants.
She underscored that prepared surface vessels have successfully defended themselves but two problems have been underscored for the ready force. First, the fleet needs to find ways to be rearmed with missiles while at sea. Second, the fleet needs to find much cheaper ways to defeat the unmanned strike force directed against the fleet.
She argued that it was necessary for the ready force to be “stressed tested” by engaging in such deployments to evolve its combat edge.
The key takeaways from her analysis were the following:
- Vulnerability of chokepoints
- Continuing relevance of surface combatants
- Magazine depth / Replenishment at sea
- Integration of counter-drone capabilities
- Importance of stress testing capabilities
- Continuing relevance of convoy operations
- Strategic depth in maritime fleet
- Defence / maritime industry coordination
- Maritime trade doesn’t stop / it evolves
Her third case study was of the PRC actions against the Philippines.
The key takeaways from her analysis were the following:
- Blurring of civil maritime security threats
- Criticality of maritime domain awareness
- Effective presence operations require quantity of forces
- Integration of information operations into wider campaign strategy
And finally she addressed the active threats to sea laid cables which are critical to the information flows globally. Here she asked the poignant question: “Whose responsibility for such defense is this in Australia? And what are we doing about it?”
This challenge is a key one, which parts of NATO are finally addressing in Europe. For example, in the recent NORDIC WARDEN Exercise, the UK and Northern European nations exercised their forces to shape a con-ops to deal with this, although the exercise indicated important technology and force structure gaps to deal with the challenge.
With regard to operations in the Red Sea, she noted:
A number of the European navies who have gone through their workups and gone through their test and evaluation have sent ships to the Red Sea and learned very quickly that their combat systems and their missile systems were not up for the fight and had to withdraw them.
That is something that we want to learn before we are getting multiple missiles shot at us in the event of a more significant conflict.
Parker underscored the really crucial point that when it comes to naval operations, the military and the civilian aspects are intertwined. Australia depends on maritime trade, which will need to continue in times of conflict, and to do so, the military and civilian parts of the equation need to be clearly working together.
She noted: We’ve learned that defence and maritime industry need to coordinate now. That’s something that we consistently relearn, and that has been a key point of the defence of merchant shipping in the Red Sea, and something that Australia needs to think about as we try and grow our maritime industry with strategic fleet…
Maritime trade does not stop in the event of conflict, so the view that we don’t need to worry about it or that we just need to worry about protecting Australia has not borne itself out in our previous world wars and it is not bearing itself out in the Black Sea or the Red Sea.
And what is happening in the west Philippine Sea is a clear blurring of civil maritime security threats. This is something that we need to pay attention to. We currently have a civil maritime strategy. We have a military maritime strategy, and the two don’t connect. It’s not too far to think that an adversary could try to overwhelm Australia’s maritime domain through using what we would continue consider civil maritime threats.
And to Parker’s point about “Ship preparedness / posture is key”: